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This dissertation consists of three chapters on the economics of
law enforcement institutions and policy. In the first chapter, I examine the
importance of individual police oﬃcers to arrest outcomes in interactions with
civilians. I show that the likelihood of an arrest is not only a function of
incident timing, geography, oﬀense type, and other contextual factors but also
critically depends on the identity of the police oﬃcer who responds to a call for
service. Examining detailed data on more than 1,850 police oﬃcers responding
to over 160,000 calls for service from the Dallas Police Department, I find
that oﬃcers vary widely in their arrest behavior, with a 1 standard deviation
increase in an oﬃcer’s propensity to arrest resulting in a 33% increase in the
likelihood that a given incident results in an arrest.
In the second chapter, I investigate the impact of police hiring on
crime rates in municipalities in the U.S. In this chapter, I use a novel esti-
iv
mation approach to which exploits variation in federal Community Oriented
Policing Services (COPS) hiring grants, while also controlling for the endoge-
nous decisions of police departments to apply for these grants. Using data
from nearly 7,000 municipalities, I find that a 10% increase in police employ-
ment rates reduces violent crime rates by 13% and property crime rates by
7%. The results also provide suggestive evidence that law enforcement leaders
are forward-looking.
In the third chapter, I explore the impact of police on student
discipline and academic outcomes. This chapter provides the first causal es-
timate of funding for school police on student outcomes, leveraging variation
in federal Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) grants. Exploiting
detailed data on over 2.5 million students in Texas, I find that funding for po-
lice in public schools results in a small but significant reduction in high school
graduation and college enrollment.
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Chapter 1
“Whose Help is on the Way?”
The Importance of Individual Police Oﬃcers in
Law Enforcement Outcomes
The public’s perception of police fairness is essential to the willing-
ness of citizens to cooperate with the police and is fundamental to establishing
police legitimacy. However, little is known about whether police oﬃcers are
actually fair and impartial in their application of the law. In this paper, I show
that the likelihood of an arrest is not only a function of incident timing, geog-
raphy, oﬀense type, and other contextual factors but also critically depends on
the identity of the police oﬃcer who responds to a call for service. Examining
detailed data on more than 1,850 police oﬃcers responding to over 160,000
calls for service from the Dallas Police Department, I quantify variation in
arrest behavior across individual police oﬃcer decision-makers and relate this
variation to oﬃcer demographic and employment characteristics. I find that
police oﬃcers are important determinants of arrest outcomes, with the vari-
ation in individual oﬃcer behavior accounting for 10-15% of the explainable
variation in arrests. Oﬃcers vary widely in their arrest behavior, with a 1
standard deviation increase in an oﬃcer’s propensity to arrest resulting in a
1
33% increase in the likelihood that a given incident results in an arrest. Ad-
ditionally, I find limited evidence that oﬃcer diﬀerences are driven by racial
bias, a result that may be related to an array of progressive police reforms
that have been adopted by the Dallas Police Department in recent years.
1.1 Introduction
The public’s perception of police fairness is essential to the willing-
ness of citizens to cooperate with the police and is fundamental to establishing
police legitimacy [98, 39].1 In recent years, public trust in police has become
increasingly strained; recent survey evidence finds that less than 30% of indi-
viduals in high-crime and low-income areas believe that police “make fair and
impartial decisions in the cases they deal with” or that police “make decisions
based on the law and not their personal opinions or beliefs” [67]. Distrust in
police is related to the perception that oﬃcers are racially biased; according to
national polling, 69% of Black and 54% of Hispanic Americans think that “po-
lice tend to target minorities,” compared to only 29% of White Americans [93].
In 2015, American confidence in police oﬃcers reached its lowest point in more
than 20 years, driven by high profile police use-of-force incidents and shootings
[61]. In the ensuing debate, pundits have often made conflicting claims about
1Survey based research in criminology finds that when civilians believe that they have
been treated fairly by the police, a concept often termed “procedural justice,” they may be
more likely to cooperate with police oﬃcers, and this cooperation may have benefits for
public safety [98, 39].
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the causes of these high profile police incidents, sometimes asserting that “any
oﬃcer would have responded in the same way” and at other times claiming
that the events are “isolated incidents attributable to ‘bad actors’ that do not
reflect the rest of a department.”2
However, little is known about whether police oﬃcers are actually
fair and impartial in their application of the law. On a more basic level, there
is scant evidence of whether oﬃcer decisions actually matter to the outcomes
of police interactions after considering the context of an incident. Further,
if police oﬃcer decisions do matter, little is known about how much oﬃcers
diﬀer from each other in their actions. If there are diﬀerences in police oﬃcer
behavior, how large are these diﬀerences? Is oﬃcer arrest behavior character-
ized by racial bias, and if so, how important is racial bias in explaining oﬃcer
diﬀerences?
Managers in police departments face a similar principal-agent prob-
lem as managers in firms; they are impacted by the behavior of individual
oﬃcers but cannot fully control oﬃcers’ actions given limited resources. Un-
derstanding the trade-oﬀs between alternative monitoring policies is an im-
portant area of study, particularly in the setting of policing, where there are
2This phrasing is not directly attributed to any single pundit or public figure. An example
of the first argument can be found in opinion pieces through the organization Blue Lives
Matter, which was established as a reaction to the Black Lives Matter movement [8]. The
second argument was recently invoked by Attorney General Sessions as a reason to cease the
Department of Justice’s enforcement of consent decree agreements with police departments,
which were established to address civil rights concerns related to law enforcement actions
[26].
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large potential consequences for both public safety and civilians that interact
with the police. This paper measures the scope of individual police oﬃcers
to impact law enforcement outcomes, a necessary first step to clarifying these
trade-oﬀs.
Police oﬃcers often operate in the field, alone or in small groups,
and have substantial legal latitude in their conduct and response to diﬀerent
situations. At the same time, police departments are increasingly incorpo-
rating technology and data to standardize operations, potentially limiting the
importance of individual oﬃcer decisions in police work.3 The ability of po-
lice oﬃcers to invest eﬀort diﬀerently across incident types can be a productive
form of police discretion when police resources are limited and there is a trade-
oﬀ between exerting eﬀort on serious and non-serious crimes. However, within
particular incident types, behavioral diﬀerences across oﬃcers are more likely
to result from diﬀerences in oﬃcer skills, experience, and preferences. This
study is the first to estimate the degree and importance of police discretion
across oﬃcers, conditional on incident context.
I analyze police oﬃcer behavior using a sample of over 160,000
3Criminologists have long noted that police work is characterized by discretion, with
researchers adopting a broad definition of discretion that encompasses variation in work-
related decisions, interpretation and implementation of the law, and the use of extra-legal
factors, such as suspect race, in decision-making [85, 39, 75]. Technological advancements
have increased police reliance on data for surveillance of suspects, tracking and monitoring
of police employee activities, automation of reporting, and focusing patrol on areas with
high oﬀending rates, or crime “hot spots.” Advancements in technology have the potential
to exacerbate diﬀerences in police treatment of civilians, or could serve to reduce police
discretion [10, 58].
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calls for service (or 9-1-1 calls) and approximately 1,850 police oﬃcers from
the Dallas Police Department in Texas. I estimate the contribution of indi-
vidual oﬃcers to predicting arrests, controlling for detailed information on the
characteristics of incidents, including call urgency and dispatch code, com-
plainant characteristics, and time and geographic factors. I then isolate each
police oﬃcers’ propensity to make arrests and estimate the degree of dispersion
in this propensity across oﬃcers. Throughout the analysis, I pay particular
attention to patterns of oﬃcer sorting to particular incident types, and con-
duct a number of robustness checks to verify that the observed dispersion in
arrest behavior across oﬃcers is not due to selection.
I find that a 1 standard deviation increase in an oﬃcer’s perma-
nent arrest propensity results in a 33% increase in the likelihood that any
given incident results in an arrest, suggesting there is substantial variabil-
ity in police oﬃcer responses to similar incidents. Further, this variation in
individual police oﬃcer behavior accounts for approximately 10-15% of the
explainable variation in incident arrest outcomes. Observable oﬃcer charac-
teristics, including salary, experience, age, race and gender, account for only a
small portion of the variation in oﬃcer arrest behavior.
In economics, research on police decision-making has largely fo-
cused on measuring racial bias in police traﬃc stops [e.g. 56, 4, 5, 46, 6, 48, 65].
New work by [40] extends this literature to oﬃcer decisions to use violent force.
Collectively, this literature has found mixed evidence that police oﬃcers ex-
5
hibit taste-based preferences for racial discrimination, with results that vary
by study setting and the test used to detect racial bias. While the literature
has frequently exploited aggregate oﬃcer demographic characteristics, nearly
all of the work in this space does not incorporate oﬃcer identity in measuring
racial bias.4
I find limited evidence of taste-based racial bias among oﬃcers,
despite the fact that I document large diﬀerences in total arrest behavior across
oﬃcers. I adapt a test of racial bias proposed in [6] to the regression framework
in my study and fail to find systematic patterns of racial bias. Moreover, oﬃcer
race is not a particularly important factor in explaining diﬀerences in oﬃcer
behavior. These results may be attributable to progressive police reforms that
have been adopted by the Dallas Police Department in recent years, including
implicit racial bias training, de-escalation training, and the use of body-worn
cameras.
In addition to providing the first estimate of oﬃcer-level police
discretion, this paper makes several other contributions. First, the analysis
in this study uses responses to calls for service that are originated by civilian
complainants, a setting that researchers have not exploited to study police
decision-making.5 I am able to explicitly measure the importance of oﬃcers
4An exception is the working paper by [47], that measures individual oﬃcer specific
eﬀects in its test of racial bias applied to oﬃcer decisions to issue speeding tickets.
5To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study that uses high frequency call data to
study police oﬃcer behavior and decisions. Prior papers using 9-1-1 call data have examined
a number of other topics, including the the impact of high profile use-of-force incidents on
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versus incident context because the incident setting is given at the time of the
response and is therefore not manipulable by responding oﬃcers. With the
exception of [104], who studies racial bias of state troopers who are randomly
dispatched to motor vehicle accidents, researchers in economics have typically
restricted their attention to interactions that are initiated by police oﬃcers,
such as general traﬃc stops, stop and frisk interviews, and speeding tickets.
Importantly, these interactions are a choice variable of the police oﬃcers in-
volved. A growing body of research finds that race can also be a factor in
police decisions to make traﬃc (or pedestrian) stops, and that studies that
focus only on the outcomes of traﬃc stops neglect to consider police discretion
that contributes to sample selection [56, 46, 48]. A major advantage of using
call for service data to study police discretion is that each observed incident
is originally initiated by a complainant and not by a police oﬃcer.
An additional contribution of this study is the number and vari-
ety of policing outcomes that I examine. Unlike traﬃc stops, call for service
data provides a diverse cross-section of police work, allowing examination of
responses to diﬀerent types of crime and incidents. The data allows measure-
ment of outcomes related to suspect identification, arrest charge severity, and
time spent by oﬃcers responding to incidents. Detailed demographic informa-
complainant crime reporting [27], forecasts of temporal and spatial patterns of 9-1-1 call
activity [17], police patrol optimization in hot-spots [100], and factors that aﬀect response
time to calls for service [69]. [12] use a similar data set from the Dallas Police Department
covering calls between 2000-2007 to study whether increases in crime cause future crime,
at the neighborhood level. [102] also uses Dallas Police Department data from 2009 on 911
calls and patrol car location to examine the impact of police presence on crime rates.
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tion on oﬃcers, arrestees, and civilian complainants also provide rich controls
in the model and enable tests of racial bias.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 summarizes institu-
tional features of the Dallas Police Department and the data sets used in this
study. Section 1.3 describes the empirical model and estimation approach.
Section 3.4.1 provides summary statistics of the data and setting. Section 1.5
details the findings related to the importance of individual oﬃcers in determin-
ing arrest outcomes and the dispersion in oﬃcer arrest behavior. Section 1.6
extends the analysis to test for the presence of racial bias among oﬃcers. Sec-
tion 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Institutional Background and Description of Data
1.2.1 Dallas Police Department Data
The setting for this study is the Dallas Police Department in Texas.
Dallas is a large and diverse urban center, with over 1.2 million residents and a
population that is 42% Hispanic, 24% Black and 29% White [14].6 Crime rates
in the city of Dallas are similar to other cities of its size in the U.S., with 694
violent crimes and 3,440 property crimes per 100,000 residents in 2015 [36].
Given its large population, the Dallas Police Department responds to between
4,000 - 7,000 calls for service each month.
6I capitalize Black, Hispanic, and White for stylistic consistency throughout the paper.
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In recent years, the Dallas Police Department (DPD) has become
a model of police reform following changes spear-headed by Chief David O.
Brown (2010-2016). DPD’s reform eﬀorts have included increasing oﬃcer
training requirements in de-escalation techniques and racial bias in policing,
employing body cameras, and firing some of its most poorly performing oﬃcers
[52, 97]. Though Dallas shares several characteristics with other large cities
across the country, the progressive nature of the department is relevant when
interpreting the results of this study.
To improve accountability and transparency in the department,
DPD joined the Obama Administration’s Police Data Initiative in 2015 and
released a number of data sets on its operations. This project uses public
data released by DPD covering responses to reported incidents, records of
persons involved in incidents (suspects and complainants), and arrests between
December 2014 and mid-October 2017.7
Each call incident can be linked to a location, dispatch code, the
time a call was placed, and the time and duration of the call response. Inci-
dents are then linked to complainants, suspects and arrestees, using data that
includes names and demographics of each of these groups. Most important for
this project, the data also includes the names and badge numbers of oﬃcers
7Given that data transparency is a relatively new DPD initiative, there is limited docu-
mentation describing the data releases. To interpret the data sets, I worked with personnel
at DPD to better understand the data sets used in this project as well as the department
protocols relevant to police responses to calls for service.
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who respond to calls for service.
The DPD incident data is a partially restricted subset of the uni-
verse of call for service incidents. For privacy reasons, the DPD data files
exclude records for sexually-oriented oﬀenses, oﬀenses involving juveniles, and
oﬀenses involving social service referrals.8 I use a liberal definition of arrests,
coding an incident as having an arrest if any of the files indicate that an arrest
was made. I supplement the DPD data sets with demographic information
on police oﬃcers obtained through an Open Records Request to the city of
Dallas. The Open Records Request data includes oﬃcer race, gender, salary,
and job title (see Data Appendix C.2 for more detail).
1.2.2 Protocols for Dispatch and Call Response
When a civilian calls DPD for police assistance, they are connected
to a 9-1-1 call-taker. The call-taker then creates an active call report that
summarizes important facts related to the incident, including the incident lo-
cation, and relevant descriptions of the events. Active call reports also include
a dispatch code that categorizes the incident/oﬀense type.
8Further, the raw incident files represent records of all incidents reported to the police,
and include some incidents that do not originate with calls from civilian complainants. To
address this issue, I use information on the identity of the complainant and the dispatch code
to exclude records that are likely to originate with a police oﬃcer rather than a complainant,
or are unlikely to be initiated through a phone call to DPD. Examples of these exclusions
include calls for service to assist an oﬃcer on another call or incident and calls originated
by the Dallas Police Department or City of Dallas (listed as complainant).
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Given a set of open active calls, DPD dispatchers then work with
police oﬃcers to assign available oﬃcers to incidents. Calls are dispatched
according to their priority, or the level of severity and urgency of the incident.
When there is a long call queue, responses to low priority calls are postponed
until more serious calls have been resolved. The pool of available oﬃcers when
a call is received depends on patrol responses to other incidents at the time.
Figure A.1 depicts the steps involved in responding to a call for service in
Dallas.
Patrol oﬃcers are the primary responders to calls for service. Oﬃ-
cers are assigned to work in 1 of 7 police divisions in the city for 8-hour shifts,
or watches, from 12am-8am, 8am-4pm, or 4pm-12am.9 Regular patrol shift
schedules are set once a year, based on the seniority of oﬃcers.10 Depending on
the needs of the department, oﬃcers may also choose to work overtime patrol
shifts outside of their regular shift schedules, though these shifts are also set in
advance, typically a month or a week prior.11 With minimal exceptions, calls
9Patrol oﬃcers are assigned to work in particular police sectors, a sub-area of a division,
under a sector sergeant (there are 35 sectors in total). Depending on the sector, patrol
oﬃcers may also be assigned to work in a beat within the sector during a shift (234 beats in
total). Despite sector assignments, patrol oﬃcers may be called to respond to any call within
their division. The three 8-hour shifts listed are approximate, in practice some oﬃcers work
10 hour shifts and other oﬃcers have start and end times that are slightly staggered across
police “watches.”
10Oﬃcers can bid to change their shift assignments each December. Changes are assigned
based on oﬃcer seniority and take eﬀect at the end of January or beginning of February in
the following year. New oﬃcers that are still in field training or have recently graduated
from the police academy, “rookies,” are not eligible to petition for shift changes.
11“Call-answering” overtime initiatives are designed to address anticipated increases in
call volume, most often in the summer months. Sometimes these patrol initiatives may
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are assigned to patrol oﬃcers who work within the geographic police division
where the call incident occurred.
Oﬃcers typically conduct patrol in police cars, alone or in pairs.
At the beginning of each shift, oﬃcers may choose to patrol with another
oﬃcer, depending on the number of cars available for that shift. Each car is
considered an “element” that can be dispatched to an incident. Throughout a
shift, paired oﬃcers respond to all calls together.
If more than one patrol element is available to respond to an inci-
dent at the time of dispatch, dispatchers consider a number of factors in their
assignment of available oﬃcers. More serious incidents may require or benefit
from a response by multiple oﬃcers. Additionally, oﬃcers who are geograph-
ically close to an incident are more likely to be dispatched to the incident,
especially if the call is urgent. At the same time, depending on availability,
oﬃcers may volunteer to take particular calls as they are posted. If oﬃcers
choose to respond to calls based on incident characteristics that are unobserv-
able and high (low) arrest oﬃcers choose incidents with a high (low) likelihood
of arrest, then oﬃcer sorting will lead to an upward bias in the estimate of dis-
persion in oﬃcer arrest behavior. To address this concern, I conduct a series
of tests to verify that oﬃcer sorting does not aﬀect the empirical estimates
(see Section 1.5.1.1).
work to target a particular oﬀense, such as burglary. In some cases, overtime shifts may be
announced only a couple of days in advance, but the typical lead time is a week or a month.
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When the assigned patrol element arrives at the scene of the inci-
dent, the responding oﬃcer(s) gather information, investigate the scene and
assist the complainant or victim. In serious incidents, assisting oﬃcers may be
called to the scene, through the request of the responding oﬃcer or dispatcher,
or because an additional oﬃcer volunteers to participate in the call.12 First
responders are responsible for coordinating other oﬃcers that may arrive at
the scene as well as filing the incident report when the response has concluded.
After the first responder files the incident report, it is submitted
to a staﬀ reviewer at DPD who examines the incident report for completeness.
After this initial review, the incident may be assigned to a detective in an
investigative unit based on the oﬀense type. The assigned detective will then
pursue additional investigation of the incident if warranted.
Over the course of an incident response, oﬃcers determine whether
a criminal oﬀense has occurred and may identify a suspect and/or make an
arrest. Alternatively, an arrest may be made at a later date after a detective
takes over responsibility for a follow-up investigation of the incident. A sus-
pect is identified in 17% of incidents, and 9% of incidents result in an arrest.
Individual responding oﬃcers have the ability to influence arrests directly, by
making the decision to apprehend an individual at the scene of the incident,
12If the responding oﬃcer is patrolling alone, this oﬃcer is designated as the first respon-
der, and if there are two responding oﬃcers, one oﬃcer in the pair is designated as the
first responder. Typically, one oﬃcer in a pair is designated as the first responder for the
duration of the shift.
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or indirectly, by laying the groundwork for an investigation by gathering in-
formation for the incident report. In practice, most arrests do not involve a
prolonged follow-up investigation and the responding oﬃcer is typically in-
volved in the arrest.13
1.3 Empirical Model
I focus on two metrics to assess the importance of individual oﬃcers
in arrest outcomes. First, I measure the collective importance of individual
oﬃcers’ arrest propensities in predicting arrest outcomes. Second, I estimate
each oﬃcer’s permanent arrest propensity and measure the dispersion in per-
manent arrest propensity across oﬃcers. The first measure summarizes how
important individual oﬃcer decisions are relative to the context of an incident,
while the second measure captures how diﬀerent oﬃcers are from one another.
As a first step, I estimate the following linear probability model,
Arrestikgt = ✓i + ✓j + ⇡Xkt +  gt +  g + "ikgt
where i indexes the responding oﬃcer, j indexes a co-responding oﬃcer (if
present), k indexes the incident, g indexes geographic location, and t indexes
13When there is information on the time of arrest and arresting oﬃcer, 93% of arrests occur
within a day of the response to the call and 95% of arrests involve the original responding
oﬃcer. The first rate is imputed from direct information on arrest oﬃcers and arrest dates
when available, as well as the data upload date for an arrest record when not available.
Information on the oﬃcers that executed an arrest is available for approximately 40% of
arrests in the data.
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time. The outcome Arrestikgt is the primary focus of the analysis and de-
notes whether an arrest was made in association with the incident. Xkt are a
set of incident specific characteristics, including 15 aggregated dispatch codes
or incident type categories and 11 location type codes (e.g. street or resi-
dence). Xkt also contains complainant characteristics, including the number
of complainants, whether there was a victim injury, and the race and gender
of complainants.14 Further, Xkt includes indicators for the number of hours
that have passed since a patrol shift began. Importantly, the model also con-
trols for the urgency or severity of the call, defined as the number of minutes
that pass between when a call occurs and the time of dispatch. This urgency
measure enters the model as both a linear and quadratic term, to account for
non-linear relationships between call urgency and arrests.
I include controls for the police beat where an incident occurred,
 g, to control for time-constant diﬀerences in arrest patterns that are location
specific. There are 234 beats in Dallas and each is fully contained within 1 of
the 7 police divisions in the city.
I also include a set of shift specific controls,  gt, to capture time-
varying location-specific arrest patterns that are associated with specific shift
assignments. These variables are Police Division* Day-of-the-Week* 8-hour
Shift* Month* Year fixed eﬀects. To increase power, I do not include a separate
14For calls with multiple complainants, I define each complainant variable using the max-
imum value for the complainant group, allowing complainants to have multiple races and
genders.
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indicator for each individual shift, but rather aggregate them into month by
year groups. For example, the four Tuesday evening shifts in the Central
Division are grouped in January 2016. These shift variables flexibly control
for unobservables at the shift level that vary over time.15
✓i measures the time-invariant or permanent arrest propensity of
oﬃcer i. Given the numerous controls in the empirical model, ✓i represents
an oﬃcer specific eﬀect that is measured within incident type, shifts, and ge-
ographic location. In cases when there are two responding oﬃcers, I include a
control for the identity of the other responding oﬃcer, ✓j. Observations with
two responders are duplicated, so that each oﬃcer gets a record of partici-
pating in the incident response through the ✓i term. This procedure allows
measurement of individual oﬃcer eﬀects net of the eﬀects of a co-responder,
using a model similar to prior work on peer eﬀects in production [e.g. 94, 74].
In this way, the specification addresses omitted variable bias related to police
oﬃcer decisions to pair with another oﬃcer, as well as potential direct eﬀects
15Because of the large number of fixed eﬀects in the model, I employ a fixed eﬀect es-
timation algorithm. In the base model, there are 217,633 observations, 1,851 first oﬃcer
categories, 2,337 second oﬃcer categories, 5,143 shift categories and 234 beats (after ex-
cluding singletons). I use an algorithm developed in [23] to estimate the set of fixed eﬀects
indirectly through an iterative procedure that provides a point estimate value for each fixed
eﬀect. Rather than estimating the model’s fixed eﬀects by including corresponding indicator
variables as controls in the model, this algorithm eﬀectively initializes each fixed eﬀect within
a fixed eﬀect group, and then iterates the estimation until both the sum of squared residuals
is minimized and the coeﬃcient on each set of fixed eﬀect terms is 1. This procedure is pro-
grammed in the STATA command reghdfe, and is notable among similar algorithms for
its fast computation time. This algorithm shares features with other procedures that have
been used to estimate multiple high-dimensional fixed eﬀects [e.g. 44, 45, 50]. I estimate all
sets of fixed eﬀects in the model jointly in this way, or ✓i, ✓j ,  gt and  g.
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attributable to the co-responder.16 I restrict the sample to observations where
the oﬃcers responding have at least 25 incident records to improve precision
in the estimation of ✓i.17
Using this model, I calculate the two metrics of importance in
this study. First, I measure the importance of the ✓i terms as predictors
in the model, by calculating the proportion of explainable variation that is
attributable to these parameters. I do this by estimating the R2 (and Adjusted
R2) from the full model and the model without ✓i and ✓j terms included. I
then calculate the proportion of the total R2 (and Adjusted R2) given by the
including oﬃcer fixed eﬀects: (R2total R2w/oFE)/R2total. I interpret this ratio as
the relative importance of individual oﬃcers in explaining the model variation
in arrest outcomes.
Second, I calculate the dispersion in oﬃcer-level permanent arrest
propensity as the standard deviation of the distribution of ✓i across oﬃcers. In
16The results in this paper are robust to two alternate formulations that exclude fixed
eﬀect terms for co-responders, ✓j . These alternate specifications are (1) observations that
are duplicated when there are co-responders but exclude co-responder fixed eﬀects and (2)
observations that are not duplicated when there are co-responders but only consider eﬀects
from the first listed responder. Formulation (2) further restricts the sample and excludes
usable observations for oﬃcers, limiting the number of oﬃcer eﬀects estimates from 1,851
to 1,692. The preferred model oﬃcer eﬀects are highly correlated to the oﬃcer eﬀects
from alternate formulations with correlations of 0.77-0.85. The baseline specification is
preferred to these alternate formulations because it allows both responders to contribute
to the outcome and more accurately measures individual oﬃcer eﬀects by adjusting for
potential contributions of co-responders.
17This restriction excludes 4% of incidents in the sample, but allows estimation of fixed
eﬀects to be based on a reasonable number of observations per oﬃcer. 5% of co-responder
incidents include only records for only one responder given this restriction. Further limiting
the sample to exclude these “one-sided” incidents does not aﬀect the results.
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order to establish a conservative estimate of police oﬃcer dispersion, I adjust
the estimates of ✓i terms using Empirical Bayes techniques.18 Broadly, Em-
pirical Bayes methods consider each observation of oﬃcer arrest propensity
as a noisy estimate of each oﬃcer’s true arrest propensity and shrink those
estimates that are less precise towards the expected value of the distribution
oﬃcer arrest propensity across all oﬃcers. In this setting, the expected value
of the distribution of oﬃcer arrest propensity is zero because oﬃcer eﬀects are
defined in relative terms (given that a constant is included in the model). This
procedure both improves precision in the estimates of the ✓i terms and estab-
lishes a conservative estimate of dispersion in police oﬃcer arrest behavior.
I calculate the adjusted estimates of ✓i using the following steps.
First, I consider the model above as a first stage and construct a composite
residual term rˆikgt = ✓ˆi+"ˆikgt, and an average oﬃcer residual, r¯i = 1Ni
P
Ni
rˆikgt.
This residual is estimated using a model that includes oﬃcer fixed eﬀects in
the first stage to allow for arbitrary correlations between responding oﬃcers
and the other covariates in the model, in a manner similar to [16]. Using these
residuals, I calculate the adjusted oﬃcer arrest propensity using the following
transformation:
✓ˆEBi =
 2A
 2A +
 2",i
Ni
· r¯i
 2A =  
2
r    2"
18Empirical Bayes shrinkage estimates are often used in the economics of education liter-
ature measuring teacher value added [e.g. 66, 16, 62, 1].
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where  2r is computed using the sample analog of the average squared com-
posite residual and  2" is the average squared within oﬃcer composite residual,
each calculated from the first stage model. The “shrinkage factor,”  2A/( 2A +
 2",i
Ni
), adjusts oﬃcer arrest propensity toward zero when the number of ob-
servations per oﬃcer, Ni, is small, or the variation in the oﬃcer eﬀect,  2",i,
is large. The ✓ˆEBi values represent a “posterior” distribution of oﬃcer eﬀects,
correcting for sampling noise in the estimation (see Appendix A.3 for more de-
tail). I calculate dispersion in oﬃcer arrest behavior as the standard deviation
of these adjusted oﬃcer eﬀects. Dispersion in the adjusted oﬃcer eﬀects will
be smaller than dispersion in the unadjusted eﬀects because the adjustment
shrinks noisier estimates towards the mean of the distribution. Throughout
this paper, I focus on results using these adjusted estimates, and refer to these
adjusted estimates as ✓ˆi. The results are not an artifact of this adjustment
though and are qualitatively similar when unadjusted fixed eﬀects from the
first stage are used.
1.4 Summary Statistics
Tables 1.1.A and 1.1.B summarize the data used in the analysis.
The first column covers the total sample at the incident-level, while the second
column covers the analysis sample, which restricts the sample to oﬃcers with
25 or more incident responses and duplicates observations with two respond-
ing oﬃcers. The analysis sample includes over 215,000 observations for 1,851
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oﬃcers.
Black, White, and Hispanic complainants are each involved in a
third of the incidents in the sample, with an average number of 1.6 com-
plainants per incident. Black and White complainants are overrepresented
relative to the Dallas population, which is over 40% Hispanic. In contrast,
White patrol oﬃcers respond to 50% of incidents, while Black and Hispanic
oﬃcers respond to 25% and 20% of incidents, respectively. Approximately a
third of arrest incidents involve arrestees who are Black, 10% who are His-
panic, and 10% who are White, when proportions are calculated relative to
total arrests. Relative to the sample of incidents with demographic informa-
tion for arrestees, 48% of arrestees are Black, 16% are White, and 16% are
Hispanic.19 White oﬃcers and Black arrestees are over-represented in police
incidents relative to the population of Dallas.
The average oﬃcer arrest rate as a portion of his responses is 11%.
Approximately 5% of incident responses involve a police oﬃcer in training,
2% involve a police sergeant, and 15% involve a female oﬃcer. Over 76% of
incident arrests include an arrest for a misdemeanor oﬀense and a third of
incident arrests include a felony arrest. Averaged across incident responses,
DPD patrol oﬃcers earn approximately $60,000 per year. About a third of
incident responses involve two responding oﬃcers.
19Demographic information is not available for each arrest in the data, and covers ap-
proximately 70% of arrests.
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On average, it takes 24-25 minutes for a patrol oﬃcer to be dis-
patched to an incident after a call is made, with a standard deviation of 28
minutes. The variation in this dispatch time lag highlights the fact that dis-
patchers prioritize calls based on their severity and that oﬃcers cannot im-
mediately respond to all incidents. The most common dispatch codes are for
burglaries of motor vehicles and residences. At the time of dispatch, only a
small number of incidents are designated as known violent oﬀenses; robberies,
criminal assaults, armed encounters, and active shootings collectively comprise
less than 10% of incidents. A victim is injured in less than 10% of incidents.
Overall, the samples summarized in Tables 1.1.A and 1.1.B are
very similar. The only material diﬀerence is mechanical; the analysis sample
has a larger number of observations with 2 responding oﬃcers, because these
incidents are duplicated in this sample. This consistency suggests it is suitable
to generalize results in the analysis sample.
1.5 Importance of Individual Oﬃcers and Dispersion in
Oﬃcer Behavior
1.5.1 Baseline Results
I find that the context of a call for service is relatively more im-
portant in predicting an arrest than the identity of the oﬃcer that responds
to the call. However, individual oﬃcers are also a significant determinant of
arrest outcomes. As discussed earlier, I measure the collective importance of
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individual oﬃcers to predicting arrest outcomes of incidents, by comparing the
proportion of variation explained with and without oﬃcer fixed eﬀects in the
model of arrest outcomes.
Figure 1.1 shows the contribution of diﬀerent controls to the total
model R2 and Adjusted R2. I estimate these relative proportions sequentially
from the bottom bar to the top, first adding the patrol shift fixed eﬀects and
indicators for hours passed since the beginning of a shift ( gt and hour indi-
cators in Xkt), then the police beat location fixed eﬀects ( g), followed by the
dispatch call types and call severity variables, location type variables, com-
plainant characteristics (each components of Xkt), and lastly the oﬃcer fixed
eﬀects (✓i and ✓j). Each percentage is calculated as an additional contribution
of R2 to the total or: (R2currentbar R2priorbar)/R2total. The explanatory power of
the oﬃcer fixed eﬀects is therefore the relative contribution of these controls
after controlling for all other variables in the model.
I find that the oﬃcer fixed eﬀects account for 11.9% of the explain-
able variation measured using Adjusted R2 and 16.5% of explainable variation
measured using R2. Factors specific to an incident, including dispatch code,
call severity, location type and complainant characteristics, account for 57 -
69% of the explainable variation in the model. Geography and time variables
associated with an incident account for 19 - 26% of the model variation. A
detailed discussion of the first stage covariate estimates, Xkt, can be found in
Appendix A.2.
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Because the order of adding variables matters to calculating R2, I
add individual oﬃcer eﬀects to the model last to ensure that the estimate of
oﬃcer importance is as conservative as possible. The total R2 and Adjusted R2
of the model is 0.23 and 0.2, respectively, suggesting that oﬃcer eﬀects explain
2.4 - 3.8% of the total variation in arrests. When oﬃcer fixed eﬀects are the
only controls in the model, they can explain 6.2 - 8% of the total variation in
arrests.
Next, I show that individual police oﬃcers vary substantially in
their arrest behavior. Figure 1.2 shows the estimated distribution of oﬃcer
eﬀects, ✓ˆi, calculated using the procedure described in Section 1.3. For each
oﬃcer, ✓ˆi represents his/her permanent or time-invariant arrest propensity,
conditional on time and geography controls and incident, location, and com-
plainant characteristics. This estimated distribution has a longer right tail,
showing that a small number of oﬃcers have especially high arrest propensi-
ties.
Swapping an oﬃcer that has a low arrest propensity with one that
has a high arrest propensity can critically change the outcome of a call re-
sponse. Given that 10.9% of sample observations result in an arrest, with a
standard deviation of 0.311, a 1 standard deviation in ✓ˆi corresponds to 0.11
standard deviations in the total arrest outcome. Additionally, a 1 standard
deviation increase in oﬃcer arrest propensity corresponds to 0.23 standard
deviations in the variation in arrest outcomes predicted by the model. In per-
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centage terms, a 1 standard deviation increase in an oﬃcer’s arrest propensity
results in a 32.8% increase in the likelihood that a given incident results in an
arrest. Further, moving from the 10th to 90th percentile in the oﬃcer fixed
eﬀect distribution translates to a 76% increase in arrest probability.
Given of the richness of the data used in this project, I am able
to extend the analysis to a number of other policing outcomes of interest.
Table A.2 extends the analysis to seven additional outcomes: identification of
a suspect, arrest for a felony oﬀense, arrest for a misdemeanor oﬀense, arrests
made by an oﬃcer that responds to an incident alone, arrests in urgent and
non-urgent calls (defined by splitting the sample at the median call urgency),
and the amount of time spent by an oﬃcer responding to an incident. Oﬃcers
responding to calls are involved in identifying the appropriate suspect and
making an arrest of the culpable party. Individual oﬃcers are important to
the determination of each of these outcomes, and there is substantial variation
across individual oﬃcers in the likelihood that each outcome occurs.
The oﬃcer eﬀects, ✓ˆi,y, estimated for each of the additional out-
comes, y, are positively correlated with the ✓ˆi distribution for the base arrest
outcome, with correlation coeﬃcients of 0.55 - 0.84.20 An exception is the
oﬃcer eﬀect for time spent responding to an incident, which is virtually un-
correlated with arrest propensity, ✓ˆi. Panel (B) of Table A.2 shows that oﬃcer
20Additionally, the oﬃcer eﬀects estimated for a given oﬃcer across all observations, ✓i,
and as a co-responder, ✓j , are strongly related with a correlation of 0.71.
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eﬀects for felony and misdemeanor arrests are also uncorrelated, implying that
these actions are trade-oﬀs and that oﬃcers with high misdemeanor arrest
propensities will not necessarily exhibit high felony arrest propensities. Like-
wise, oﬃcer eﬀects across urgent and non-urgent call settings are not strongly
related. Aside from these relationships, oﬃcer eﬀects derived from these dif-
ferent outcomes are largely positively correlated. Extending the analysis to
these additional policing outcomes shows that oﬃcers exhibit heterogeneity
across diﬀerent dimensions of police work.
1.5.1.1 Tests of Oﬃcer Sorting to Incidents
As discussed above, the fact that patrol oﬃcers can choose to re-
spond to certain incidents creates a potential concern. While I control for
an array of observable characteristics, if oﬃcers systematically sort to calls
based on the unobservable characteristics of incidents, the estimates of indi-
vidual oﬃcer arrest propensity could be biased. Two sorting patterns appear
plausible, first, oﬃcers who have a high arrest propensity may volunteer for
incidents with a high likelihood of arrest, and second, oﬃcers who have a low
arrest propensity may volunteer for incidents with a low likelihood of arrest.
In either case, the estimates of ✓ˆi will be positively correlated with the error
terms "ikgt and inflate the dispersion in oﬃcer fixed eﬀects, ✓ˆi.
To address this concern, I conduct four tests of oﬃcer sorting in the
analysis. First, I focus two diﬀerent settings where oﬃcer sorting is less likely
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to impact the results. If sorting is driving the results, estimates of dispersion
should be smaller in settings where sorting is less likely. The first setting I
consider consists of incidents that are dispatched when few oﬃcers are available
to respond to calls, so oﬃcers have less choice in their responses. I define this
“Low Availability” sub-sample by counting the number of unavailable oﬃcers
that are responding to other incidents at the time of each incident, using
information on the time oﬃcers spend responding to prior incidents. I then
keep incidents that have more unavailable oﬃcers than the median value within
a patrol shift*month cell,  gt, to account for variation in total staﬃng across
shifts.
In the second setting, I focus on incidents where an oﬃcer’s ob-
served response to a call is unlikely to have occurred, and are therefore less
susceptible to concerns about oﬃcer sorting. I define this “Unlikely Response”
sub-sample using techniques similar to propensity score matching. First, I
estimate a linear probability model for each oﬃcer i that predicts whether i
responded to a particular incident, conditional on the full set of covariates in
the model, including incident characteristics, Xkt, geographic beats,  b, shift
indicators,  gt, and fixed eﬀects for co-responders, ✓j. From these regressions,
I obtain a predicted response probability for each oﬃcer across all observa-
tions. I then code observations as unlikely responses if the predicted response
probability is below its median value among the actual incident responses for
each oﬃcer. By construction, this sub-sample of unlikely responses consists of
incident responses that are not characterized by predictable sorting of oﬃcers.
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I restrict each robustness sample to oﬃcers with at least 25 ob-
servations in the relevant sub-sample, yielding 1,504 oﬃcers in the “Unlikely
Response” sample and 1,556 oﬃcers in the “Low Availability” sample. I then
compare estimates within these sub-samples to corresponding samples that in-
clude all observations for these oﬃcers. Tables A.1.A and A.1.B show that the
characteristics of the robustness samples are similar to the primary analysis
sample.
Figure 1.3(a) and 1.3(b) show the results of restricting the obser-
vations to the “Low Availability” and “Unlikely Response” sample. The graphs
show a close match in the distributions across each of the samples and their
corresponding baselines. The correlation in oﬃcer eﬀects is 0.785 between each
of the robustness samples and their corresponding baseline.
Table 1.2 shows that the estimated dispersion in oﬃcer eﬀects is
comparable across the analysis sample, the “Low Availability” sample, and the
“Unlikely Response” sample. First, the proportion of variation explained by
the fixed eﬀects is similar across the main sample and the “Low Availability”
and “Unlikely Response” samples, accounting for 11 - 17% of the explainable
variation in the baseline (columns (1), (2) and (4)) and 12 - 19% of the ex-
plainable variation in the robustness samples (columns (3) and (5)). Second,
a 1 standard deviation increase in oﬃcer fixed eﬀects increases the probabil-
ity of arrest by 32.8% in the primary sample, 38.5% in the “Low Availability”
sample, and 41.5% in the “Unlikely Response” sample. If dispersion in oﬃ-
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cer behavior is increased by oﬃcer sorting, we would expect the estimates of
dispersion to be lower in these robustness samples than the baseline. How-
ever, we observe the opposite pattern here. The larger dispersion estimates in
the sorting robustness samples is in part due to lower precision of the oﬃcer
eﬀects estimates in these smaller samples. Across each of these settings, the
oﬃcer eﬀects are highly correlated and the estimates of oﬃcer dispersion are
qualitatively similar.
Next, I consider how important incident characteristics are in the
estimation of ✓ˆi. I calculate the correlation between the distribution of ✓ˆi from
the full model to ✓ˆ0i estimated from a model that omits incident character-
istics that could influence an oﬃcer’s decision to respond to a call, Xkt and
 g. If oﬃcer arrest propensity is orthogonal to observable incident character-
istics, these distributions will be perfectly correlated. This test is informative
if unobservable incident characteristics are correlated with observables, an as-
sumption that is often applied in tests of endogeneity. Figure 1.3(c) shows that
the ✓ˆ0i distribution is somewhat more disperse than the base ✓ˆi estimates that
include incident characteristics; however, the estimates across these distribu-
tions have a correlation of 0.906. This high correlation suggests that incident
characteristics are not very important controls in the estimation of the oﬃcer
eﬀects distribution.21
21I have also measured the joint significance of incident and geographic characteristics that
oﬃcers may use to choose responses, Xkt and  g, in predicting oﬃcer eﬀects, ✓i. I do this by
duplicating ✓i to the incident-level, regressing these eﬀects on the full model specification,
and taking a joint F-test of Xkt and  g. The F-statistic of this test is 1.79, and is significant
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I also construct a balance test that asks whether high and low arrest
oﬃcers are similarly likely to respond to incidents, given their characteristics.
To do this, I create a composite index of covariates in the model as the pre-
dicted arrest likelihood of an incident, estimated from a model that excludes
oﬃcer eﬀects. Next, I separately estimate the likelihood that an oﬃcer in the
top 25% (high arrest oﬃcers) and bottom 25% (low arrest oﬃcers) responds
to an incident, by regressing an indicator variable for whether oﬃcers in these
groups responded to an incident on covariates in the model, again excluding
oﬃcer eﬀects. In Figure 1.3(d), I plot the diﬀerence in the response likelihood
for high and low arrest oﬃcers in relation to the predicted arrest likelihood
of incidents. I find a nearly flat relationship between these variables with a
fitted slope of 0.1, implying that high and low arrest oﬃcers are approximately
equally likely to respond to high or low arrest incidents.
Overall, these tests suggest that the baseline estimates of oﬃcer
dispersion are not biased by oﬃcer sorting. This pattern is likely related to
the rich set of controls in the model, which include geography, time, patrol shift
controls, and complainant characteristics, as well as a proxy for the urgency
or severity of each incident.
but not particularly large (with standard errors clustered at the focal oﬃcer, i, and shift
level,  gt, to account for duplicated incident records and oﬃcer eﬀect outcomes). Together
with the test above that finds a very high correlation between oﬃcer eﬀects estimated with
and without observables, this test suggests that incident characteristics have a small but
significant relationship to ✓i.
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1.5.2 Oﬃcer Demographics
How does oﬃcer arrest propensity relate to oﬃcer demographics?
A natural next step is to consider how the estimated oﬃcer fixed eﬀects, ✓ˆi,
are associated with oﬃcer demographic characteristics.22 I regress ✓ˆi terms on
oﬃcer race, gender, age, trainee or sergeant status, experience, and experience
squared in Table 1.3.23 The oﬃcer demographics regressions oﬀer information
about whether oﬃcers with specific traits systematically diﬀer in their arrest
propensities.
Oﬃcers with more experience have higher arrest propensities, while
oﬃcer trainees, and female oﬃcers have lower arrest propensities. All else
equal, the likelihood of arrest is 7% higher when a responding oﬃcer has 10
years of experience instead of 5 years of experience, 9% lower when a respond-
ing oﬃcer is a police trainee, and 4% lower when an oﬃcer is female. While
Hispanic oﬃcers are not statistically diﬀerent from the omitted other race of-
ficer group, Hispanic oﬃcers have statistically lower arrest propensities than
White or Black oﬃcers. Relative to White oﬃcers, oﬃcers that are Hispanic
22So far, I have not included oﬃcer demographics in the estimation model because these
factors do not vary over time and are collinear with the oﬃcer fixed eﬀect terms. While
some oﬃcer characteristics like salary, trainee status, or age, may in fact vary over time,
they change slowly relative to the timing of incident observations. Given their low frequency,
these changes would be absorbed by other time factors in the model if included directly in
the estimation equation. Further, the oﬃcer demographic data was obtained as a snapshot
file and does not include records of promotions or salary changes.
23Salary is omitted from this regression because it is nearly perfectly correlated with
experience, given the compensation formulas used by the department. Results are similar
when salary is used instead of years of experience.
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have 6% lower likelihood of arrest on average. Aside from this coeﬃcient for
Hispanic oﬃcers, race is not a systematically important factor in predicting
total oﬃcer arrest propensity. The regressions are very similar using oﬃcer
eﬀects derived from the “Low Availability” and “Unlikely Response” samples.
There are a number of interesting patterns present when this anal-
ysis is extended to oﬃcer eﬀects from the set of additional policing outcomes
in Tables A.3. Again, police trainees are less likely to make felony and mis-
demeanor arrests and arrests in non-urgent calls. Oﬃcers with higher levels
of experience have higher propensities to identify suspects and make arrests
when responding to calls alone. Older oﬃcers spend more time responding
to incidents than younger oﬃcers. Hispanic and Black oﬃcers are less likely
to have high propensities to identify suspects and are more likely to spend a
longer time responding to calls for service. As in the general arrest outcome,
female oﬃcers have lower felony arrest propensities and Hispanic oﬃcers are
least likely to make arrests across each of these additional settings.
Overall, however, demographic factors do not explain a large share
of the total variation in oﬃcer eﬀects, with regression R2 statistics of 0.02
- 0.04. Instead, this analysis shows that the substantial variation in arrest
behavior observed across oﬃcers is due to unobservable characteristics of police
oﬃcers, such as oﬃcer preferences or unobservable dimensions of productivity.
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1.5.3 Robustness Tests
1.5.3.1 Bootstrap Tests of Primary Results
How large is the dispersion in oﬃcer arrest behavior? One way
to assert that the distribution of oﬃcer arrest propensities is meaningful is to
benchmark the observed standard deviation in oﬃcer eﬀects, ✓ˆi, to the amount
of variation that would be observed across oﬃcers if there were no “true” oﬃcer
eﬀects. Even in the absence of oﬃcer diﬀerences, there will be some measured
variation in outcomes across oﬃcers, simply due to idiosyncratic variation in
the error term or “noise.”
To confirm that the results in this study reflect actual variation
in behavior across oﬃcers, I next construct a wild cluster bootstrap test to
benchmark the results [13]. In this test, I calculate the residuals, rˆ, and
predicted outcome values, ˆArrest, from a regression that does not include
oﬃcer fixed eﬀects, thereby assuming a null hypothesis that the true value
of all ✓i and ✓j terms is zero and outcomes are not systematically correlated
within oﬃcer observations. While imposing this null hypothesis, the procedure
allows errors to be correlated within shift clusters,  gt, to account for common
shocks within geographic areas, time periods, and oﬃcer groups, while also
accounting for error correlation across duplicated incident observations. In
each bootstrap iteration, I apply weights of w 2 { 1, 1} to residuals rˆ that
are constant within the observations for each shift cluster  gt and assigned with
equal probability for each shift cluster. Using these weights, I reconstruct a
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new outcome variable as the predicted outcome plus the weighted residual,
˜Arrestb = ˆArrest + wbrˆ. I then regress this new outcome variable, ˜Arrestb,
on the fully specified model that includes oﬃcer fixed eﬀects and calculate the
dispersion of the Empirical Bayes adjusted oﬃcer eﬀects for each iteration.
I also recover the R2 and Adjusted R2 contribution of oﬃcer fixed eﬀects
for each iteration of the bootstrap. The distribution of these metrics across
bootstrap iterations provides a benchmark that corresponds to variation in
oﬃcer eﬀects that would arise if there were no “true” oﬃcer eﬀects simply
because of idiosyncratic variation or “noise.”
Figure 1.4 displays the results of these tests using 250 bootstrap
replications. These graphs confirm that the estimated variation in oﬃcer ef-
fects and the contribution of the oﬃcer eﬀects to explaining the model variation
is not due to noise in the data. Each of the model estimates are well outside
the 95% confidence interval given by the bootstrap tests.
1.5.3.2 Robustness Specification Tests
Next, I consider several alternate specifications of the base model
in Table 1.4. In column (2), I substitute the 234 police beat categories with
narrower geographic area controls of 1,143 police reporting areas in the city
of Dallas. Column (3) alternatively substitutes the police beat controls with
geographic controls that vary by time, or 1,225 Police Sector*Month category
variables. Column (4) includes 21,358 individual 8-hour shift level indicators
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(Date*8-hour shift*Division) instead of the monthly aggregated shift indica-
tors,  gt, used in the primary specification. By conditioning on individual
8-hour shifts within police divisions, this specification absorbs variation in ar-
rests at the date by geography level, accounting for factors such as changing
weather conditions, holidays, and other day specific events in the city of Dallas.
In column (8), I replace the 15 aggregated dispatch codes and 11 aggregated lo-
cation codes used in the main specification with 117 specific dispatch code and
34 specific location type categories in the raw incident data.24 Across specifi-
cations these additional controls do very little to change the analysis, oﬀering
estimates that are close to the base model. In fact, the correlation between
the base distribution of oﬃcer fixed eﬀects and these alternate specifications
is above 0.95.
Columns (6) and (7) consider alternative procedures to adjust the
estimates for precision instead of the Empirical Bayes method used in the
primary results. In column (6), I report the dispersion in unadjusted oﬃcer
fixed eﬀects from the first stage, where the sample is restricted to oﬃcers
with more than 100 observations. In column (7), I weight the unadjusted
oﬃcer fixed eﬀects by the number of observations per oﬃcer and calculate a
weighted standard deviation as the dispersion metric. Across both of these
alternative precision methods, the dispersion estimates are similar to the base
model, with a 1 standard deviation in oﬃcer eﬀects corresponding to a 38%
24I collapse dispatch code categories to increase the estimation speed of the model and
address small cell categories in the majority of the analysis.
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increase in arrest probability. Lastly, in column (8), I report dispersion in
oﬃcer behavior using the unadjusted first stage oﬃcer fixed eﬀects. With no
adjustment for precision, this standard deviation estimate is moderately larger
than the base model, corresponding to a 46% increase in arrest probability.
The baseline results are robust to a number of diﬀerent alternate
specifications and validity tests. In sum, individual oﬃcers vary substantially
in their arrest behavior, and individual oﬃcers are important in determining
the outcomes of police interactions.
1.6 Racial Bias Among Oﬃcers
1.6.1 Testing for Racial Bias Using Information on Oﬃcers and
Arrestee Outcomes
Is there evidence of racial bias among police oﬃcers in Dallas? In
this section, I test for the presence of racial bias by investigating relationships
between oﬃcer race and arrestee race.
I adapt the test of racial bias used in work by [6] examining oﬃcer
bias in traﬃc stops. [6] develop a model of oﬃcer interactions that allows
oﬃcers of diﬀerent races to have diﬀering arrest behavior as long as these
diﬀerences are independent of suspect race. Specifically, they test whether
the relative rank order of arrest rates across oﬃcer race groups is the same
within each suspect race. For example, if White oﬃcers are more likely than
Black oﬃcers to arrest a suspect from any race group, then this reflects the
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total arrest preferences of White and Black oﬃcers but does not imply that
either group is racially biased. Alternatively, if Black oﬃcers have higher
arrest rates than White oﬃcers for White suspects and White oﬃcers have
higher arrest rates than Black oﬃcers for Black suspects, either Black oﬃcers
or White oﬃcers are racially biased (or both). Critically, the test does not find
evidence of racial bias if oﬃcers statistically discriminate against suspects, or
if oﬃcers of all races use suspect race as a signal of oﬀending characteristics
that are correlated with race. More generally, the test allows suspect race
groups to have diﬀerent compositions or unobservable characteristics that may
cause diﬀerences in arrest rates for suspects of diﬀerent races across all oﬃcers.
Arrest rates can diﬀer across suspect race groups in the test because diﬀerences
in oﬃcer race arrest rates are always measured as a relative ranking within a
suspect race group.
Appendix A.4 presents the economic framework for the racial bias
test, adapted from [6] to the call for service setting. In the call for service
setting, oﬃcers maximize their expected benefit of making an arrest and face
costs of exerting eﬀort that may diﬀer by oﬃcer and suspect race. Oﬃcers
make eﬀort choices after viewing the suspect race and a signal of whether the
arrest is feasible or whether their will be a suﬃcient basis for an arrest if the
oﬃcer exerts eﬀort. The distribution of signals of feasibility and underlying
feasibility of arrests are allowed to diﬀer by suspect race, and these diﬀerences
enable oﬃcers to statistically discriminate against suspects of a particular race.
A key diﬀerence between the call for service setting and the traﬃc stop setting
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is that I do not directly observe suspect race for all incidents.25 Instead, I
execute this test by comparing oﬃcer arrest propensities for diﬀerent arrestee
race outcomes.
I consider unconditional arrestee race outcomes that take a value
of 1 if an individual is arrested and is a particular race, either Black, Hispanic,
or White, and 0 otherwise. As before, I estimate ✓i,r terms for each arrestee
race outcome, r, using the model outlined in Section 1.3. Next, I regress the
✓i,r terms on the full set of oﬃcer demographic characteristics and examine the
impact of oﬃcer race on oﬃcer arrest propensity. This regression framework
allows me to directly test whether the rank of arrest rates across oﬃcer race
changes for diﬀerent arrestee race outcomes.26
The test used in this paper oﬀers three new advantages. First, I
am able to test for racial bias among oﬃcers in a setting that is not aﬀected
by oﬃcers electing to initiate interactions. Prior work studying racial bias in
policing has examined interactions between oﬃcer and suspect race in oﬃcer-
25I have limited information on suspect identification in the data. There are two sets of
records of suspects in the data: (1) I observe suspects identified and demographic infor-
mation for these suspects in a subset of cases (limited to data prior to 2017), (2) I observe
demographic characteristics of suspects that are unknown to oﬃcers at the conclusion of the
response. I treat both of these records as outcomes in the data because they are entered by
responding oﬃcers and may be a function of oﬃcer eﬀort. Arrest records can be considered
a subset of (1) and are available for the duration of the sample period.
26My preferred specification uses the two stage regression in order to be consistent with the
analysis in Section 1.5.2. I also conduct the test by inserting oﬃcer demographic variables
directly into the first stage while omitting the oﬃcer fixed eﬀects in Section 1.6.2.2. The
results are similar in both formulations.
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initiated incidents, such as traﬃc stops [e.g. 56, 4, 5, 6, 48].27 These papers
consider suspect race as a given characteristic of a traﬃc stop; however, in
reality, suspect race is also a choice variable of the oﬃcer, who chooses to stop
a particular individual. In this paper, I am able to test for the presence of
racial bias in a setting that is not aﬀected by this form of selection because
calls are initiated by complainants and not oﬃcers.
Second, I use a regression framework to control for a large array of
observable incident characteristics. [6] address the fact that diﬀerent oﬃcers
may face diﬀerent types of incidents by re-sampling their data to create com-
parable incident sets across oﬃcer race. In my setting, I use regression models
to measure oﬃcer race arrest eﬀects adjusted for observable diﬀerences in the
composition of incidents across oﬃcers.
Lastly, I leverage oﬃcer identifiers to better understand relation-
ships between oﬃcer behavior and arrestee race. I am able to use oﬃcer
identifiers to trace the distribution of oﬃcer eﬀects by race for each of the ar-
restee race outcomes and find that most variation in oﬃcer behavior is within
rather than across oﬃcer race.
The racial bias test used in this paper cannot detect cases when
all oﬃcers exhibit similar racial bias toward a particular group, a limitation of
prior tests as well. As discussed above, Black arrestees are markedly overrepre-
27An exception in this literature is [104], which studies racial bias of state troopers who
are randomly dispatched to motor vehicle accidents rather than oﬃcer-initiated interactions.
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sented in the sample, making up 40% of total incident arrests and only 24% of
the Dallas population.28 If arrests with Black suspects result in higher arrest
rates of Black individuals across all oﬃcers, this pattern could be consistent
with statistical discrimination, or institutional discrimination. Institutional
racial bias will occur when the organizational priorities of the department di-
rect resources toward policing one race group relative to others, and all oﬃcers
behave similarly given these priorities. Likewise, the higher representation of
Black arrestees could also be consistent with uniform police oﬃcer attitudes
of taste-based racial bias against Black suspects. Recent evidence on the im-
portance of implicit racial bias in decision-making could be consistent with
uniform taste-based discrimination against minority groups [e.g. 32].
1.6.2 Results of the Test of Racial Bias
1.6.2.1 Baseline Racial Bias Results
Before turning to the results of the test of racial bias, I assess
whether incident characteristics are comparable across oﬃcer races. Tables A.5.A
and A.5.B show that the composition of incidents is similar for diﬀerent oﬃcer
race groups. The most meaningful diﬀerence is that each oﬃcer race is more
likely to respond to a complainant that has the same race. Because social in-
teractions are largely segregated, individuals are most likely to be victimized
by an individual of the same race, so the variation in complainant race also
28These proportions are calculated relative to total arrests, not relative to arrests with
arrestee race information (70% of observations).
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means that oﬃcers are more likely to respond to an incident with a suspect of
their own race. The empirical strategy used to conduct the test of racial bias
controls directly for complainant race to address this diﬀerence in exposure.
I limit the sample used in this test to observations where responding oﬃcers
have a single race and each oﬃcer has more than 25 observations.29
Table 1.5 shows the results of the test of racial bias among oﬃ-
cers. Each regression estimates the relationship between oﬃcer demographic
control variables and the measured oﬃcer eﬀect, ✓i,r, calculated from a pre-
dictive model of whether the incident resulted in an arrest of an individual of
race, r (corresponds to columns). The F-tests show whether the oﬃcer race
coeﬃcients are statistically diﬀerent from one another.
In the full sample (Panel A), White oﬃcers have a higher propen-
sity than Hispanic and Black oﬃcers to make any arrest. The rank order of
White oﬃcers having the highest arrest propensity, followed by Black oﬃcers
and then Hispanic oﬃcers is consistent for each arrestee race outcome, con-
trolling for incident characteristics. Each of the links in this order are not
always statistically diﬀerent from one another. In column (2), White oﬃcers
are statistically more likely than Hispanic oﬃcers to arrest Black suspects, but
the diﬀerence between Hispanic oﬃcers and Black oﬃcers is not significant.
Likewise, Black oﬃcers are more likely than Hispanic oﬃcers to arrest Hispanic
29The racial bias analysis sample is constant for all arrestee race outcomes. This restriction
mechanically increases the number of White oﬃcers with co-responders; responder pairs that
are a single race are more likely to be White because there are more White oﬃcers overall.
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suspects, but the diﬀerence between Black and White oﬃcers is not significant
(column (3)). Lastly, in column (4), White oﬃcers are more likely than Black
oﬃcers to arrest White suspects, however the diﬀerence between Black oﬃcers
and Hispanic oﬃcers is not significant. None of the oﬃcer race coeﬃcients is
statistically diﬀerent from the omitted race category of “other race” oﬃcers for
any of the outcomes.
I am also able to leverage individual oﬃcer identifiers to better
understand patterns of oﬃcer behavior across arrestee race. In Figure 1.5, I
compare the distribution of measured oﬃcer eﬀects, ✓i,r, by oﬃcer race for
each arrestee race outcome. The distributions of oﬃcer fixed eﬀects by oﬃcer
race are quite close to one another for each outcome. The distribution of
White oﬃcer arrest eﬀects is noticeably to the right of the distributions of
Black and Hispanic oﬃcers for Black arrestee and White arrestee outcomes.
Importantly, these figures do not suggest that the rank order of oﬃcer arrest
eﬀects by oﬃcer race changes across these outcomes. Moreover, the pictures
suggest that there is more variation in arrest propensity within oﬃcer race
than between oﬃcer races. In fact, if oﬃcer eﬀects were constant across oﬃcer
race, the dispersion in oﬃcer eﬀects for each of these outcomes would decrease
by less than 1%.30 In other words, race is not the most important determinant
30This change is calculated using coeﬃcients from the regressions in Table 1.5. For the
racial bias sample, a 1 standard deviation increase in the oﬃcer eﬀect distribution corre-
sponds to a 39% increase in total arrest likelihood, and a 58%, 110%, and 92% increase
in Black, Hispanic, and White arrestee race outcomes, respectively. The larger percentage
changes for the demographic arrestee outcomes is related to their smaller mean values.
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of an oﬃcer’s arrest behavior.
The test cannot reject the null hypothesis that oﬃcers are not
racially biased. This pattern could be consistent with the progressive reforms
adopted by the Dallas Police Department. As discussed above, DPD enacted
a number of reform initiatives prior to and during the sample period, includ-
ing implicit racial bias training, de-escalation training, the use of body-worn
cameras, and sharing data on its operations with the public.
1.6.2.2 Robustness of Racial Bias Results
In Panels (B) and (C) of Table 1.5, I replicate the test of racial bias
using the “Low Availability” and “Unlikely Response” robustness samples to
address concerns about oﬃcer sorting. In both of these alternative samples, the
test cannot reject the null hypothesis that White oﬃcers have the highest arrest
propensity, followed by Black oﬃcers, and then Hispanic oﬃcers. Extending
the analysis to these samples suggests that the racial bias result is not driven
by oﬃcer sorting. In Table A.6, I show that this finding is also robust to
considering a simplified version of the test, which does not include oﬃcer fixed
eﬀects in the first stage of the model but instead inserts oﬃcer characteristics
as direct controls in the first stage.
The racial bias test used in this paper has the advantage of being
unlikely to yield a false positive claim of bias, an attractive feature given that
a finding of racial bias is politically sensitive. However, a potential concern
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about the test used in this paper is that it has low power to detect racial
bias. The first reason that the test may have low power is conceptual; the
test cannot detect patterns of racial bias that are shared across all oﬃcers
or patterns of racial bias that are consistent with certain oﬃcer race groups
arresting all types of suspects more frequently than other oﬃcer race groups.
In addition to this limitation, the test may have lower power because it is a
joint hypothesis test.
I empirically assess the power of the racial bias test using a boot-
strap simulation. The simulation estimates the rate that the null hypothesis
will be rejected when an alternative hypothesis of racial bias is imposed in the
data. I simplify this analysis by imposing artificial changes to one oﬃcer race
coeﬃcient and allowing other oﬃcer race coeﬃcients to remain unchanged.
I set the altered coeﬃcient to become larger for diﬀerent-race arrestee out-
comes and smaller for the same-race arrestee outcome. For example, I allow
the White coeﬃcient to increase in the second-stage regression of Black and
Hispanic arrest outcomes, ✓i,Black and ✓i,Hispanic, and decrease in the second-
stage regression of the White arrest outcome, ✓i,White. Specifically, I set the
deviations in the White coeﬃcient to be a constant percent change in the rel-
evant arrestee race outcome relative to the Black and Hispanic oﬃcer average.
This change imposes the alternative hypothesis that the oﬃcer race arrest rate
ranking diﬀers across arrestee race outcomes.31
31This simulation is conducted using the following steps (for the White coeﬃcient exam-
ple). Allow each oﬃcer race coeﬃcient in the second stage to be denoted by ↵r. I first
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Figure A.3 plots the power of the test for diﬀerent values of the
alternative hypothesis, or diﬀerent percent deviations in arrests caused by the
altered coeﬃcient. This illustrative exercise shows that I am able to accept an
alternative hypothesis of a 14.5% deviation in arrest outcomes due to changes
in the White oﬃcer coeﬃcient with 95% power. For Black and Hispanic oﬃcer
coeﬃcients, I am able to accept corresponding alternative hypotheses of an
10.5% and 18.5% deviation with 95% power, respectively. This power exercise
shows that the test is unlikely to detect particularly small diﬀerences in racial
bias but that it will succeed in rejecting the null hypothesis when there are
substantial patterns of bias.
Lastly, I benchmark the findings in this paper by replicating a
regress the second stage ✓i,r outcomes on oﬃcer demographics excluding the White oﬃcer
race coeﬃcient, Whitei,r and recover a predicted ✓ˆ0i,r estimate and a predicted residual rˆi,r.
In each bootstrap iteration, I draw a wild bootstrap weight wb 2 { 1, 1} with equal prob-
ability for each weight. I then impose an alternative hypothesis on the Whitei,r coeﬃcient
to construct a simulated value for each oﬃcer eﬀect, ✓˜bi,r = ✓ˆ0i,r +  Whitei,r + wbrˆi,r. I
set the magnitude of   to be a constant percent increase for Black and Hispanic arrestee
outcomes and an equivalent percent decrease in the White arrestee outcome, so that the
alternative hypothesis is a true diﬀerence in White oﬃcer ranking across the arrestee race
outcomes. These percent changes are set relative to Black or Hispanic oﬃcer averages for
the total arrest outcome, using the higher of the two oﬃcer groups (Black or Hispanic) for
percent increases and the lower of the two for the percent decrease. In other words, a   of a
5 percent deviation will equal the   = ↵Black+0.05/(mean(ArrestHispanic)+↵Black) for
the ✓i,Hispanic regression if Black oﬃcers were the reference category with larger coeﬃcient,
and   = ↵Hispanic   0.05/(mean(ArrestWhite) + ↵Hispanic) for the ✓i,White regression if
Hispanic oﬃcers were the reference category with the smaller coeﬃcient. Using these sim-
ulated bootstrap values, ✓˜bi,r, I regress oﬃcer eﬀects on the full set of oﬃcer demographic
variables and use F-tests to determine whether the ranking of oﬃcer race groups changes
across arrestee race outcomes. Figure A.3 plots the rejection rate or power of the test for
diﬀerent values of the alternative hypothesis,  .
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number of tests used in the prior literature in Table A.7.32 First, I conduct a
simple comparison of the demographic composition of arrestees and residents
in Dallas in Panel (A) and find that Black arrestees disproportionately rep-
resented relative to their share in the city population. Panel (B) shows that
conditional arrest rates for Black and Hispanic arrestees are approximately
49%, while these rates are significantly higher for Whites at 55%. Using the
framework in [65], this pattern provides evidence of racial bias of oﬃcers be-
cause average “hit rates” are higher for White suspects, suggesting that oﬃcers
may “over-suspect” minority suspects and “under-suspect” White suspects. In
Panel (C), I replicate an aggregate version of the test in [6] without adjusting
for incident characteristics and fail to find evidence of racial bias.33 Lastly,
in Panel (D), I construct a version of the test presented in [5] which proposes
that oﬃcer behavior is characterized by racial bias when oﬃcers arrest indi-
viduals of their own race at lower rates than individuals of other races. Using
this test, I find that oﬃcers actually arrest individuals of their own race at
higher rates than individuals of other races. In general, I fail to reject the
null hypothesis that oﬃcers are not biased replicating tests of racial bias that
32For simplicity, I each of the tests uses aggregated arrest statistics for diﬀerent demo-
graphic subgroups in the data, that are not adjusted for incident characteristics, geographic
or time factors, or oﬃcer eﬀects. In the source papers, the authors have also conducted
various regression-based tests that adjust for other factors related to a police search or inci-
dent. In the majority of the paper, I treat suspect identification as an outcome of a police
response, but the comparisons in this section condition on suspect information directly.
Suspect identification records are available prior to 2017.
33Interestingly, the rank order in the raw aggregate data is diﬀerent than in the regression
adjusted test described above; Black oﬃcers are most likely to make arrests, followed by
Hispanic oﬃcers and then White oﬃcers. This suggests that Black and Hispanic oﬃcers
respond to incidents that are more likely to result in arrest.
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are used in the prior literature. The data in this setting fails simpler tests of
racial bias that involve stricter assumptions (Panels (A) and (B)), while more
nuanced tests that apply more general assumptions do not show evidence of
racial bias among oﬃcers (Panels (C) and (D)).
Overall, I do not find clear patterns of racial bias among oﬃcers.
In this section, I adapted the test proposed in [6] to the call for service setting
and found that the relative ranking of oﬃcer arrest propensity across oﬃcer
race does not significantly diﬀer across arrestee race outcomes. Further, the
data suggests that oﬃcer arrest propensity diﬀers more within race than across
race, implying that an oﬃcer’s race is not the most important determinant of
his arrest behavior.
1.7 Conclusion
Individual police oﬃcers are critical to the outcomes of police work.
While the context of an incident, such as geographic location, time, and oﬀense
type, largely determines if the response to the incident will result in an arrest,
individual police oﬃcer decisions also matter. Analyzing high frequency call
for service data from Dallas, Texas, I find that the individual oﬃcers that
respond to calls for service account for 10-15% of the explainable variation in
arrest outcomes.
Police work is characterized by discretion and police oﬃcers diﬀer
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from one another. I find that a 1 standard deviation increase in oﬃcer arrest
propensity increases the likelihood of an arrest by 33%. In general, observable
oﬃcer demographic characteristics do not explain a large share of the variation
in arrest behavior across oﬃcers.
Further, the variation in individual oﬃcer arrest propensity does
not appear to be driven by racial bias. I find that the rank order of arrest
propensity by oﬃcer race does not significantly change across arrestee race
outcomes. Given this evidence, I am unable to detect substantive patterns of
racial bias among oﬃcers. While these findings counter traditional concerns
about discrimination against minority individuals in policing, the results may
be related to a number of progressive police reforms that have been adopted
by the Dallas Police Department, including implicit racial bias training, de-
escalation training, and the use of body-worn cameras. However, more research
is needed to understand how these reform initiatives may alter oﬃcer biases
and actions.
Having established that individual oﬃcers are critical to the out-
comes of police and civilian interactions, questions remain for future research.
First, what are the marginal welfare costs (or benefits) of arrests that result
from police discretion? An arrest may be a positive or negative welfare out-
come depending on the incident context, culpability of the arrestee, and sever-
ity of the oﬀense. Some arrests may serve to increase public safety through
deterrence or incapacitation of the suspect, while others may have limited
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public safety benefits and cause undue burden to the suspect and his/or her
family. Given that the outcomes of police interactions can have varying con-
sequences, it is unclear whether the average arrest propensity of oﬃcers is
optimal, or if the ideal arrest propensity might correspond to a diﬀerent point
in the distribution. A greater understanding of the quality of marginal arrests
could improve response protocols of police departments.
Lastly, what are the best policy levers to reduce dispersion in ar-
rest behavior? From a fairness perspective, investing in reducing dispersion
in oﬃcer behavior could yield benefits in the form of increased trust in law
enforcement and equal access to police protection services. Future work should
assess the costs and benefits of diﬀerent law enforcement practices that may
be used to increase uniformity in oﬃcer behavior, including additional police
training, monitoring protocols, mentorship programs, and targeted hiring and
firing of oﬃcers.
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1.8 Tables and Figures
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
Table 1.1.A: Summary Statistics: Outcomes, Oﬃcers, and Complainants
Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Total,Observations 167,747 217,633
Total,Incidents 167,747 161,531
Total,Officers 2,904 1,851
Outcomes
Arrest 0.09 (0.29) 0.11 (0.31)
Suspect 0.17 (0.38) 0.19 (0.39)
Felony,Arrest 0.03 (0.17) 0.04 (0.18)
Misdemeanor,Arrest 0.07 (0.25) 0.08 (0.27)
Arrestee,Black 0.03 (0.18) 0.04 (0.19)
Arrestee,Hispanic 0.01 (0.11) 0.01 (0.12)
Arrestee,White 0.01 (0.11) 0.01 (0.12)
Officer,Characteristics
Officer,Arrest,Rate 0.11 (0.06) 0.11 (0.05)
Two,Responders 0.35 (0.48) 0.52 (0.50)
Black, 0.25 (0.41) 0.24 (0.39)
Hispanic 0.20 (0.37) 0.21 (0.35)
White 0.50 (0.46) 0.50 (0.45)
Female 0.16 (0.33) 0.16 (0.32)
Age 39.31 (9.66) 38.37 (9.30)
Trainee 0.05 (0.19) 0.07 (0.20)
Sergeant 0.02 (0.13) 0.01 (0.10)
Salary,($10,000s) 6.00 (1.08) 5.88 (1.02)
Years,of,Experience 12.70 (8.95) 11.82 (8.56)
Total,Incidents 167.25 (107.87) 171.03 (103.62)
Complainant,Characteristics
Victim,with,Injury 0.08 (0.28) 0.10 (0.29)
Number,of,Complainants 1.56 (0.96) 1.59 (0.99)
Black 0.35 (0.48) 0.36 (0.48)
Hispanic 0.35 (0.48) 0.35 (0.48)
White 0.33 (0.47) 0.32 (0.47)
Female 0.49 (0.50) 0.50 (0.50)
,
Total,Sample Analysis,Sample
These tables display summary statistics for covariates used in analysis. The first column, “Total Sample”,
consists of all incidents in the data, with each incident having only one record. The second column, “Analysis
Sample”, summarizes the primary analysis sample and excludes records for police oﬃcers that respond to
fewer than 25 incidents. Additionally, this sample duplicates incident responses with two responding oﬃcers
so that the records for each responding oﬃcer may contribute to the estimation of Oﬃcer Fixed Eﬀects.
Complainant characteristics are shown for observations that have information on complainant demographics,
which corresponds to 95% of the sample. Information for suspect outcomes is only available prior to 2017
and is summarized for the period available.
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Table 1.1.B: Summary Statistics: Incident Urgency, Location Type, and Dispatch
Code
Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Total,Observations 167,747 217,633
Total,Incidents 167,747 161,531
Total,Officers 2,904 1,851
Call$Urgency
Time,to,Dispatch,(Minutes) 24.81 (28.31) 24.09 (27.94)
Location$Type
Apartment 0.12 (0.33) 0.13 (0.33)
Residence,Other 0.15 (0.36) 0.15 (0.36)
Bar/Club/Entertainment 0.03 (0.17) 0.03 (0.17)
Retail 0.06 (0.24) 0.07 (0.25)
Business,Other 0.05 (0.22) 0.05 (0.22)
Govt/Health/School/Religion 0.01 (0.10) 0.01 (0.10)
Motor,Vehicle 0.02 (0.15) 0.02 (0.15)
Parking,Lot 0.25 (0.43) 0.24 (0.43)
Street 0.20 (0.40) 0.20 (0.40)
Outdoor,Other 0.05 (0.22) 0.05 (0.22)
Other,Location 0.05 (0.21) 0.05 (0.21)
Dispatch$Code$Type
Criminal,Assault 0.01 (0.12) 0.01 (0.12)
Armed,Encounter/Active,Shooter 0.02 (0.12) 0.02 (0.13)
Injured,Person 0.01 (0.11) 0.01 (0.11)
Robbery 0.05 (0.22) 0.06 (0.24)
Burglary,of,Business 0.05 (0.22) 0.05 (0.22)
Burglary,of,Residence 0.12 (0.32) 0.11 (0.32)
Burglary,of,Motor,Vehicle 0.19 (0.39) 0.17 (0.38)
Unauthorized,Use,of,Motor,Vehicle 0.06 (0.23) 0.05 (0.22)
Theft 0.08 (0.27) 0.07 (0.26)
Criminal,Mischief 0.07 (0.26) 0.07 (0.25)
Major,Disturbance 0.10 (0.30) 0.11 (0.32)
Major,Accident 0.04 (0.20) 0.04 (0.21)
Minor,Accident 0.10 (0.30) 0.09 (0.29)
Other,Y,Serious 0.06 (0.24) 0.07 (0.26)
Other,Y,Minor 0.04 (0.20) 0.04 (0.21)
Total$Sample Analysis$Sample
These tables display summary statistics for covariates used in analysis. The first column, “Total Sample”,
consists of all incidents in the data, with each incident having only one record. The second column, “Analysis
Sample”, summarizes the primary analysis sample and excludes records for police oﬃcers that respond to
fewer than 25 incidents. Additionally, this sample duplicates incident responses with two responding oﬃcers
so that the records for each responding oﬃcer may contribute to the estimation of Oﬃcer Fixed Eﬀects.
Call Urgency or Time to Dispatch (Minutes) is a variable that captures the priority level or severity of a
given call at the time of dispatch.
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Figure 1.1: Relative Proportion of Total R2, Components of Model
This figure shows the relative importance of explanatory variables in the estimation model. Each bar graph
grouping represents the percent of total model R2 (Adjusted R2) accounted for by a grouping of variables. I
estimate these percentages sequentially from the bottom bar to the top, with each percentage calculated as
an additional contribution of R2 to the total or: (R2currentbar  R2priorbar)/R2total. The explanatory power
of Oﬃcer FE is therefore the relative contribution of these variables after controlling for all other variables
in the model.
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Figure 1.2: Distribution of Oﬃcer Eﬀects, ✓ˆi
This figure graphs the distribution of the Oﬃcer Eﬀects, ✓ˆi, measured in the primary arrest outcome model
on the analysis sample. Each oﬃcer in the sample has at least 25 incident responses.
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Figure 1.3: Tests of the Importance of Oﬃcer Sorting to Oﬃcer Eﬀect Distri-
bution
Figure 1.3.A: Oﬃcer Eﬀects in Full Sample and Low Availability Sample
This graph compares the base model oﬃcer eﬀects, ✓ˆi, to oﬃcer eﬀects, ✓ˆ0i, that are estimated from the
“Low Availability” sample. The “Low Availability” sample is determined by taking the set of observations
where more oﬃcers are unavailable because they are on other calls at the time a call is made (split at the
median within patrol shift cells). The analysis is restricted to oﬃcers with at least 25 observations in the
sub-sample. The corresponding base sample benchmark is estimated over the full set of responses for the
same oﬃcer group.
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Figure 1.3.B: Oﬃcer Eﬀects in Full Sample and Unlikely Response Sample
This graph compares the base model oﬃcer eﬀects, ✓ˆi, to oﬃcer eﬀects, ✓ˆ00i , that are estimated from the
“Unlikely Response” sample. The “Unlikely Response” is determined by taking a sub-sample of observations
where oﬃcers have a lower predicted probability of responding to calls, where response probability is mea-
sured using a regression that predicts each oﬃcer’s response to an incident given observable characteristics
(sample below median response likelihood for each oﬃcer). The analysis is restricted to oﬃcers with at least
25 observations in the sub-sample. The corresponding base sample benchmark is estimated over the full set
of responses for the same oﬃcer group.
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Figure 1.3.C: Oﬃcer Eﬀects Measured with and without Incident Controls
This graph compares the base model oﬃcer eﬀects, ✓ˆi, to oﬃcer eﬀects, ✓ˆ000i , that are estimated from a
model that does not include incident characteristics and police beat fixed eﬀects, Xkt and  g . These
incident characteristics are those that an oﬃcer may choose at the level of an incident response, as shifts
and partners are determined prior to a call event.
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Figure 1.3.D: Balance Test of Arrest Likelihood and Oﬃcer Response Likelihood
This graph examines whether high (low) oﬃcers are similarly likely to respond to incidents, given observable
characteristics. Observable characteristics are aggregated as the predicted arrest probability of an incident,
from a model without oﬃcer eﬀects (X axis). Response likelihoods of high arrest oﬃcers (top 25% of
oﬃcer eﬀects) and low arrest oﬃcers (bottom 25% of oﬃcer eﬀects) are determined by separately predicting
responses for these oﬃcer groups using a model that excludes oﬃcer eﬀects. The Y axis measures whether
high arrest oﬃcers are more likely than low arrest oﬃcers to respond to a given incident using the diﬀerence
between these two response likelihoods.
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Table 1.2: Summary Results and Tests of Sorting, Comparison to Unlikely
Response Sample
Analysis(Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Corresponding Low4Availability Corresponding Unlikely4
Full4Sample Full4Sample Responses Full4Sample Responses
Primary'Results
Contribution)of)Officer)Effects
Relative4%4of4RE24from4Officer4Effects 16.5% 15.9% 18.5% 15.8% 18.8%
Relative4%4of4Adj.4RE24from4Officer4Effects 11.9% 11.6% 12.6% 11.5% 13.6%
Distribution)of)Officer)Effects
S.D.4of4Officer4Effect 0.036 0.034 0.041 0.034 0.039
%4Change:414S.D.4Increase4in4Officer4Effect 32.8% 31.2% 38.5% 31.3% 41.5%
Gap:410th4to490th4Percentile4in4Officer4Effect 0.082 0.080 0.098 0.080 0.089
%4Change:410th4to490th4Percentile4in4Officer4Effect 75.9% 74.1% 92.5% 74.0% 94.5%
Auxilary'Results
Distribution)of)Officer)Effects:
Model)without)Incident)Controls
S.D.4of4Officer4Effect 0.044 0.042 0.048 0.042 0.047
%4Change:414S.D.4Increase4in4Officer4Effect 40.8% 39.1% 45.1% 39.5% 49.6%
Gap:410th4to490th4Percentile4in4Officer4Effect 0.105 0.102 0.117 0.102 0.110
%4Change:410th4to490th4Percentile4in4Officer4Effect 96.6% 94.4% 110.5% 94.7% 117.1%
Correlation)of)Officer)Effects
Full4model4and4Model4Without4Incident4Controls 0.907 0.901 0.910 0.906 0.923
SubEsample4and4Corresponding4Full4Sample 0.785 0.785
Mean4of4Outcome 0.109 0.108 0.106 0.108 0.094
S.D.4of4Outcome 0.311 0.310 0.307 0.310 0.292
Total4Officers 1,851 1,556 1,556 1,504 1,504
Total4Observations 217,633 207,203 116,070 205,020 102,203
Low(Availability(Sample Unlikely(Response(Sample
This table summarizes the main analysis arrest results and tests of oﬃcer sorting. The contribution of oﬃcer
eﬀects shows the relative proportion of R2 due to including oﬃcer eﬀects in the model. The "Correlation of
Oﬃcer Eﬀects" compares the base model oﬃcer eﬀects, ✓ˆi, to oﬃcer eﬀects, ✓ˆ000i , that are estimated from a
model that does not include incident characteristics and police beat fixed eﬀects, Xkt and  g .
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Table 1.3: Oﬃcer Eﬀects and Oﬃcer Demographics
(1) (2) (3)
Low)Availability Unlikely
Outcome:)Officer)Effect Full)Sample) Responses Responses
Black 0.002 0.008 0.002
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Hispanic E0.002 0.003 E0.003
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
White 0.004 0.009+ 0.004
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Female E0.004+ E0.003 E0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age E0.0004* E0.0002 E0.0002
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Trainee E0.010** E0.003 E0.009*
E0.003 (0.004) (0.004)
Sergeant E0.005 E0.018 E0.015*
(0.005) (0.011) (0.007)
Experience 0.0019*** 0.0016** 0.0023***
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Experience^2 E0.00004*** E0.00003* E0.00005***
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001)
Observations 1,832 1,551 1,500
REsquared 0.041 0.024 0.042
Fixed)Effect)Mean E0.001 E0.002 E0.002
Fixed)Effect)S.D. 0.036 0.041 0.039
Outcome)Mean 0.109 0.106 0.094
Outcome)S.D. 0.311 0.307 0.292
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
This table shows regression results of oﬃcer eﬀects measured using the arrest outcome, ✓ˆi, regressed on
fixed oﬃcer characteristics, at the oﬃcer level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The analysis in
columns (2) and (3) is restricted to oﬃcers with at least 25 observations in each sub-sample. Other race
oﬃcers are the omitted race category. Oﬃcers without demographic information are excluded from the
regressions.
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Figure 1.4: Bootstrap Benchmark Test Distribution
Figure 1.4.A: S.D. of Oﬃcer Eﬀect Distribution
Figure 1.4.B: Proportion of R2 (left) and Adjusted R2 (right) Explained by Oﬃcer
Eﬀects
Each graph shows the residual bootstrap test distribution for three primary statistics, S.D. of the Oﬃcer
Eﬀect distribution, as well as the relative proportion of R2 and Adj. R2 explained by oﬃcer fixed eﬀects.
Each bootstrap iteration is obtained as follows: (1) Residuals and predicted outcomes are obtained from a
first stage model that does not include Oﬃcer FE (under the null hypothesis that these variables are jointly
zero), (2) Estimated residuals are assigned a wild bootstrap weight of w 2 {1, 1} that is constant within
shift clusters  gt, with equal probability for each shift group, and these residuals are added to the predicted
outcomes from (1), (3) Using these simulated outcome variables, the full model, including Oﬃcer FE, is
estimated to obtain each statistic of interest. Post-estimation Empirical Bayes adjustments are made to the
estimates after each iteration. Each test is based on 250 bootstrap replications.
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Table 1.5: Racial Bias Test, Oﬃcer and Arrestee Race
Table 1.5.A: Racial Bias Test, Full Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Outcome=Officer,Effects
Arrest
Arrest,,,
Black
Arrest,
Hispanic,
Arrest,,
White
A.#Full#Sample
Black,Officer :0.001 0.0004 0.0002 :0.0005
(0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Hispanic,Officer :0.004 :0.0001 :0.002 :0.001
(0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
White,Officer 0.003 0.002 0.0003 :0.0004
(0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Black=Hispanic:,,, F:Test 0.94 0.10 5.15 0.00
P:Value 0.33 0.75 0.02 0.98
Black=White:,,,,,,,, F:Test 2.84 2.64 0.02 0.01
P:Value 0.09 0.11 0.88 0.91
Hispanic=White:,,, F:Test 7.26 4.37 6.49 0.02
P:Value 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.89
Observations 1,613 1,613 1,613 1,613
Arrest,Mean 0.091 0.034 0.013 0.012
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
This table shows regressions of oﬃcer specific eﬀects on oﬃcer demographics, where oﬃcer eﬀects are derived
from four diﬀerent first stage outcomes, general arrests, and whether the arrestee was Black, White or
Hispanic. Each arrestee race outcome is defined unconditionally as 1 if an individual of that race was arrested
and 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The full sample, Panel (A), is restricted to
observations where responding oﬃcers have a single race, and each oﬃcer has more than 25 observations
within this restriction.
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Figure 1.5: Distribution of Oﬃcer Eﬀects across Oﬃcer Race
Figure 1.5.A: Oﬃcer Eﬀects by Oﬃcer Race, Arrest Outcome
These graphs the distribution of oﬃcer eﬀects by oﬃcer race for diﬀerent arrest demographic outcomes. The
oﬃcer eﬀects correspond to the outcomes used in Table 1.5. These graphs are shown for the full racial bias
test sample, which restricts to observations where the responding oﬃcers have a single race and each oﬃcer
within this restriction has at least 25 observations. Each arrestee race outcome is defined unconditionally as
1 if an individual of that race was arrested and 0 otherwise. Each graph shows the density overlap of oﬃcer
eﬀects for the diﬀerent arrest outcomes.
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Figure 1.5.B: Oﬃcer Eﬀects by Oﬃcer Race, Arrestee Black Outcome
These graphs the distribution of oﬃcer eﬀects by oﬃcer race for diﬀerent arrest demographic outcomes. The
oﬃcer eﬀects correspond to the outcomes used in Table 1.5. These graphs are shown for the full racial bias
test sample, which restricts to observations where the responding oﬃcers have a single race and each oﬃcer
within this restriction has at least 25 observations. Each arrestee race outcome is defined unconditionally as
1 if an individual of that race was arrested and 0 otherwise. Each graph shows the density overlap of oﬃcer
eﬀects for the diﬀerent arrest outcomes.
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Figure 1.5.C: Oﬃcer Eﬀects by Oﬃcer Race, Arrestee Hispanic Outcome
These graphs the distribution of oﬃcer eﬀects by oﬃcer race for diﬀerent arrest demographic outcomes. The
oﬃcer eﬀects correspond to the outcomes used in Table 1.5. These graphs are shown for the full racial bias
test sample, which restricts to observations where the responding oﬃcers have a single race and each oﬃcer
within this restriction has at least 25 observations. Each arrestee race outcome is defined unconditionally as
1 if an individual of that race was arrested and 0 otherwise. Each graph shows the density overlap of oﬃcer
eﬀects for the diﬀerent arrest outcomes.
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Figure 1.5.D: Oﬃcer Eﬀects by Oﬃcer Race, Arrestee White Outcome
These graphs the distribution of oﬃcer eﬀects by oﬃcer race for diﬀerent arrest demographic outcomes. The
oﬃcer eﬀects correspond to the outcomes used in Table 1.5. These graphs are shown for the full racial bias
test sample, which restricts to observations where the responding oﬃcers have a single race and each oﬃcer
within this restriction has at least 25 observations. Each arrestee race outcome is defined unconditionally as
1 if an individual of that race was arrested and 0 otherwise. Each graph shows the density overlap of oﬃcer
eﬀects for the diﬀerent arrest outcomes.
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Chapter 2
Safety in Police Numbers:
Evidence of Police Eﬀectiveness from COPS
Grant Applications
Understanding the impact of police on crime is critical to designing
policies that maximize safety. In this paper, I use a novel estimation approach
to measure the impact of police hiring, which exploits variation in federal
Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) hiring grants, while also con-
trolling for the endogenous decisions of police departments to apply for these
grants. Using data from nearly 7,000 U.S. municipalities, I find that a 10%
increase in police employment rates reduces violent crime rates by 13% and
property crime rates by 7%. The results also provide suggestive evidence that
law enforcement leaders are forward-looking.
2.1 Introduction
Policymakers, among others, are increasingly focused on the need
for criminal justice reform. U.S. incarceration rates are over 300% larger than
the world average and rates of police employment are 35% less than the world
68
average [51, 99]. At the same time, levels of policing per capita have remained
relatively constant in the United States, declining by approximately 2% be-
tween 1995 and 2014.1 In recent years, pressures on local government budgets
have put additional strain on police departments [21]. The lower emphasis on
investment in policing relative to incarceration does not make sense in light of
substantial research evidence that incarceration rates are ineﬀective at current
levels.2 But at what cost? What are the benefits of additional police? This
paper contributes to this important policy debate by evaluating the impact of
police force expansions on reported crime rates.
Measuring the causal impact of police on crime is diﬃcult because
police hiring is likely a cause as well as a consequence of changing criminal
activity. It is not surprising that police districts with high levels of crime also
have large police departments or that districts with a spike in crime may ex-
pand resources for law enforcement. In order to measure the causal impact of
police, it is necessary to use experimental or quasi-experimental sources of vari-
ation in police staﬃng that are not driven by crime. The existing economics lit-
erature studying the eﬀect of police has leveraged a variety of sources of quasi-
experimental variation, including variation in local election cycles, terrorist
attacks, state tax rates, and mass lay-oﬀs [e.g. 25, 29, 31, 64, 70, 71, 72, 76].
1This change is calculated using data on the total number of sworn police from national
FBI Uniform Crime Report (UCR) data, adjusted by national population estimates from
the U.S. Census.
2A large literature finds that there are decreasing marginal returns to incarceration rates
in terms of crime reduction. Because U.S. levels are so high, investments in incarceration
are likely ineﬀective. See for example [30, 15, 60, 80].
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Recent work by [15] also finds that measurement error in police and crime
data sources may also cause bias in estimates of the causal impact of police. A
number of controlled experiments conducted by criminologists within partic-
ular cities have also found that increasing policing presence in targeted crime
"hot spots" reduces crime in these locations [e.g. 9, 101]. My estimation strat-
egy builds upon this research by providing both a new estimate of the causal
impact of police hiring and by developing empirical insights about how law
enforcement decisions to invest in hiring are related to changes in crime.
In this paper, I use variation in Community Oriented Police Ser-
vices (COPS) hiring grant awards and grant applications to measure the im-
pact of police force expansions on crime. Since its establishment in 1994 under
the Violent Crime Control Act (VCCA), the COPS Oﬃce at the Department
of Justice (DOJ) has distributed over $12 billion in total grants to fund police
hiring, invest in policing technology, support police oﬃcers in public schools,
advance community policing, supplement law enforcement funding in small
towns and tribal communities, and target specific crimes. Approximately $7
billion of COPS grant funding has been devoted to police hiring grants, des-
ignating support for over 80,000 eligible sworn police oﬃcer positions. This
paper increases our understanding of this program in recent decades, focusing
on the eﬀectiveness of grants administered between 2000-2014.
Importantly, because the decision to apply for police hiring grants
is not random, I compare crime outcomes within cities in years when they
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receive hiring funding to outcomes in years when their grant applications are
rejected, as well as to baseline years when cities did not seek funding. Con-
trolling for grant applications is an important feature of my strategy because
police departments seek federal hiring funds when they are interested in ex-
panding their police forces. This interest depends on the needs and goals of
departments, which are in turn related to fluctuations in local crime condi-
tions and expectations about future crime. In practice, I measure the impact
of police on crime using an instrumental variables design, instrumenting for
municipal police presence using COPS grant acceptances conditional on grant
application decisions. Because there are large fluctuations in total funding
for the COPS program oﬃce, there is substantial variation in the number of
possible grants that can be awarded in each year. This program variation cre-
ates quasi-randomness in the probability of a grant acceptance in a given year
within a given city and is the foundation of my identification strategy.
In concurrent work, [77] and [20] study COPS grants awarded since
2009 using regression discontinuity designs. While similar to this paper in
spirit, there are several notable diﬀerences between our papers. First, I em-
phasize panel data comparisons within police districts over time across years
when departments receive grants versus years in which they do not receive
grants, over a longer period and broader set of cities than has been used in
other work. The sample in this paper covers approximately 10 times the num-
ber of cities examined in [77] and 7 times the number of cities as in [20].
Second, because I use information on multiple years of the COPS grant pro-
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gram, I can control for overlapping COPS hiring grant cycles as well as COPS
grant applications and acceptances for other police functions (such as tech-
nology, school grants, and community partnership grants). Third, by directly
including application controls in my model, I am able to empirically observe
how application decisions are linked to subsequent changes in crime, a new
contribution to the literature. The results across these papers are comparable,
particularly when comparing the elasticities from the robustness checks with
similar sample restrictions.3 In contrast, prior papers on the COPS hiring
program have treated the timing of grant receipt as quasi-random, measuring
crime outcomes within a city before and after the city received a grant to hire
police oﬃcers [42, 34, 106].
In my primary specification, I find that a 10% increase in police
employment rates reduces violent crime rates by 13% and property crime rates
by 7%, estimates that overlap with the upper range of eﬀects in the existing
literature. In addition to the contribution of the study design, the analysis also
uses a larger and more representative national data set than has been used in
prior work, measuring eﬀects in a sample of nearly 7,000 municipalities across
the country between 2000 and 2014. The model estimates are comparable to
prior work studying the impact of police, which have found crime elasticities
3Both [77] and [20] focus on grants administered in 2009. [77] uses information on COPS
grant applications to define his sample comparison group and does not directly control for
applications. The sample restrictions used in these papers are comparable to robustness
checks in this paper that limit the sample to police departments that applied for or received
a grant between 2000-2014 (Specification 9 and 10 in Table 2.6).
72
ranging from -0.3 to greater than -1, depending on the setting and study
design.
Interestingly, I also find that police departments that apply for hir-
ing grants also experience increases in crime rates in later years. Because of
this relationship, estimates of grant acceptance that do not control for appli-
cation decisions will be smaller than the true crime reducing eﬀect of police.
The fact that police departments experience increases in crime after they ap-
ply for hiring grants suggests that police departments may be forward-looking
when they make investment decisions. These patterns support the notion that
local police departments may be most knowledgeable of their own resource
needs, and that when they seek federal funding but are denied assistance,
they operate less eﬃciently.
I also explore the mechanisms of the crime reducing impact of po-
lice hiring. I find that solved or "cleared" crimes decline at a slower rate
than reported crimes when police forces expand, providing evidence that in-
vestments in police hiring increase the rate of crime-solving. At the same
time, police hiring does not increase the total level of arrests or "cleared"
crimes for serious crime categories, suggesting that police hiring reduces crime
through deterrence rather than incapacitation. Examining a broader set of ar-
rest categories, I also find that when police departments expand, arrest rates
for narcotics crimes decline, while arrest rates increase for marijuana crimes
and driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). Using data on arrests for dif-
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ferent demographic subgroups, I show that the changes in drug crime resulting
from police hiring are concentrated among Black males, while the increase in
DUI arrests is concentrated among White males.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 provides details of
the federal COPS hiring grant program and institutional context for the es-
timation strategy. Section 3.3 describes the empirical model and the data
sources used in estimation. Section 2.4 discusses the results, outlining main
findings as well as robustness tests and analysis of potential mechanisms. Sec-
tion 2.5 concludes.
2.2 COPS Hiring Grant Program
In 1994, the VCCA authorized the Attorney General to distribute
federal funds to local law enforcement through the COPS Oﬃce at the De-
partment of Justice, with the goal of putting 100,000 new police oﬃcers on the
street by the year 2000. The COPS Oﬃce provides grants to law enforcement
to support a number of functions, including technology improvements, public
school safety, and community policing programs; however, hiring grants rep-
resent over 50% of funds distributed. Hiring grants have retained the same
basic features over time, including provisions that grant funding is not used
to supplant local funds for existing oﬃcers, that local law enforcement must
match a portion of the funding for each new oﬃcer hired, and that each grant
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is funded for period of three years.4
Early evaluations of COPS hiring grants by academic criminol-
ogists and the government found evidence that the grants were often used
to supplant local funding for existing police, rather than hire new oﬃcers
[41, 88, 106]. Given concerns about the eﬀectiveness of the grants, the Bush
Administration sharply decreased funding for the COPS oﬃce between 2000
and 2008, reaching a low of approximately $210 million in new grants (of
all types) distributed in 2007, with no new hiring grants distributed in 2006
or 2007.5 After the financial crisis in 2008, the Obama Administration ad-
vocated for increased funding for the COPS Oﬃce, as the Administration
viewed COPS grants as a tool to support local law enforcement agencies with
stretched resources during the recession. In 2009, the American Reinvestment
and Recovery Act (ARRA) provided an additional $1 billion in funds to the
COPS Oﬃce to help address the personnel needs of state, local, and tribal
police departments [91].
Descriptive statistics of COPS grants over time reflect the chang-
ing political interest in this program. The top two graphs in Figure 3.1 show
4The institutional details described in this section were obtained through the COPS
website (http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/) as well as direct communications with staﬀ at the
COPS Oﬃce.
5In Figure 3.1, this dollar figure is lower, at less than $200 million, because information in
the figures only include data for the restricted analysis sample used in this study. The most
important sample restriction is that I limit attention to municipal police agencies, rather
than including the universe of diﬀerent police department types (county police, sheriﬀ’s
departments, state police, university police, etc.).
75
that grants and grant funding declined between 2000 and 2008, and then shot
up again in 2009 with the increase in ARRA stimulus funding. The bottom
left graph in Figure 3.1 shows that prior to 2000, nearly all hiring grants were
accepted, but when funding was cut for the COPS oﬃce during the Bush Ad-
ministration, grants became more competitive.6 The gap between applications
and acceptances increased in 2009, as the demand for federal assistance during
the downturn outstripped the newly authorized funding. Because the research
design in this paper hinges on controlling for the timing of endogenous de-
cisions to apply for hiring grants, I restrict the analysis to the time period
between 2000-2014 when there is variation in hiring grant applications and
acceptances. The bottom right graph shows the actual variation used in this
study, where acceptances are defined during the full period that each grant is
administered rather than just the first year a grant is awarded, and applica-
tions are similarly defined for the corresponding full treatment period when a
grant is intended to be received.
Prior to 2009, COPS hiring grants provided up to 75% of the salary
and benefit cost per police oﬃcer up to a max benefit of $75,000 per oﬃcer over
three years. During this period, police departments submitted short narrative
6Literature examining earlier years of this program could not exploit variation in COPS
grant applications because nearly all hiring grants were approved by the COPS oﬃce prior
to 2000. [34] use data from approximately 2,000 cities to measure the impact of grants
awarded between 1994 and 2001. The authors conduct limited tests that show that total
amount awarded to each department is not correlated with pre-program crime rates, but
these tests are aggregated across years and are not referenced to the actual point in time
when a grant is received.
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applications for hiring grants, and the selection process for hiring grant recip-
ients was based on the subjective determination of the COPS Oﬃce. These
descriptions varied widely, but typically included a brief description of how
prospective grant funds would be used. Likewise, the training, monitoring
and auditing of grantees was not standardized in this period. Beginning in
2009, the COPS Oﬃce changed the terms of its grants to respond to greater
personnel needs of police departments during recession, providing 100% of the
salary and benefit cost of a police oﬃcer up to a max benefit of $125,000 per
oﬃcer over three years, for up to 5% of the current sworn police force.7 At
the same time, the COPS Oﬃce formalized grant processes and increased its
monitoring eﬀorts of grant recipients.8
The new grants also had more extensive application procedures,
including questions on district crime, financial needs, and community policing
programs and partnerships.9 These applications were scored by considering
7Departments have also been limited to a maximum number of hires, and these hiring
ceilings varied moderately year to year for police departments of diﬀerent sizes, from 15-50
total oﬃcers.
8In this period, recipients were required to submit quarterly progress reports to the
COPS Oﬃce and 10% of grantees were identified by a risk algorithm for more extensive
monitoring. Relative to the number of grants that are monitored, only a tiny fraction are
formally audited, with only 211 audits of COPS grantees (for all program types) between
2000-2014 (https://oig.justice.gov/reports/cops-ext.htm).
9Applicants must provide a strategic plan of community policing activities the depart-
ment will enact during the grant period. For fiscal need, police departments provide informa-
tion on their police force and hiring request and their budget, as well as district information
on local tax revenue, the percentage of families in poverty, the unemployment rate, the
foreclosure rate, and details on major financial or budgetary events in the district. Lastly,
applicants are asked to provide counts of the 7 Index I crimes for the prior three years
(http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/Default.asp?Item=2819).
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the fiscal needs and community policing proposals in each district, while also
placed a lower weight on local crime conditions. The application weight on
crime varied from 20-35% of the total score between 2009 and 2014, while
the weight on fiscal need ranged from 30-75% and the weight on community
policing ranged from 15-50% of the total score. After considering application
scores, the COPS oﬃce has faced the additional allocation constraint that at
least 0.5% of grant program funds must be distributed to each state and half
of all funds must go to police departments serving districts with fewer than
150,000 residents.
The fact that crime conditions were included in the hiring grant
application process is an important consideration for the identification strat-
egy in this paper, which presumes that the timing of a grant acceptance is
not based on changes in crime rates within a district. From a grant design
perspective, it is important to note that crime was a minor factor in grant
distribution decisions that was weighed alongside a number of other dimen-
sions and allocation restrictions. Given the importance of this consideration, I
formally test this identification assumption empirically in Section 2.4.3 below.
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2.3 Empirical Model and Data Sources
A primary obstacle to measuring the impact of crime control policy
is simultaneity.10 While police may have a causal impact on reducing crime,
districts with higher levels of crime may also respond by hiring more police.
If the true eﬀect of police is to reduce crime, then simultaneity in the model
will cause the key coeﬃcient on police to be upwardly biased toward zero.
This paper employs an instrumental variables design to break this
feedback loop, using an instrument that increases police force size but is not
a function of crime. The empirical design uses the discontinuous increase in
funding for police from federal COPS hiring grants as an instrument for police
force size, as has been used in other prior research [e.g. 34]. However, the
design in this paper controls for the elective decision to apply for a COPS
grant, measuring the eﬀect of receiving a grant conditional on this application
decision. By controlling for grant application decisions, this instrument is not
a function of the decision of a police department to apply for a grant but is
instead only a function of the federal government’s decisions about how to
allocate these grants.
10As noted by [15], measurement error in policing data may also introduce bias in this
relationship.
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The empirical model is as follows:
Policeit = ↵0 + ↵1AcceptHiringit + ↵2ApplyHiringit (2.1)
+↵3ApplyOtherGrantsit + ↵4AcceptOtherGrantsit
+ Xit +  ct +  i + uit
Crimeit =  0 +  1Policeit +  2ApplyHiringit (2.2)
+ 3ApplyOtherGrantsit +  4AcceptOtherGrantsit
+ ˜Xit +  ˜ct +  ˜i + "it
where, Crimeit and Policeit are the crime rate and police rate for city i in year
t, or the number of reported crimes or police oﬃcers per 10,000 residents.11
The primary outcomes considered in this paper are the 7 Index I crimes, which
include 4 violent crime categories, murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated as-
sault, and 3 property crime categories, burglary, larceny, and vehicle theft. Xit
is a vector of demographic covariates that includes municipal district popu-
lation, proportion male, the racial distribution of the population (proportion
White, Black, and Hispanic), the age distribution of the population (propor-
tion under 14, between 15 and 24, and between 25 and 39), the unemployment
rate, and average earnings for individuals employed in the municipality.
11In this study, I use a liberal population restriction of cities with more than 1,000 resi-
dents. In my sample, several of the crime outcomes frequently take values of 0, rendering
a log-log model infeasible without systematically restricting the sample to higher crime lo-
cations and years. Instead, I construct crime outcomes and police variables as rates per
capita, which improves the model’s comparison across cities of diﬀerent sizes. While several
papers scale crime rates by 100,000 residents, I adjust rates per 10,000 residents given the
large number of smaller cities in the sample.
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 ct are year by population group fixed eﬀects, that allow the model
to separately control for diﬀering crime time trends in cities of diﬀerent sizes.
City population groups are split into cities with 1,000 to 1,999 residents, 2,000
to 4,999 residents, 5,000 to 9,999 residents, 10,000 to 24,999 residents, 25,000
to 49,999 residents, 50,000 to 99,999 residents and 100,000 residents or more.12
In Section 3.4.4, I examine alternative controls for diﬀering time trends across
diﬀerent district types, including robustness checks with state by year fixed
eﬀects and grant application cohort by year fixed eﬀects.
The crime and police data are drawn from the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) Uniform Crime Report (UCR) data, while the demo-
graphic data are compiled from the U.S. Census and the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS). Police agencies report their crime and police information to
the UCR program voluntarily, and while the FBI conducts some auditing and
monitoring of submissions, a number of reporting errors likely persist in the
data. Because reporting errors may be more common for smaller police de-
partments, prior literature has restricted analysis to larger cities, typically to
cities over 10,000 residents or more. To address these issues and expand my
sample to municipalities with 1,000 residents or more, the crime and police
data are cleaned using a regression algorithm to identify outliers and replace
these outliers as missing. In this algorithm, I regress each district’s crime and
police outcomes on a quartic time trend to obtain fitted trend values for each
12These groups are determined using the modal population group for a city over the period
of 1990-2014.
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outcome and then identify outliers that deviate from these fitted values be-
yond a threshold (see Data Appendix C.2 for more detail).13 After cleaning
the data, there are 6,966 police districts and 93,081 observations in the violent
crime sample and 6,964 districts and 93,296 observations in the property crime
sample.
The research design hinges on the grant acceptance and application
variables in the model. The variable ApplyHiringit is an indicator for whether
a police department applied for a hiring grant in year t, t 1, or t 2, allowing
this dummy variable to be set to 1 for the duration of the 3 year grant period for
which the agency applied for funding. Similarly, the AcceptHiringit variable is
also a dummy variable set to equal 1 if the agency received a grant and is within
the 3 year funded grant period. In this structure, a department that applied
for funding in 2009 and was rejected would have the indicator ApplyHiringit
set to 1 during the 3 year period of 2009, 2010, and 2011 when the department
would have received funding if accepted, and the AcceptHiringit variable set
to 0 during this same period. Likewise, a department with an accepted grant
13The threshold is the maximum of a 50 percent deviation from the fitted value or the 99th
percentile of the distribution of deviations from fitted values for cities within a population
group. Outliers are identified using a larger sample window of 1990-2014 and are identified
separately for violent and property crimes and arrests, allowing these groups of outcomes
to have diﬀerent observations in the model results. The regression algorithm is based on
a procedure that is used by [34] to flag outliers for manual visual inspection; in the larger
sample in this paper, I use the algorithm to replace observations as missing. The regression
algorithm I use to identify outliers is eﬀective at retaining information for small districts that
appear to be consistently and accurately reporting crime data. To the best of my knowledge,
this paper uses a lower population threshold than other papers in this space, allowing for a
larger and more representative national sample. The 1,000 resident population restriction
excludes 13% of the cleaned data sample.
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in 2009 would have both indicators set to 1 for the 3 year grant period of
2009-2011.14 The actual grant duration variation that corresponds to the
construction of the ApplyHiringit and AcceptHiringit variables is shown in
the lower right graph in Figure 3.1.
Police departments may apply and/or be accepted for multiple
grants during the sample period, and over time the same district can change
states, alternating between having a rejected grant, an accepted grant, or no
application. The total impact of receiving a grant is the sum ofAcceptHiringit+
ApplyHiringit while the impact of a grant rejection is ApplyHiringit. Because
the decision to apply for a grant is non-random and may be influenced by the
needs and goals of a police department, ApplyHiringit serves as a critical con-
ditioning control in this model, while the conditional AcceptHiringit variable
is the excluded instrument. The analysis in this paper is focused on the 2000-
2014 time period because prior to 2000 nearly all hiring grant applications
were accepted (Figure 3.1, lower right graph).
Data on all of the rejected and accepted COPS grants was obtained
through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the COPS DOJ Of-
fice. Through this disclosure, COPS shared information on the grant program,
14In the UCR data, police oﬃcer employment is reported as a snapshot on October 31st.
To match this timing feature, grants with start dates for January-October are Indexed to
begin in the current calendar year and grants with start dates in November and December
are Indexed to begin in the following year (see Data Appendix C.2). I choose to match
police and crime variables within the same year because October employment reflects hiring
from earlier months in the year, and I observe a strong first stage using this construction.
This timing assumption diﬀers from [34] which lags police variables by a year.
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project start date, and project end date for both rejected and accepted appli-
cations. For accepted grants, the COPS disclosure also included the amount
of money awarded and the number of oﬃcers eligible for funding through the
grant, although this information was often incomplete.15
The model also includes municipal police district or police depart-
ment fixed eﬀects,  i. By including police department fixed eﬀects, the model
does not simply compare crime outcomes for districts that received hiring
grants to districts that applied for but did not receive a grant. Instead, as
in most papers examining the impact of police, the model uses within district
variation to control for unobserved factors that vary across districts but do
not change over time. Using within district variation helps to control for dif-
ferences in policing culture and objectives, diﬀerences in local governments,
and diﬀerences in crime patterns across cities that are constant over time.
The police department fixed eﬀects are critical to the model design, as they
also control for baseline diﬀerences in police organizations that may aﬀect a
department’s likelihood of receiving a grant.16
15In their evaluation of the COPS hiring grant program, [34] used variation in the size
of the monetary award as an instrument for police force expansions rather than simply
whether a police department received a grant. In this paper, it is not possible to use the
size of monetary awards as an instrument because comparable information is not available
for departments that applied for grants and were rejected. Using variation on the intensive
margin could bias the results if the funding amounts of rejected applicants (not observed)
systematically diﬀers from the funding amounts requested and received by accepted grantees.
16Given the inclusion of police department fixed eﬀects, it is not possible to directly include
lags of crime rates in the model as this would introduce mechanical correlation between a
lagged crime term and the error term.
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In this structure, the impact of policing is measured as the dif-
ference in crime outcomes in years when a district is receiving federal COPS
funding versus years when a district did not apply for funding, while also con-
trolling for changes in policing that occur in years when a district applies for
funding and is rejected. Because there is substantial variation in appropria-
tions for hiring grants across years, the number of possible grants that can
be funded in a given year is a key driver of the probability of hiring grant
acceptance within a district over time (Figure 3.1, upper right graph). It is
worth emphasizing that the variation in grant receipt across districts is more
likely to be aﬀected by diﬀerences in application eﬀort and other diﬀering at-
tributes across police departments, and that these factors are controlled for by
including police department fixed eﬀects,  i. The identifying assumption of
the model is that conditional on a police department’s decision to apply for a
hiring grant in a given year, the timing of the acceptance of that department’s
grant proposal is not a function of changes in crime rates in that police district.
In addition to satisfying this identifying assumption, the instru-
ment must also satisfy the exclusion restriction. The exclusion restriction re-
quires that the conditional acceptance of a hiring grant may only reduce crime
through increasing the size of the police force in a department. In Section 2.4.2
below, I discuss the results from the first stage, which show that the number
of police actually hired as a result of a grant is lower than the number of police
that are designated to be hired in COPS hiring grant applications. This im-
perfect pass-through means that some grant funding may serve other purposes
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in a police department that cannot be observed or addressed by the researcher.
To address this concern, I include controls for COPS grant acceptances and
applications for police functions other than hiring, AcceptOtherGrantsit and
ApplyOtherGrantsit, as hiring grant acceptances may be correlated with both
the interest in and receipt of grants for other policing functions that could
also influence crime outcomes. Data on grants for non-hiring functions (such
as technology, school grants, and community partnership grants) provides a
proxy measure of police department interest in investing in these alternative
policing functions.17 After including these controls, the analysis that follows
assumes that the transfer of grant funds influence crime through police hiring
rather than other means.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Summary Statistics
The average police district in the sample has 24,278 residents, a
police rate of 23.5 oﬃcers, a violent crime rate of 34.8, and a property crime
rate of 318.1 (per 10,000 residents). The demographics in the sample are com-
parable to those in the U.S. over this period, with districts that are on average
84% White, 10% Black, and 11% Hispanic, while the average unemployment
rate is 7% and the average annual earnings for employed workers was $35,991
17These variables are coded to reflect the varying project duration of COPS grants across
programs (see Data Appendix C.2).
86
(Table 2.1).
Within the sample period, 9% of district-year observations are
funded within a 3 year COPS hiring grant cycle, while 26% of observations
are within a comparable application hiring grant cycle, corresponding to an
eﬀective acceptance rate of 35% (Table 2.1). The average hiring award is
$825,585 or $223,788 per 10,000 residents, designating funding for an average
of 5.8 police oﬃcers or 2 police oﬃcers per 10,000 residents. While only 25%
of districts were ever accepted for a hiring grant, 65% of districts applied for
at least one hiring grant during the sample period. On average, police depart-
ments applied for multiple hiring grants, resulting in 17% of the sample that
was both accepted and rejected for a hiring grant within the sample period
(Table 2.2).
2.4.2 Primary Results
Table 2.3 shows the primary model results for violent and property
crime rates using the preferred specification. The direct OLS estimation of
the impact of police on violent and property crime yields small but significant
positive coeﬃcients. As discussed above, OLS estimates may be upwardly
biased due to simultaneity.
The first stage estimates show that the conditional impact of re-
ceiving hiring grant funding results in an increase of 0.65 oﬃcers per 10,000
residents, considerably less than the eligible police oﬃcer increase designated
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by the average grant, which would increase the police rate by 2 oﬃcers per
10,000 residents (Table 2.2). These results imply that for every oﬃcer funded
through a COPS grant, 0.33 oﬃcers are actually hired. My first stage estimates
are lower than those in [34], who find that for every oﬃcer funded through a
grant, only 0.7 oﬃcers were actually hired. At the same time, the application
controls in my model show that police departments that apply for grants and
are not accepted actually cut their police forces, and this provides meaningful
context to understanding the first stage impact of grant awards.
Though these results are not stated in dollar terms, the gap in el-
igible hires and actual hires is consistent with the literature on the "flypaper
eﬀects" of intergovernmental grants which predicts substantive but imperfect
pass-through of targeted grant funding [e.g. 54]. Controlling for grant appli-
cations increases the observed conditional grant receipt or implied "flypaper"
eﬀects in this paper, because districts that applied and did not receive grants
reduced their police staﬃng levels.
The imperfect pass-through of funding may mean that hires were
more costly than projected in the grant applications or that local districts
did not comply with the fund matching requirement of grants. Alternatively,
these grant funds may have been utilized for other policing purposes that
could also impact crime and may be a concern for the exclusion restriction. As
discussed above, I have included application and acceptance variables for other
COPS grant types as a proxy for a district’s interest and investment in non-
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hiring policing functions, as these non-hiring functions may be both correlated
with hiring grants and aﬀect crime outcomes. Moreover, it is unlikely that
departments are reducing crime through diverting grant funds to increased
wages for existing oﬃcers, because wages and hiring are budget trade-oﬀs and
reductions in crime are strongly associated with increasing hiring in the IV
estimates.
The coeﬃcient on ApplyHiringit is -0.13 to -0.14 and is significant
at the 5% level, showing that police departments that applied for and did
not receive grants were anticipating staﬃng reductions. Though this negative
coeﬃcient means that the total impact of a grant is less than the conditional
acceptance eﬀect, it implies that police departments applying for hiring grants
did in fact need these grants to maintain their staﬃng levels. In contrast, both
the ApplyOtherGrantsit and AcceptOtherGrantsit coeﬃcients are positive
and significant, suggesting that districts that applied for other grant types
were planning to increase funding for staﬃng, whether or not an other grant
was received. The instrument AcceptHiringit has a high level of predictive
power, with associated F-Statistics of 74.6 to 77.5.
In the reduced form models, the impact of receiving a hiring grant
on crime rates, conditional on applying, is negative and highly significant.
The impact of applying for a hiring grant is positive for both violent and
property crime and highly significant for violent crime, showing that police
departments that decide to apply for hiring grants subsequently experience
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increases in crime rates.
The two stage least squares or instrumental variables estimates in
columns (4) and (8) show that police have a large impact on reducing crime.
The implied elasticities evaluated at the mean are -1.28 for violent crime rates
and -0.73 for property crime rates, and are moderately larger than the -0.3 to
-1 range in the prior literature on policing.18 In this paper, controlling for the
elective decision to apply for hiring grants increases the measured impact of
policing, because applications are associated with future crime increases. In
other words, omitting the application controls would lead to an underestimate
of the impact of policing on crime.
In Table B.1, I estimate the impact of diﬀerent components of the
model by successively including additional controls. In this table, all models
include controls for hiring grant application and other grant application and
acceptance. In columns (1) and (5), the models control only for time fixed
eﬀects, and all estimation approaches show a strong positive relationship be-
tween police and crime. Adding demographic covariates in columns (2) and
(6) does have an impact on the magnitude of these coeﬃcients, but they re-
main large and positive. When police department fixed eﬀects are added in
columns (3) and (7), the sign flips negative for the reduced form and IV re-
gressions, highlighting the importance of using within police district variation
18Because there are multiple treatments within districts over time, I use calculate elastici-
ties using crime and police means for the entire sample period rather than a "pre-treatment"
mean.
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rather than cross-sectional variation. In the preferred specification, columns
(4) and (8), I add year by city size fixed eﬀects in place of year fixed eﬀects
to flexibly control for changing crime trends in rural and urban municipali-
ties. These additional fixed eﬀects modestly reduce the magnitude of the IV
estimates.
Using the preferred model, I next estimate the eﬀects of policing on
each of the 7 Index I crimes in the UCR data in Table 2.4. These results show
that the police impact on the violent crime rate is driven by eﬀects on robbery
and aggravated assault. There is no significant impact of police on murder or
rape, and these weak results may be due to the fact that these crimes have a
low incidence in the sample, making it diﬃcult to identify a change. Within
property crime, policing has a large impact on larceny and vehicle theft, but
the coeﬃcient on policing in the burglary regression is actually positive with
an elasticity of 0.79.19 Robbery and vehicle theft have the largest elasticities
among the crimes with significant eﬀects, with elasticities of -2.1 and -4.1
respectively. The crime eﬀects are most significant for crimes of acquisition:
robbery, larceny, and vehicle theft.
19The positive burglary eﬀect may be an artifact of noise in this variable, as can be seen
in the treatment eﬀect over time graph in Table B.1.
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2.4.3 Model Validity and Treatment Eﬀects Over Time
As discussed above, the identifying assumption of the model is
that conditional on a police department’s decision to apply for a hiring grant
in a given year, the timing of hiring grant acceptance is not a function of
changes in crime rates within a police district. To formally test the identifying
assumption, I estimate the treatment eﬀect of hiring grant acceptances and
applications interacted with year indicator variables for the three years before
and after treatment.20
Figure 2.2 displays the results of these tests, where each row shows
the acceptance and application coeﬃcients over time from the same regression
on the total sample. The lags for hiring grant acceptances are flat for both
violent and property crimes, though in period -3, the lag for violent crime
rates is positive and significant. For the application eﬀects, the pre-treatment
indicators are also primarily flat for both violent and property crime. There is
no observed spike in total violent or property crime in the year prior to treat-
ment for either acceptances or applications, indicating that police departments
20Each treatment is centered within a 6 year time window with the year prior to treatment
(year -1) omitted, restricting the sample to hiring applications and acceptances that were
submitted between 2000-2012. The years 2000 and 2001 use lagged data that is outside
the sample period from 1998 and 1999, that was cleaned and prepared in the same way as
data in the sample period. Because districts can have multiple acceptances or applications
over time, the data is duplicated and stacked for each year between 2000 and 2012. To
control for multiple treatments, I define indicators for hiring and other grant acceptances
and applications within each duplicated data set that are defined in all years other than
the centered treatment year, when they are set to equal zero. This procedure creates a
"pseudo-panel" of duplicated data that functions as if each district had a single treatment.
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are not applying for or receiving hiring grants because of transient shocks to
crime rates. Despite the inclusion of crime information in COPS hiring grant
applications, these tests confirm that prior crime rates were a minor factor in
determining acceptances within police districts.21
Instead of observing pre-treatment deviations in crime conditions
for grant applicants, a diﬀerent picture emerges in these graphs. The accep-
tance coeﬃcients are negative in the post-treatment period for both violent
and property crime and tend to get larger over the grant period. In contrast,
the application coeﬃcients are positive and are highly significant for violent
crime in the post-treatment period. Consistent with the general model results,
this test shows that, on average, police departments that decide to apply for
hiring grants subsequently experience increases in crime rates. This pattern
suggests that the years that departments choose to apply for hiring funds are
"negatively selected." Because of this relationship, failing to control for their
application decision would lead to an underestimate of the impact of policing.
In contrast to the crime rate outcomes, it does appear that hiring
grant acceptances were more likely to be distributed to districts facing police
21Figure B.1 shows the eﬀects for specific crimes. Pre-trends in the timing of conditional
acceptance rates (top row of each pane), are insignificant for all sub-crimes except for robbery
and burglary, where they are positive. While these eﬀects do not translate to overall crime
rate trends, an upward bias in the pre-period could increase the size of the crime elasticities
that I estimate. To address these concerns, I include a number of robustness checks in
Section 3.4.4 that control for additional aspects of selection in the timing of conditional
acceptances, including application cohort time trends, and time trends that vary across
cities that were only accepted, never accepted, were both accepted and rejected, or never
applied.
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staﬃng shortfalls, as the acceptance coeﬃcients are highly significant and neg-
ative in the pre-treatment years when police employment rates are considered
as an outcome. This pattern reflects the COPS application consideration of
"fiscal need" in grant allocation decisions. Notably, while flat pre-treatment
crime trends are necessary for the identification assumptions of the model, a
dip in pre-treatment policing levels in the first stage does not violate the as-
sumptions of the estimation approach. Consistent with evidence from the first
stage of the model, the bottom right graph of Figure 2.2 shows that police
departments applying for grants were also anticipating moderate reductions in
staﬃng.
Though prior research on policing discusses the issue of the joint
determination of crime and policing in a given time period, this research has
not been able to empirically investigate whether police departments may re-
spond to their outlook of future crime. If police hiring is not only a function of
current or prior crime rates but is also a function of expectations of crime rates
in later periods, there are additional measurement obstacles to understanding
the causal impact of police beyond simple simultaneity bias. The relationship
between police application decisions and subsequent crime increases could in
part be due to foreseeable police staﬃng shortfalls that contribute to crime
increases. At the same time, the hiring application coeﬃcients in this paper
provide suggestive evidence that police departments may have an understand-
ing of their communities that allows them to make dynamic hiring decisions
based on expectations of changes in crime.
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The relationship between police department grant application deci-
sions and subsequent crime rates is also consistent with theories of fiscal feder-
alism [e.g. 87], which investigate optimal assignment of taxation and spending
across diﬀerent tiers of government. In this context, police departments have
local and specific knowledge about the crime conditions in their communities
as well as the resource needs of their organizations. When departments seek
funding and are not assisted by the federal government, they appear to operate
at a lower level of eﬃciency.
2.4.4 Robustness Tests
Next, I perform several robustness tests of the model. First, I con-
duct placebo tests that randomly vary the timing of hiring grant acceptance
among police departments that apply for hiring grants, to show that the ob-
served eﬀects are due to actual hiring grant receipt and not due to chance.
Figure 2.3 maps the distribution of 1,000 replications of these randomized
timing placebo tests and shows that the model estimates are well below the
95% confidence interval of the replication distribution.22
Table 2.6 shows the results of additional robustness tests using
diﬀerent analysis samples and methodologies.23 Specification 1 extends the
22I assign placebo acceptances in such a way that the placebo acceptance rate matches
the observed acceptance rate over the total sample period. Results are similar for placebo
tests that randomize both the application timing and acceptance timing for hiring grants.
23I have also explored the heterogeneity of the police impacts by interacting the key police
rate coeﬃcient with characteristics of police districts but found few interesting patterns
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sample period to 1990-2014 to include years when nearly all hiring grants were
accepted and finds smaller impacts of hiring grants, with no significant impacts
for larceny and aggravated assault. Because it is not possible to eﬀectively
control for the application eﬀect between 1990-2000, this larger sample period
may underestimate the impact of police by not incorporating the fact that
departments face future crime increases when they apply for grants.
In Specification 2, I expand the sample to include small police
departments with fewer than 1,000 residents, a sample that may have a higher
rate of reporting errors. The results in this sample are directionally consistent
with those from the base analysis sample, though the coeﬃcients are smaller in
the noisier sample. When the model observations are weighted by population
in Specification 3, the coeﬃcients increase in magnitude, showing that the
crime reduction eﬀects are driven by districts with larger populations. In
these tests, the elasticity for violent crime is -2.7 and for property crime is -2,
over 2 times the elasticities in the base model.
Because criminal justice policies and policing tactics may have
common elements within states, I include state by year fixed eﬀects in Specifi-
cation 4, replacing the population group by year fixed eﬀects in the base model.
This specification allows crime time trends to diﬀer across states, rather than
beyond stronger impacts in more populous cities (results available on request). In these
tests, crime reduction eﬀects appear to be larger in districts that have a greater proportion
of non-white residents, however, this result may be partly due to the fact that diverse
districts are also likely to be more populous and eﬀects are stronger in larger cities.
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across diﬀerent city population groups (base model). The estimates using this
approach are quite similar to the base specification.
In Specifications 5 and 6, I consider alternatives to the data clean-
ing approach that is used in the analysis. In Specification 5, I use an alternative
method to identify outliers. Here, I define the ratio of crime outcomes (and
police employment) to the within city mean for a variable and then remove
observations with ratios that are below the 1st percentile and above the 99th
percentile within each population group. This cleaning procedure drops more
observations than my preferred algorithm, yielding a sample of 65,548 for vio-
lent crime and 74,663 for property crime. The results using this procedure are
consistent with the primary results, and are stronger for larceny and vehicle
theft, while the positive coeﬃcient on burglary is also larger and more signif-
icant.24 In Specification 6, I expand the sample to include the raw data that
does not exclude the outliers that were identified when the data was cleaned.25
These results show the importance of cleaning the data as none of the crime
outcomes show notable or significant impacts of police on crime reduction in
this specification.
In the second part of Table 2.6, I formulate a number of robust-
24Like the main cleaning algorithm, this procedure identifies outliers for groups of out-
comes, violent crime, property crime and police employment, and then sets sub categories
equal to zero when there is an outlier in the larger group. This procedure also uses data
from 1990-2014 to identify outliers.
25This raw data does include basic data cleaning but was not subject to the algorithm to
identify outliers (see Data Appendix C.2).
97
ness checks related to the grant variation I use in the estimation strategy.
First, I directly consider the impact of controlling for application by estimat-
ing the model without these controls in Specification 7. These estimates are
less negative and less significant than the preferred model, showing that failing
to condition on application decisions leads to an underestimate of the crime
reducing impact of police hiring.
I construct an illustrative test in Specification 8 that uses award
dollars per capita as an instrument for police employment rates, a strategy
similar in spirit to the methodology in [34]. To do this, I exclude munici-
palities with missing award information for accepted hiring grants or other
COPS grants at any point in the sample period. Unfortunately, I do not have
information on the award amount requested for grants that were rejected, so
these tests do not contain controls for grant applications. Like Specification
7, these estimates are weaker and less significant than the preferred model.
The elasticities in this model are -0.62 for violent crime and -0.46 for property
crime, which are close to those reported in [34] of -0.99 and -0.26, respectively.
Restricting the sample to police agencies that applied for a hiring
grant in Specification 9, or to agencies that were accepted for a hiring grant
in Specification 10, does little to change the magnitude or general pattern of
results. In Specification 11, I further restrict the sample to include only those
agencies that were both rejected for a hiring grant and received a hiring grant
in the sample period. Despite shrinking the sample by over 60%, these results
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are roughly consistent with the main model estimates, though many of the
coeﬃcients are not significant.
A small fraction of grant recipients withdrew their applications and
returned their funding after their project was accepted by the COPS Oﬃce
(13% of accepted grant years). In the main model, I consider withdrawn
acceptances within the accepted category, which renders the grant coeﬃcients
in the first stage as "intent to treat" estimates. In Specification 12, I consider
withdrawn hiring and other grant applications as a separate category and
exclude them from accepted grants. The results are highly consistent with the
preferred specification, showing that the categorization of these grants is not
critical to the analysis.
In Specification 13, I allow the crime time trends in police districts
to vary by their hiring grant acceptance profile. I define four mutually exclu-
sive groups of police departments, (1) departments for which all applications
were accepted, (2) departments for which all applications were rejected, (3)
departments that were both accepted and rejected on COPS grant applica-
tions, and (4) departments that did not apply for grants. I allow the crime
trends to diﬀer across these acceptance groups by inserting acceptance group
by year fixed eﬀects in place of the population group by year fixed eﬀects in
the base model. The eﬀects in this specification are comparable to the base
model, with eﬀect sizes that are somewhat larger.
Lastly, in Specification 14, I allow the year fixed eﬀects to vary
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by grant application cohort, interacting the year eﬀects with whether a police
department submitted a new application for a grant in that year.26 As in
Specification 4, this estimation replaces the population group by year fixed
eﬀects with an alternate set of year fixed eﬀects. This model allows time
trends to vary by a department’s time-varying application decisions. The
results from this robustness check are consistent with the base model, though
they are larger and more significant.
2.4.5 Mechanisms: Crime Clearances
While prior work has consistently found that police reduce crime,
there is less consensus about the mechanisms behind this eﬀect.27 Broadly,
when police reduce crime rates, they may do so by taking more individuals
into custody and increasing total levels of incapacitation, or by reducing crime
through deterrence. The distinction between incapacitation and deterrence is
important because incapacitation entails additional costs beyond the base cost
of hiring police, including the direct costs of court proceedings and incarcera-
26I define application cohorts using the first year that a district applied for a grant, going
back to the beginning of program data in 1994. Due to small numbers of "first applications"
in certain years, I group 2004-2008 cohorts and the 2010-2014 cohorts together.
27There is a growing literature that evaluates particular police tactics and finds mixed
results. For example, there is evaluation evidence that "hot spots" policing, a tactic that
focuses policing resources on high crime areas within a city, is an eﬀective approach to
reducing crime [e.g. 9, 101], while other papers have found that "broken windows" policing,
which emphasizes heavy enforcement for low level crimes, has weak crime reducing eﬀects
[12]. Likewise, advances in computing and IT in police departments may reduce crime when
they are coupled with complementary management strategies, including personnel training
and specialization [43].
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tion and indirect "collateral" costs to incarcerated individuals.28
It may also be the case that while crime falls, arrests stay flat or
decrease at a slower pace than crime, meaning that while total incapacitation
levels do not increase, the proportion of crimes that result in apprehension
increases. A recent book chapter by [89] finds that arrests for Index I crimes
do not increase as a result of COPS hiring grants, and because of this, she
attributes the decline in crime caused by police hiring to be due to increased
deterrence from a greater policing presence. A growing literature in economics
and criminology finds that the certainty of punishment may be more important
to deterring potential oﬀenders than punishment severity [53, 68, 73, 83]. If
this is true, an increase in crime solving rates may be tied to an increase in
deterrence and reductions in crime.
Criminologists often examine clearance rates, or the number of
crimes solved or "cleared" (by arrest or other means) divided by the total
number of reported crimes, as a metric of police performance in crime solv-
ing.29 When modeling clearances as an outcome, it is important to contextu-
alize changes in clearances, as clearance rates are not direct measures of police
eﬀectiveness [19]. For example, a district that has a constant or declining
28There is extensive literature on the collateral costs of incarceration in the United States.
These costs may include increased rates of reoﬀending, lost income, higher rates of unem-
ployment, and adverse impacts on families and children [e.g. 59, 80, 90, 92].
29Cleared or solved crimes are correlated with arrests and changes in incapacitation and
are available for Index I crimes in the UCR data. Cleared crime counts are not directly
comparable to reported crimes because they may include crimes solved that were reported
in earlier years. A crime may also be cleared without an arrest (e.g. a suspect is deceased).
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clearance rate and a decline in crime may be experiencing an increase in polic-
ing productivity. While examining clearance rates is the standard approach
to estimate the impact of additional police on crime solving performance, I do
not use clearance rates as an outcome in this paper because clearance rates
are undefined when the number of reported crimes in a category is zero.
Instead, I estimate the impact of police rates on total numbers
of cleared crimes adjusted per 10,000 residents in Table 2.5. I then conduct
a bootstrap sample test to measure whether the declines in reported crime
and cleared crime are proportional by testing if their estimated elasticities are
equal.30 For the categories with significant reductions in total reported crime
rates, the measured elasticities for cleared crimes are nearly all less negative
than their corresponding crime rates, and are significantly less negative for
robbery, aggravated assault, larceny, total violent crime and total property
crime. This pattern suggests that while the absolute number of crimes cleared
does not increase when more police are hired, the number of crimes cleared
increases relative to the number of crimes reported. Because changes in total
cleared crimes are a measure of changes in incapacitation, total incapacita-
tion levels are likely decreasing while crime solving rates are also going up.
These tests suggest that larger police forces are better equipped to solve crime
and may increase deterrence by raising the probability of apprehension and
30To construct this test, I draw 500 bootstrap samples from the data and derive the
distribution of diﬀerences in the elasticities from estimating the models on each sample. I
then determine the probability of the original observed elasticity diﬀerence relative to the
bootstrap distribution of diﬀerences under the null hypothesis.
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punishment for criminal behavior.
2.4.6 Shifts in Policing Focus
To augment the cleared crime analysis, I include illustrative out-
comes of arrests per 10,000 residents in Table 2.7 in order to gain an under-
standing of how policing activity may change when more police are hired.31
Aside from a slight decline in vehicle theft, there are no significant changes in
arrests for Index I crimes adjusted for population, consistent with the results
for cleared crimes in Table 2.5 and the findings in [89]. However, there are
significant changes in arrest outcomes for categories outside of the 7 Index I
crimes. A greater police presence is associated with increases in arrests for
marijuana sale, while it is also associated with decreases in arrests for the sale
and possession of narcotics. The impact of police expansions on DUI arrests
is also positive and significant, with an elasticity of 1.2.
Unfortunately, arrest outcomes for drug crime and intoxicated driv-
ing cannot easily be benchmarked to crime rates because reported crime rates
are not available for these arrest categories. Consequently, it is not possible
31Arrest counts are available for a larger set of crimes in the FBI UCR data, including
several crimes that are not reported by victims, including drug crimes and driving under
the influence (DUI). I chose to add the categories of simple assault, drug, and DUI arrests
because they are high frequency arrest categories that are more likely to be consistently
and accurately reported. While an arrest may be a means of clearing a crime, arrests
are counted in units of people apprehended and are not directly comparable to crime units
because more than one person may be arrested for a crime. Arrest counts are included at the
person-incident level, with the most serious arrest charge recorded for each person-incident.
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to diﬀerentiate between a decrease in narcotics arrests that corresponds to a
decline in use of narcotics due to increased policing or a decrease in narcotics
arrests that is associated with a reduced emphasis on narcotics enforcement.
For arrest outcomes that increase, it is less likely that these arrest spikes are
linked to a corresponding increases in crime, given that the timing of hiring
grant acceptances is not related to pre-treatment levels of reported crimes that
are observable. Instead, increases in marijuana and DUI arrests are more likely
to occur as a result of increased policing capacity and a shift in policing focus.
The shifts in arrests provide evidence that police departments change tactics
and enforcement patterns when police forces expand.
I also explored how police hiring aﬀects arrests for diﬀerent demo-
graphic subgroups in Table B.2 and Table B.3. The decline in vehicle theft
rates is most significant for Blacks and young adults aged 15-24. Changes in
drug arrests (both the increases in marijuana arrests and decreases in narcotics
arrests) are more pronounced for Blacks, males, and young adults aged 15-24.
The more elastic arrest responses for young Black men may indicate that newly
hired police are focused on policing this demographic group, possibly through
increasing patrols in Black neighborhoods. At the same time, reductions in
larcenies and simple assault arrests are strongest for children younger than 15
and increases in DUI arrests are more significant among Whites and males.
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2.5 Conclusion
This paper uses a novel identification strategy to measure the
causal impact of policing on crime. Using a research design that exploits
variation in federal COPS hiring grants applications and acceptances, I find
that an increase in police presence significantly reduces crime, with elasticities
of -1.28 for violent crime and -0.73 for property crime.
Given the large crime reducing eﬀects of police hiring on serious
crime, investments in police force expansions are likely to be cost-eﬀective.
Leveraging the results in this paper, a "back-of-the-envelope" calculation can
be used to illustrate the welfare impact of police hiring in the context of Index
I crimes. If the average district in the sample increased its police employment
rate by 1 oﬃcer per 10,000 residents, or 2.4 total additional police oﬃcers, the
primary results imply that there would be an annual reduction of 1.5 robberies,
3 aggravated assaults, 20.9 larcenies, and 8.5 vehicle thefts, while increasing
the number of burglaries by 5.3. The cost of this police hiring increase can be
determined directly from the summary statistics and first stage estimates. The
average hiring grant award was $258,234 over 3 years (per 10,000 residents) and
resulted in an increase in the police rate of 0.65. This implies that the annual
cost of raising the police rate by 1 oﬃcer per 10,000 residents is $132,428, or
$54,546 per individual oﬃcer-year. Applying upper and lower bound estimates
of the literature on the social cost of crime, I find that the average welfare
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benefit of this hiring increase ranges from -$16,007 to $556,306 per district.32
Though this range is wide, this exercise confirms that funding for police hiring
likely passes a cost-benefit test when considering changes in Index I crimes.
The clearance and arrest analysis also have welfare implications for
policies that expand police presence. The cleared crimes analysis shows that
police hiring raises the certainty of apprehension without increasing total inca-
pacitation, providing evidence that the declines in Index I crime rates resulting
from police hiring are caused by deterrence. Because total incapacitation rates
for these crimes decrease when police forces expand, any additional costs re-
lated to incarcerating oﬀenders are not likely to outweigh the welfare benefits
of reducing Index I crime rates.
Outside of Index I crimes, investments in police hiring do have sig-
nificant impacts on other arrest types, decreasing arrests for narcotics oﬀenses
and increasing arrests for marijuana oﬀenses and DUI crimes. These arrest
32All monetary values are computed in 2015 dollars in this exercise, using the CPI Inflation
Index from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The lower bound estimates are derived from [78]
that calculates social crime costs by estimating the diﬀerent components of tangible and
intangible victim costs. The upper bound estimates are derived from [18] that estimates
social crime costs from survey responses about willingness-to-pay to avoid crime. Because
larceny and vehicle theft are not included in [18], I calculate the upper bound for these crimes
as the sum of the lower bound and the value of property lost (or "property transfer") for
the average crime in each category using national data from the FBI UCR in 2015, following
the approach in [80]. The cost-benefit calculations shown here do not consider additional
deadweight loss resulting from government transfers or multipliers of employment. I have
also excluded local police department salary matching costs because the first stage estimates
suggest that far fewer police oﬃcers are actually hired by the grants than are designated
by the grants. This shortfall suggests that police departments are not suﬃciently matching
hiring grant funds on average.
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changes are diﬃcult to translate to total welfare because they cannot be con-
textualized to underlying crime rates for these oﬀenses. If one presumes that
declines in narcotics arrests are indicative of reductions in narcotics crime, the
welfare gains for this crime group are likely positive, decreasing total narcotics
crime and incapacitation for these oﬀenses. Alternatively, the welfare impact
of increases in arrests for marijuana oﬀenses and DUIs are more uncertain.
These welfare eﬀects depend on the underlying changes in the incidence of
these oﬀenses, the social cost of these oﬀenses, and the costs and benefits of
additional incapacitation of oﬀenders that are apprehended. Further, because
increases in arrests for diﬀerent oﬀense types are concentrated among partic-
ular demographic groups that may be geographically segregated (e.g. young
Black males for marijuana sales and White males for DUI oﬀenses) there may
be additional community welfare consequences of police hiring.
Beyond providing evidence that police force expansions reduce
crime and are likely cost-eﬀective, this paper oﬀers insight into the nature
of simultaneity bias in measuring impacts of police. By mapping how crime
rates change in districts that apply for hiring grants, I observe that the decision
to apply for federal hiring funds is not motivated by a spike in crime, but is in-
stead correlated with subsequent increases in crime rates. This pattern reveals
that police departments may not only be responsive to current crime condi-
tions, but may also react to expected changes in crime. This paper is the first
to document suggestive evidence of that police decisions are forward-looking,
and this behavior highlights additional challenges in measuring the causal im-
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pact of police. Moreover, this empirical relationship is indicative of specific
knowledge that police departments may have about local crime conditions and
resource needs.
While this paper demonstrates that police hiring has a substan-
tial impact on crime reduction, the results do not provide information on
the eﬀect of police tactics on other critical outcomes, including racial bias or
use-of-force.33 Investments in police should not only improve the safety of
communities but should also establish trust between communities and law en-
forcement. More research is needed to understand best practices in policing
as well as the welfare implications of diﬀerent policing approaches.
33A large body of literature in economics, sociology, and criminology finds evidence that
minority individuals are more likely to interact with the criminal justice system and face
higher probabilities of arrest. In economics, studies have found evidence of statistical dis-
crimination [6, 5] and taste-based discrimination [104] in police interactions.
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2.6 Tables and Figures
Figure 2.1: COPS Grant Program over Time
Figure 2.1.A: COPS Grant Program, Types of Grants
In these graphs hiring grants are attributed to the years in which they were applied for or awarded. The
COPS grants tabulated here correspond to the sample used in analysis rather than the universe of grants
applied for and awarded. In the top graph, grant counts are collapsed within a category, year, and police
department, such that an agency that receives two new technology grants in a given year is only counted
once. Likewise, in the rare cases that there is more than one new hiring application for the same agency
in the same year, these grants are also collapsed, and outcomes are considered acceptances if one or more
grants is accepted. The sample consists of municipalities with over 1,000 residents and is also restricted by
availability of population size, demographic covariates, and censoring of outcome outliers. Funding sharply
decreased for the COPS oﬃce between 2000 and 2008, reaching a low of approximately $210 million in new
grants (of all types) distributed in 2007, with no new hiring grants distributed in 2006 or 2007. The data
shown above for 1994 to 1999 uses comparable sample descriptions as the actual sample period.
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Figure 2.1.B: Hiring Grants, Applications and Acceptances
In the top graph, hiring grants are attributed to the years in which they were applied for or awarded. In the
lower graph, the actual variation used in the analysis is shown in terms of grant-years. In this graph, each
hiring grant has a project period of 3 years that begins in the first year of the grant. Application periods
are also defined to last 3 years. The COPS grants tabulated here correspond to the sample used in analysis
rather than the universe of grants applied for and awarded. Grant counts are collapsed within a category,
year, and police department, such that an agency that receives two new technology grants in a given year
is only counted once. Likewise, in the rare cases that there is more than one new hiring application for the
same agency in the same year, these grants are also collapsed, and outcomes are considered acceptances if
one or more grants is accepted. The sample consists of municipalities with over 1,000 residents and is also
restricted by availability of population size, demographic covariates, and censoring of outcome outliers (see
Data Appendix C.2). Funding sharply decreased for the COPS oﬃce between 2000 and 2008, reaching a
low of approximately $210 million in new grants (of all types) distributed in 2007, with no new hiring grants
distributed in 2006 or 2007. The actual analysis sample is restricted to 2000-2014 though the grant program
was established in 1994. The data shown above for 1994 to 1999 uses comparable sample descriptions as
the actual sample period.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics, Covariates and Outcomes
Mean S.D.
Number-of-Law-Enforcement-Agencies 6,990
Number-of-Observations 94,264
Covariates
Population 24,278 (137,612)
%-Population-<14-Years-Old 0.20 (0.03)
%-Population-15O24-Years-Old 0.14 (0.03)
%-Population-25O39-Years-Old 0.19 (0.03)
%-White 0.84 (0.14)
%-Black 0.10 (0.13)
%-Hispanic 0.11 (0.14)
%-Male 0.49 (0.02)
Unemployment-Rate 0.07 (0.03)
Annual-Pay 35,991 (9,948)
Hiring-Variables
Police-Rate 23.53 (12.88)
Accept-Hiring-Grant 0.09 (0.29)
Apply-Hiring-Grant 0.26 (0.44)
Accept-Other-Grant 0.12 (0.33)
Apply-Other-Grant 0.18 (0.39)
Violent-Crime-Rates
Violent-Crime 34.80 (39.09)
Murder 0.32 (1.05)
Rape 2.63 (3.82)
Robbery 6.86 (11.56)
Aggravated-Assault 24.99 (30.56)
Property-Crime-Rates
Property-Crime 318.1 (238.2)
Burglary- 65.49 (57.25)
Larceny 232.4 (185.3)
Vehicle-Theft 20.23 (26.22)
Crime outcomes and police variables are per 10,000 residents in a municipality. Because of the procedure
used to identify outliers, violent crimes and property crimes have diﬀerent numbers of observations used in
analysis. Violent crime outcomes include 6,966 agencies and 93,081 observations. Property crime outcomes
include 6,964 agencies and 93,296 observations. Covariate and grant variable statistics are calculated using
both sets of observations, or on 6,990 agencies and 93,296 observations. Summary statistics refer to obser-
vations used in the models, over the period of 2000-2014. The grant variables shown in this table reflect the
grant variation used in the analysis with variables constructed to cover the duration of a grant project or
the period that a grant project is intended to occur. This duration is 3 years for hiring grants and varies
for other grant types.
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Table 2.2: Grant Characteristics
Accept Apply
Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Number-of-New-Grant-Years 6,174 18,190
Grant,Type,(Proportion,of,Column)
Hiring 0.39 (0.49) 0.62 (0.48)
Technology 0.31 (0.46) 0.16 (0.36)
School 0.33 (0.47) 0.20 (0.40)
Other-Type 0.39 (0.49) 0.28 (0.45)
Accepted,Hiring,Grants
Hiring-Award-($) 825,585 (3,552,003)
Hiring-Award-($)-per-10,000-Residents 223,788 (227,590)
Eligible-Hires 5.80 (30.29)
Eligible-Hires-per-10,000-Residents 2.01 (2.47)
By,Law,Enforcement,Agency Mean S.D.
Number-of-Law-Enforcement-Agencies 6,990
Hiring,Grants
Ever-Applied 0.65 (0.48)
Number-of-Applications 1.62 (1.68)
Ever-Accepted 0.25 (0.43)
Number-of-Acceptances 0.34 (0.71)
Ever-Rejected 0.58 (0.49)
Number-of-Rejections 1.28 (1.49)
Both-Accepted-and-Rejected 0.17 (0.38)
The number of new grant years is a count of agencies that applied for or were accepted for any new grants in
each year, summed over the sample period. Grant type statistics are proportions of acceptances (6,174 new
grant-years) and applications (18,190 new grant-years) in each respective column. An agency may receive
multiple grants in a year of diﬀerent types, allowing the grant type columns not to sum to one. In some
cases, an agency may apply or be accepted for more than one grant within a type. Across the analyses in
this paper, only collapsed types are considered. In other words, if an agency has one or more other grants
in a year, that agency has the AcceptOtherGrantsit indicator variable turned on. Likewise, the number of
applications is a count of hiring grants collapsed by year. Total award sums all funds received across grant
types and are summed across all observations with any grants awarded. The total award mean is lower than
the hiring award mean because it covers a larger set of grant-years and includes observations with only other
grants. The number of law enforcement agencies are those with either data for property or violent crime
outcomes that are used in the analyses, or 6,990 agencies over the period 2000-2014.
112
Ta
bl
e
2.
3:
Im
pa
ct
of
Po
lic
e
on
C
rim
e
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
O
LS
FS
:00
000
0
Po
lic
e0
Ra
te
Re
du
ce
d0
Fo
rm
IV
O
LS
FS
:00
000
0
Po
lic
e0
Ra
te
Re
du
ce
d0
Fo
rm
IV
Ke
y$
Va
ria
bl
es
Po
lic
e
0.
26
3*
**
C1
.8
92
*
2.
17
3*
**
C9
.9
04
**
(0
.0
48
)
(0
.7
5)
(0
.4
05
)
(3
.8
08
)
Ac
ce
pt
0H
iri
ng
0.
64
8*
**
C1
.2
27
**
0.
65
8*
**
C6
.5
2*
*
(0
.0
73
)
(0
.4
61
)
(0
.0
73
)
(2
.3
31
)
Ap
pl
ic
at
io
n$
Co
nt
ro
ls
Ap
pl
y0
Hi
rin
g
0.
74
6*
*
C0
.1
39
**
1.
23
4*
**
0.
97
2*
**
C0
.3
11
C0
.1
33
*
2.
38
3
1.
06
4
(0
.2
56
)
(0
.0
54
)
(0
.2
97
)
(0
.2
79
)
(1
.3
43
)
(0
.0
54
)
(1
.5
4)
(1
.4
88
)
Ac
ce
pt
0O
th
er
0G
ra
nt
0.
06
0.
36
7*
**
0.
40
2
1.
09
7+
2.
53
0.
34
6*
**
4.
68
+
8.
10
6*
(0
.5
09
)
(0
.0
86
)
(0
.5
16
)
(0
.6
44
)
(2
.5
88
)
(0
.0
87
)
(2
.6
50
)
(3
.3
71
)
Ap
pl
y0
O
th
er
0G
ra
nt
0.
77
6+
0.
22
5*
*
0.
70
4
1.
13
*
2.
24
1
0.
22
6*
*
1.
99
3
4.
23
4
(0
.4
55
)
(0
.0
8)
(0
.4
57
)
(0
.4
94
)
(2
.3
5)
(0
.0
81
)
(2
.3
81
)
(2
.6
18
)
%
0E
ffe
ct
2.
75
%
C3
.5
3%
2.
79
%
C2
.0
2%
El
as
tic
ity
0.
17
8
C1
.2
8
0.
16
1
C0
.7
33
FC
Te
st
:0A
cc
ep
t0H
iri
ng
74
.5
7
77
.5
2
Y0
M
ea
n
34
.8
23
.5
3
34
.8
34
.8
32
3.
1
23
.6
2
32
3.
1
32
3.
1
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
93
,0
81
93
,0
81
93
,0
81
93
,0
81
93
,2
96
93
,2
96
93
,2
96
93
,2
96
N
um
be
r0o
f0D
ep
ar
tm
en
ts
6,
96
6
6,
96
6
6,
96
6
6,
96
6
6,
96
4
6,
96
4
6,
96
4
6,
96
4
Vi
ol
en
t0C
rim
e
Pr
op
er
ty
0C
rim
e0
**
*
p<
0.
00
1,
**
p<
0.
01
,*
p<
0.
05
,+
p<
0.
1
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
in
ea
ch
m
od
el
ar
e
ro
bu
st
an
d
cl
us
te
re
d
at
th
e
po
lic
e
de
pa
rt
m
en
t
le
ve
l.
C
ri
m
e
ou
tc
om
es
an
d
po
lic
e
va
ri
ab
le
s
ar
e
pe
r
10
,0
00
re
si
de
nt
s
in
a
m
un
ic
ip
al
it
y.
E
ac
h
sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
on
co
rr
es
po
nd
s
to
th
e
pr
ef
er
re
d
co
va
ri
at
e
se
t,
in
cl
ud
in
g
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
co
va
ri
at
es
,
po
lic
e
de
pa
rt
m
en
t
fix
ed
eﬀ
ec
ts
an
d
ye
ar
by
ci
ty
si
ze
fix
ed
eﬀ
ec
ts
.
D
em
og
ra
ph
ic
va
ri
ab
le
s
in
cl
ud
e
po
pu
la
ti
on
,a
ge
di
st
ri
bu
ti
on
,r
ac
ia
ld
is
tr
ib
ut
io
n,
pr
op
or
ti
on
m
al
e,
un
em
pl
oy
m
en
t
ra
te
an
d
av
er
ag
e
pa
y.
A
ll
m
od
el
s
co
nt
ro
lf
or
hi
ri
ng
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n
an
d
ap
pl
ic
at
io
ns
an
d
ac
ce
pt
an
ce
s
of
ot
he
r
C
O
P
S
gr
an
ts
.
113
Ta
bl
e
2.
4:
Im
pa
ct
of
Po
lic
e
on
C
rim
e,
Sp
ec
ifi
c
C
rim
es
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
Vi
ol
en
t3
Cr
im
e
M
ur
de
r
Ra
pe
Ro
bb
er
y
Ag
gr
av
at
ed
3
As
sa
ul
t
Pr
op
er
ty
3
Cr
im
e
Bu
rg
la
ry
3
La
rc
en
y
Ve
hi
cl
e3
Th
ef
t
Po
lic
e
J1
.8
92
*
J0
.0
07
J0
.0
24
J0
.6
13
**
*
J1
.2
49
+
J9
.9
04
**
2.
19
4*
J8
.6
06
**
J3
.4
93
**
*
(0
.7
5)
(0
.0
22
)
(0
.0
86
)
(0
.1
86
)
(0
.6
51
)
(3
.8
08
)
(0
.9
84
)
(3
.1
07
)
(0
.6
74
)
El
as
tic
ity
J1
.2
8
J0
.4
75
J0
.2
19
J2
.1
02
J1
.1
76
J0
.7
33
0.
78
9
J0
.8
72
J4
.0
65
Y3
M
ea
n
34
.8
0.
32
2
2.
62
6
6.
85
8
24
.9
9
31
8.
1
65
.4
9
23
2.
4
20
.2
3
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
93
,0
81
93
,0
81
93
,0
81
93
,0
81
93
,0
81
93
,2
96
93
,2
96
93
,2
96
93
,2
96
N
um
be
r3o
f3D
ep
ar
tm
en
ts
6,
96
6
6,
96
6
6,
96
6
6,
96
6
6,
96
6
6,
96
4
6,
96
4
6,
96
4
6,
96
4
Pr
op
er
ty
3C
rim
e
Vi
ol
en
t3C
rim
e
**
*
p<
0.
00
1,
**
p<
0.
01
,*
p<
0.
05
,+
p<
0.
1
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
in
ea
ch
m
od
el
ar
e
ro
bu
st
an
d
cl
us
te
re
d
at
th
e
po
lic
e
de
pa
rt
m
en
t
le
ve
l.
C
ri
m
e
ou
tc
om
es
an
d
po
lic
e
va
ri
ab
le
s
ar
e
pe
r
10
,0
00
re
si
de
nt
s
in
a
m
un
ic
ip
al
it
y.
E
ac
h
sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
on
co
rr
es
po
nd
s
to
th
e
pr
ef
er
re
d
co
va
ri
at
e
se
t,
in
cl
ud
in
g
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
co
va
ri
at
es
,
po
lic
e
de
pa
rt
m
en
t
fix
ed
eﬀ
ec
ts
an
d
ye
ar
by
ci
ty
si
ze
fix
ed
eﬀ
ec
ts
.
D
em
og
ra
ph
ic
va
ri
ab
le
s
in
cl
ud
e
po
pu
la
ti
on
,a
ge
di
st
ri
bu
ti
on
,r
ac
ia
ld
is
tr
ib
ut
io
n,
pr
op
or
ti
on
m
al
e,
un
em
pl
oy
m
en
t
ra
te
an
d
av
er
ag
e
pa
y.
A
ll
m
od
el
s
co
nt
ro
lf
or
hi
ri
ng
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n
an
d
ap
pl
ic
at
io
ns
an
d
ac
ce
pt
an
ce
s
of
ot
he
r
C
O
P
S
gr
an
ts
.
114
Figure 2.2: Timing of Treatment, Application and Acceptances
The range around each estimate represents a 95% confidence interval using robust standard errors clustered
at the police department level. Crime outcomes and police variables are per 10,000 residents in a munici-
pality. The specification shown is the preferred specification of the reduced form model. Coeﬃcients in the
acceptance and application graphs in each row are derived from the same regression on the total sample of
municipal police districts. Graphs are created by duplicating balanced panels of 6 years corresponding to a
centered treatment year for each year between 2000-2012. Specifically, period dummies for hiring application
(coeﬃcients shown on right) and hiring acceptance (left) are included for each period, with the year prior to
the first treatment year omitted as a reference year. Treatments are Indexed to the first year of a new hiring
grant acceptance or application (year 0 above). Because police agencies may have multiple and overlapping
treatment periods, duplication allows the model to control for other coinciding grant treatment eﬀects in
years before and after the new treatment.
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Figure 2.3: Placebo Timing Tests, Randomized Attribution of Grant Applica-
tions and Acceptances (1,000 Replications)
These graphs show the kernel density distributions of 1,000 replications of the model where the timing
of grant applications and acceptances is randomized. The randomization procedure is restricted to police
agencies that applied for a hiring grants during the sample period of 2000-2014. Hiring acceptances are
randomly attributed to agencies that applied for hiring grants in the years that they applied, in such a way
that the acceptance rate in the placebo replication is the same as in the observed sample. The confidence
interval shown is based on the mean and standard deviation of the distribution of coeﬃcients from the
1,000 replications. In each of the placebo replication models, the preferred fully-specified model is used with
robust standard errors clustered at the police department level.
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Table 2.6: Robustness Tests and Samples, Specific Crimes (Part 1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Violent3
Crime Murder Rape Robbery
Aggravated3
Assault
Property3
Crime Burglary3 Larceny
Vehicle3
Theft
Base%Model
Police J1.892* J0.007 J0.024 J0.613*** J1.249+ J9.904** 2.194* J8.606** J3.493***
(0.75) (0.022) (0.086) (0.186) (0.651) (3.808) (0.984) (3.107) (0.674)
Elasticity J1.28 J0.475 J0.219 J2.102 J1.176 J0.733 0.789 J0.872 J4.065
Observations 93,081 93,081 93,081 93,081 93,081 93,296 93,296 93,296 93,296
1.%Expanded%Period:%199062014
Police J0.873+ 0.002 0.048 J0.336** J0.587 J3.602 1.288* J3.149 J1.742***
(0.458) (0.011) (0.045) (0.109) (0.402) (2.421) (0.585) (1.946) (0.351)
Elasticity J0.529 0.126 0.441 J1.029 J0.489 J0.239 0.413 J0.287 J1.717
Observations 148,379 148,379 148,379 148,379 148,379 148,756 148,756 148,756 148,756
2.%Adding%Districts%with%Population<1,000
Police J0.808 J0.01 0.006 J0.279* J0.525 J8.395* 0.50 J6.175* J2.719+
(0.495) (0.011) (0.038) (0.121) (0.395) (3.98) (0.499) (2.966) (1.411)
Elasticity J0.642 J0.858 0.0611 J1.102 J0.581 J0.682 0.211 J0.676 J3.38
Observations 106,930 106,930 106,930 106,930 106,930 107,151 107,151 107,151 107,151
3.%Weighted%by%Population
Police J7.297* 0.032 J0.014 J2.882** J4.433+ J36.09* 4.80 J27.99* J12.9*
(3.078) (0.131) (0.158) (1.077) (2.391) (14.71) (3.505) (11.38) (5.196)
Elasticity J2.742 1.02 J0.101 J3.194 J2.791 J2.01 1.304 J2.287 J6.337
Observations 93,081 93,081 93,081 93,081 93,081 93,296 93,296 93,296 93,296
4.%State%by%Year%Fixed%Effects
Police J1.879* J0.007 J0.026 J0.779*** J1.067+ J8.277* 2.678** J6.574* J4.381***
(0.735) (0.022) (0.084) (0.197) (0.630) (3.688) (0.978) (2.987) (0.736)
Elasticity J1.270 J0.526 J0.230 J2.672 J1.005 J0.612 0.963 J0.666 J5.098
Observations 93,081 93,081 93,081 93,081 93,081 93,296 93,296 93,296 93,296
5.%Alternate%Outlier%Cleaning%Procedure
Police J1.808* J0.053 J0.005 J0.750** J1.001 J14.263** 3.980** J13.027** J5.215***
(0.886) (0.035) (0.112) (0.289) (0.743) (4.742) (1.391) (4.0) (1.02)
Elasticity J1.050 J3.175 J0.0392 J1.999 J0.833 J0.963 1.314 J1.204 J5.387
Observations 65,548 65,548 65,548 65,548 65,548 74,653 74,653 74,653 74,653
6.%Raw%Data%Set,%Outliers%included
Police 2.694 0.035 0.04 0.859 1.760 16.826 J3.518 14.918 5.426
(6.248) (0.086) (0.159) (1.984) (4.129) (38.857) (8.188) (34.384) (12.429)
Elasticity 1.87 2.599 0.375 3.05 1.696 1.28 J1.297 1.554 6.531
Observations 99,744 99,744 99,744 99,744 99,744 99,744 99,744 99,744 99,744
Violent3Crime Property3Crime
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
Standard errors in each model are robust and clustered at the police department level. Crime outcomes
and police variables are per 10,000 residents in a municipality. While the sample changes in each row
of models, each specification corresponds to the preferred covariate set, including demographic covariates,
police department fixed eﬀects and year by city size fixed eﬀects. Demographic variables include population,
age distribution, racial distribution, proportion male, unemployment rate and average pay. All models
control for hiring application and applications and acceptances of other COPS grants.
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Robustness Tests and Samples, Specific Crimes (Part 2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Violent3
Crime Murder Rape Robbery
Aggravated3
Assault
Property3
Crime Burglary3 Larceny
Vehicle3
Theft
Base%Model
Police J1.892* J0.007 J0.024 J0.613*** J1.249+ J9.904** 2.194* J8.606** J3.493***
(0.75) (0.022) (0.086) (0.186) (0.651) (3.808) (0.984) (3.107) (0.674)
Elasticity J1.28 J0.475 J0.219 J2.102 J1.176 J0.733 0.789 J0.872 J4.065
Observations 93,081 93,081 93,081 93,081 93,081 93,296 93,296 93,296 93,296
7.%Model%without%Apply%Controls
Police J0.650 J0.014 0.109 J0.505** J0.241 J8.994* 2.953** J8.627** J3.319***
(0.757) (0.024) (0.091) (0.195) (0.66) (3.969) (1.039) (3.275) (0.691)
Elasticity J0.44 J1.009 0.975 J1.732 J0.227 J0.665 1.061 J0.874 J3.862
Observations 93,081 93,081 93,081 93,081 93,081 93,296 93,296 93,296 93,296
8.%Illustrative%Alternate%IV:%Award%Size
Police J0.913 J0.01 0.001 J0.420** J0.484 J6.194 1.561* J5.763+ J1.992**
(0.627) (0.03) (0.08) (0.156) (0.564) (3.835) (0.794) (3.223) (0.713)
Elasticity J0.623 J0.724 0.0113 J1.471 J0.459 J0.46 0.563 J0.586 J2.349
Observations 85,567 85,567 85,567 85,567 85,567 85,772 85,772 85,772 85,772
9.%Agencies%that%Ever%Applied
Police J1.491* J0.002 0.025 J0.513** J1.001+ J8.107* 1.892* J6.798* J3.2***
(0.679) (0.019) (0.076) (0.162) (0.597) (3.484) (0.886) (2.83) (0.602)
Elasticity J0.931 J0.102 0.211 J1.545 J0.882 J0.561 0.643 J0.645 J3.301
Observations 73,690 73,690 73,690 73,690 73,690 73,941 73,941 73,941 73,941
10.%Agencies%that%were%Accepted
Police J1.301 J0.008 0.014 J0.458* J0.849 J10.052* 2.220+ J7.958* J4.314***
(0.891) (0.024) (0.101) (0.218) (0.787) (4.590) (1.179) (3.675) (0.881)
Elasticity J0.719 J0.49 0.111 J1.135 J0.675 J0.647 0.698 J0.708 J3.876
Observations 47,396 47,396 47,396 47,396 47,396 47,548 47,548 47,548 47,548
11.%Agencies%both%Rejected%and%Accepted
Police J1.158 J0.016 0.021 J0.358 J0.805 J9.13+ 2.522+ J6.775 J4.877***
(1.106) (0.03) (0.13) (0.265) (0.993) (5.547) (1.454) (4.391) (1.194)
Elasticity J0.660 J1.015 0.161 J0.932 J0.658 J0.586 0.801 J0.598 J4.432
Observations 32,091 32,091 32,091 32,091 32,091 32,179 32,179 32,179 32,179
12.%Excluding%Withdrawn%Accepted%Grants
Police J1.707* J0.004 J0.005 J0.551** J1.147+ J10.29** 2.424* J9.143** J3.573***
(0.74) (0.022) (0.086) (0.187) (0.645) (3.832) (0.983) (3.158) (0.691)
Elasticity J1.154 J0.272 J0.046 J1.891 J1.08 J0.761 0.871 J0.926 J4.158
Observations 93,081 93,081 93,081 93,081 93,081 93,296 93,296 93,296 93,296
13.%Acceptance%Group%by%Year%Fixed%Effects
Police J2.636** J0.006 J0.039 J0.898*** J1.693* J14.930** 3.119* J12.655** J5.394***
(0.993) (0.027) (0.113) (0.259) (0.846) (5.230) (1.302) (4.244) (1.075)
Elasticity J1.783 J0.417 J0.352 J3.083 J1.594 J1.105 1.121 J1.282 J6.277
Observations 93,081 93,081 93,081 93,081 93,081 93,296 93,296 93,296 93,296
14.%Application%Cohort%by%Year%Fixed%Effects
Police J2.565** J0.012 J0.066 J1.000*** J1.486+ J15.171** 2.857* J12.250** J5.778***
(0.969) (0.027) (0.109) (0.264) (0.815) (5.196) (1.287) (4.179) (1.108)
Elasticity J1.734 J0.900 J0.595 J3.433 J1.399 J1.122 1.027 J1.241 J6.723
Observations 93,081 93,081 93,081 93,081 93,081 93,296 93,296 93,296 93,296
Violent3Crime Property3Crime
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
Standard errors in each model are robust and clustered at the police department level. Crime outcomes
and police variables are per 10,000 residents in a municipality. While the sample changes in each row
of models, each specification corresponds to the preferred covariate set, including demographic covariates,
police department fixed eﬀects and year by city size fixed eﬀects. Demographic variables include population,
age distribution, racial distribution, proportion male, unemployment rate and average pay. All models
control for hiring application and applications and acceptances of other COPS grants.
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Table 2.7: Shifts in Policing Focus, Arrests for Specific Crimes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Violent3
Crime Murder Rape Robbery
Aggravated3
Assault
Property3
Crime Burglary3 Larceny
Vehicle3
Theft
Arrest&Rates
Police J0.126 J0.024 0.033 0.026 J0.161 6.043 0.197 3.215 2.631
(0.378) (0.026) (0.044) (0.085) (0.346) (5.786) (0.237) (3.018) (2.841)
Elasticity J0.166 J1.973 0.955 0.240 J0.265 2.199 0.447 1.501 15.98
Y3Mean 17.75 0.280 0.813 2.477 14.18 64.06 10.27 49.96 3.838
Observations 81,605 81,605 81,605 81,605 81,605 81,786 81,786 81,786 81,786
Number3of3Departments 6,411 6,411 6,411 6,411 6,411 6,410 6,410 6,410 6,410
(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17)
Marijuana3
Sale3
Narcotics3
Sale
Other3Drug3
Sale
Marijuana3
Possess
Narcotics3
Possess
Other3Drug3
Possess
Simple3
Assault DUI
Arrest&Rates
Police 0.623** J0.431* 0.060 2.249* J1.302*** J0.437 J0.151 3.371*
(0.198) (0.192) (0.192) (0.943) (0.384) (0.463) (0.864) (1.311)
Elasticity 3.806 J3.984 0.534 1.665 J4.240 J0.915 J0.0700 1.217
Y3Mean 3.815 2.526 2.631 31.50 7.163 11.15 50.37 64.55
Observations 81,423 81,423 81,423 81,423 81,423 81,423 82,438 82,438
Number3of3Departments 6,332 6,332 6,332 6,332 6,332 6,332 6,405 6,405
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
Standard errors in each model are robust and clustered at the police department level. Crime outcomes,
arrest outcomes and police variables are per 10,000 residents in a municipality. All models shown have the
preferred set of covariates, including demographic covariates, application and acceptance controls for other
grants, year by city size fixed eﬀects and police department fixed eﬀects. Demographic variables include
population, age distribution, racial distribution, proportion male, unemployment rate and average pay.
All models control for hiring application and applications and acceptances of other COPS grants. Arrest
outcomes are not expressed relative to reported crime rates but as total arrests per 100,000 residents. The
sample size is diﬀerent for each arrest type, given the sample cleaning procedure (see Data Appendix C.2).
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Chapter 3
Patrolling Public Schools:
The Impact of Funding for School Police on
Student Discipline and Long-term Education
Outcomes
As police oﬃcers have become increasingly common in U.S. public
schools, their role in school discipline has expanded. While there is grow-
ing public debate about the consequences of police presence in schools, there
is scant evidence of the impact of police on student discipline and academic
outcomes. This paper provides the first causal estimate of funding for school
police on student outcomes, leveraging variation in federal Community Ori-
ented Policing Services (COPS) grants. Exploiting detailed data on over 2.5
million students in Texas, I find that funding for police in public schools re-
sults in a small but significant reduction in high school graduation and college
enrollment. In contrast to higher total rates of discipline observed for low-
income minority students, I find that the negative treatment eﬀects of school
police funding are more concentrated among students that are not classified
as low-income and low-income White students.
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3.1 Introduction
Police are an active presence in U.S. public schools. In 2014, 43%
of public schools had security staﬀ at school at least once a week, aﬀecting over
70% of students across the country [105]. While estimates vary, government
surveys suggest that there are at least 20,000 police oﬃcers working in schools
[57]. These School Resource Oﬃcers (SROs) serve a number of roles, including
protecting campuses from outside threats and educating students about safety
and the law. However, SROs also fill another critical role: they are engaged in
daily school discipline issues and administer punishments for student behav-
ior. Despite the fact that victimizations of students have decreased in recent
decades, serious school disciplinary actions have become more commonplace,
increasing by nearly 200% between 2000 and 2014, and aﬀecting Hispanic and
Black students at 1.5 to 2.5 times the rate or White students [28, 105].
As police have become a fixture in public schools, policy-makers,
educators, researchers, and academics are debating the merits of this approach
to school discipline. Proponents of school police advocate that SROs are crit-
ical to preventing rare but catastrophic school shooting events and may also
serve as positive role models to students. Critics of school police argue that
SROs create a heavy-handed disciplinary culture that adversely aﬀects learning
and may further disadvantage poor and minority students in low-performing
schools.
School discipline policy can have real impacts on educational at-
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tainment outcomes, such as earning a high school diploma or enrolling in
college. Safety is a prerequisite to learning, and policies that increase school
safety and deter dangerous or disruptive behavior may have a positive eﬀect on
student academic success. Alternatively, disciplinary actions may stigmatize
students and decrease their attachment to school, negatively aﬀecting their
performance. Studies in economics have found that juvenile arrests and juve-
nile detention decrease the probability of completing high school and increase
the probability of future arrests [3, 63, 55]. The economic literature on juvenile
behavioral responses to criminal sanctions has also found that juveniles may
be less deterred by changes in punishment severity [68] and may be more neg-
atively impacted by the experience of sanctions [3, 7]. By extension, citations,
arrests, and referrals to juvenile detention that result from interactions with
SROs may lead to future involvement with the criminal justice system, in a
process often termed the "school-to-prison pipeline." Through these channels,
school police can positively or negatively impact the long-term outcomes of the
students that they interact with, aﬀecting their human capital development,
labor market attachment, and earnings later in life. This paper is the first
study to estimate the causal impact of school police on student educational
outcomes.
While there is a growing qualitative and ethnographic literature
on the impact of school security on students [e.g. 86], there is little quantita-
tive research on this topic and the causal eﬀect of school police is unknown.
Literature reviews and meta-analysis studies on school police note the lack of
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rigorous empirical evidence on this topic [57, 37, 2, 11]. Studies in this space
are often limited by small samples or consider simple observational pre-post
or cross-sectional comparisons between schools. The best example of descrip-
tive research in this area is [82], which uses a survey of 470 schools and a
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence design, and finds that schools that increase policing
report an increase in non-serious violent crimes.
Studying the impact of school police presence on students has
proved diﬃcult for a number of reasons. First, appropriate data is hard to
obtain. While schools follow a mandate to track aggregate disciplinary out-
comes, detailed student-level data sets are not widely available. More im-
portantly, information on the number of police employed in a school is not
uniformly tracked because SROs are typically employed by a third party, such
as a police department, rather than directly by a school district. Beyond data
constraints, the assignment of police oﬃcers to particular schools is designed
by school administrators, city oﬃcials, and law enforcement leaders and is
non-random. Schools with higher levels of disciplinary actions, higher rates of
students in poverty, higher minority populations, and lower graduation rates
typically have a larger police presence. Given the selected characteristics of
these school types, cross-sectional comparisons between schools that have po-
lice and those that do not will be biased. However, even when researchers
examine changes in police presence in a particular school, the timing of invest-
ments in police may also be a function of changes in discipline and student
behavior. If schools choose to hire police when they experience an increase in
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negative student behaviors, then not only is discipline a function of policing
but policing is also likely a function of discipline, and simple longitudinal or
panel data analysis will be biased by this joint determination or simultaneity.
To address these measurement obstacles, I use information on fed-
eral grants received by school districts to fund police in public schools. I mea-
sure the impact of this funding on a range of student outcomes, using variation
across years within school districts, rather than cross-sectional variation across
school districts. Within a given district, I compare students enrolled in school
in years when the district receives federal grant funding to students enrolled
in school in years without this funding. Critically, I also account for non-
random school district decisions to seek funding for police in particular years
by including grant application timing as a direct control in the model.1
This paper represents the first study to measure the causal impact
of school police on student outcomes. I leverage detailed individual data on
students in all public schools in Texas that enables me to track short-term
changes in disciplinary actions as well as high school graduation, college at-
tendance and graduation, and earnings and employment. The empirical design
of the study exploits variation in federal Community Oriented Policing Ser-
1The empirical approach in this study is closely related to work on the impact of COPS
hiring grants for traditional police departments on municipal crime rates [103]. Likewise,
this paper is also related to the larger literature on the impact of COPS grants on crime
[34, 42, 106] and a growing body of economics research using quasi-experimental methods
that finds that increasing police presence reduces crime rates in the general population [e.g.
25, 31, 72, 64, 29].
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vices (COPS) grants that provide funding for police in public schools. Over
my sample period of 1999 to 2013, over $1 billion in federal COPS grants
was distributed nationally for purposes of hiring school police oﬃcers, pro-
viding funds for school security technology, and other community partnership
projects, with $71 million awarded in Texas.
Using data on 2.5 million students in 1,167 Texas public school
districts, I find that federal funding for school police modestly increases dis-
ciplinary actions for middle school students by 4% and decreases disciplinary
actions for high school students by 3%. Exposure to a 3-year federal grant
for school police decreases high school graduation rates by approximately 1%
and decreases college enrollment rates by 3%. However, the impact of po-
lice funding diﬀers across student race and socioeconomic status. Negative
average outcomes are concentrated among students that are not classified as
economically disadvantaged and economically disadvantaged White students,
with long-term negative outcomes linked to diﬀerential increases in middle
school discipline for these groups. Because the estimation strategy identifies
the impact of marginal increases in policing, the demographic pattern of the
results may be driven by the fact that poor minority students are already be-
ing disciplined at significantly higher rates than wealthier students and White
students, and marginal increases in policing may allow disciplinary focus to
expand to groups that do not have a high existing level of contact with school
discipline.
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This paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 describes details of
the federal COPS hiring grant program and student discipline in Texas, pro-
viding institutional context for the estimation strategy. Section 3.3 describes
the empirical model and the data sources used in estimation. Section 3.4 dis-
cusses the results, outlining main findings and heterogeneity of the results by
student demographic characteristics as well as robustness tests. Section 3.5
concludes.
3.2 Background and Institutional Context
3.2.1 Federal COPS Grants for School Police
The COPS oﬃce at the Department of Justice was originally es-
tablished to fund the hiring of new police oﬃcers as part of the Violent Crime
Control Act of 1994. In 1998, the COPS oﬃce extended its grant programs
to include funding for police oﬃcers in schools, with the launch of pilot pro-
grams to fund police hiring in schools and partnerships between school police,
schools, and other community organizations. Political interest for funding
police in schools escalated after the high-profile Columbine school shooting
in 1999. Policy-makers invested in school police with the intention of both
preventing tragic school shootings and generally improving safety in public
schools. Between 1999 and 2005, over $750 million in funding was distributed
for the purpose of hiring police oﬃcers in schools, allocating funding for over
6,500 SRO positions [22].
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While Columbine inspired a surge of investment in SROs, school
police and security staﬀ did not originate in this period. The earliest school
police programs began as early as the 1940s, and several large urban school
districts began establishing school police programs in the 1980s and 1990s,2
coinciding with a new movement of "zero-tolerance" toward student miscon-
duct.3 Still, prior to 1999, school police were confined to large urban districts
and school police programs were not widespread [2, 11]. Over the past decade
and a half, new SRO programs have been founded while pre-existing SRO pro-
grams have grown; today, there are at least 20,000 SROs nationwide and over
70% of students attend schools with security staﬀ on campus at least once a
week [105, 57].
In recent years, interest in providing COPS funding for SRO pro-
grams has decreased. Federal appropriations for the school police hiring de-
clined in the mid-2000s as part of a broader reduction in COPS funding by
the Bush Administration, which had concerns about the overall eﬀectiveness
2A sampling of the earliest recorded incidents of police operating in public schools are
Los Angeles, CA (1948), Indianapolis, CA (1939), and Flint, MI (early 1950s). The National
Association of School Resource Oﬃcers (NASRO) was established in 1991, also prior to the
expansion of school police that was spurred by the Columbine shooting [11].
3"Zero-tolerance" policies refer to laws or school policies that require predetermined
consequences for specific student oﬀenses, without considering mitigating circumstances or
context for an oﬀense incident. These polices have expanded in scope and across geographies
since the passage of the federal Gun Free Schools Act in 1994, which required automatic
expulsion of any student that brought a gun on school grounds. Research on the imple-
mentation of "zero-tolerance" policies, or rules that mandate harsh discipline for a set of
student infractions, is similarly sparse. An exception is a recent study by [24], which ex-
amines state-level "zero-tolerance" statutes using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence design and finds
that these polices modestly increase overall suspension rates and have larger impacts on
Black students.
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in COPS grants [34]. During the Obama Administration, oﬃcials became in-
creasingly concerned about the active role many SROs play in disciplining
students, the large disparity in school discipline by student race, and the fact
that student interactions with SROs may have repercussions for student in-
volvement in the criminal justice system later in life. Given these concerns,
COPS funding levels for school police have remained low since 2009. In 2014
and 2016, the Departments of Education and Justice released new guidance
and resources for SRO programs, defining a narrow role for school police that
excludes involvement in routine discipline and highlights the importance of
disciplinary systems that do not discriminate against groups of students [33].
During the sample period of this paper, there were three broad
groups of federal grants available for use in schools. The largest program,
COPS in Schools (CIS), operated from 1999-2005 and provided up to $125,000
in hiring funds per SRO over a period of 3 years. Approximately three-
quarters of all COPS funding for school police has been granted through CIS.
The second group of funds was administered by Secure Our Schools (SOS)
grants between 2003-2012, and focused on auxiliary functions of school police.
With over $100 million distributed nationally, these flexible 2-year grants have
funded security technology, security assessments, and training for school po-
lice. The final school police grants oﬀered through the COPS oﬃce consists of
school-based partnerships (SBP) with law enforcement agencies for particular
projects, as well as other grant types that were granted to school district police
129
departments.4
The application process for COPS school grants is narrative-based.
Each applicant is asked to describe safety problems facing their school district
and their proposed approach to remedying these problems, denote any com-
munity partnerships that support the grant proposal, and state their request
for assistance. Review of these applications was based on the subjective judge-
ments of individuals at the COPS oﬃce. Given this application review process,
it is likely that grant awardees were not randomly selected among school dis-
tricts in each grant solicitation period. Because of this, the research design in
this paper does not rely on cross-sectional variation in grant receipt between
school districts, but rather focuses on within school district variation, com-
paring years with federal COPS funding to years that are not funded for the
same school district.
3.2.2 School Resource Oﬃcers and School Discipline in Texas
The setting for this study is the state of Texas. With 5.2 million
students enrolled, Texas public schools have over 10% of the U.S. student
population and represent the second largest state school system after California
4Information on COPS grant programs for school police was obtained through the COPS
website, conversations with COPS employees, and summary statistics from data on all COPS
grant acceptances and rejections obtained through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
request for this research. An additional grant program, the Safe Schools Initiative (SSI)
provided flexible funding for school and community safety and delinquency prevention, but
no funds through this program were distributed in Texas during the sample period.
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[84]. The student body in Texas is diverse, with minority students representing
over half of the student population (see Table 3.1). Though this paper is
restricted to a single state, the size and diversity of the setting make the
findings informative for other contexts.
A number of advocacy and research organizations have studied
student discipline in Texas, in part because of the availability of student-level
discipline data in this state. Selected statistics from this research finds that
nearly 6 in 10 students are suspended or expelled between the 7th and 12th
grade, over 275,000 misdemeanor tickets are issued to juveniles for truancy
and other student misconduct each year, and minority students and Special
Education students are disproportionately disciplined relative to White stu-
dents [35, 38]. In recent years, reports by the organization Texas Appleseed
on student ticketing and school police in Texas prompted new legislation lim-
iting issuance of citations and fines for misbehavior in school and mandating
increased training for SROs [95, 96]. Because of a lack of comprehensive data
in other states, it is diﬃcult to know if school discipline patterns in Texas are
representative of the rest of the country.
Texas has embraced the use of SROs in schools, and many commu-
nities have established "school district" police departments that are designated
to serve a particular school district rather than contracting with police oﬃcers
employed by local municipal police departments to serve in schools. This in-
dependent school district police model has become widespread in Texas, with
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over 160 school district police departments in the state [38]. These police
departments tend to be present in larger school districts and may operate in
high schools, middle schools, and elementary schools. A typical police pa-
trol ratio in a large school district is two oﬃcers per high school, one oﬃcer
per middle school and rotating patrol in elementary schools. In addition to
school patrol, several school district police departments in Texas have special-
ized units, including K-9 teams, gang suppression units, crisis response teams,
traﬃc safety, and incident reporting hotlines.5 The size and budget of these
police departments varies; in 2007, Houston ISD Police employed 289 staﬀ at
a cost of $55 per student, while Edgewood ISD employed 31 staﬀ at a cost of
$145 per student, and San Angelo ISD had a staﬀ of 44 at a cost of $16 per
student [38].6
COPS grants for school police have been actively utilized in Texas,
with 7% of total federal funds distributed in the state. Figure 3.1 shows that
the majority of grants and funds distributed have been distributed through
the CIS program, funding hiring of SROs in schools. The majority of grants
were distributed between 2000 and 2004, with funding peaking at over $16
million dollars for more than 100 new grants in 2001.7 The bottom panel of
Figure 3.1 shows that COPS grants for school police have been consistently
5These characterizations of school district police departments come from web searches of
police departments in Texas.
6Data for Houston ISD and San Angelo ISD is from the 2006-2007 school year, while
data for Edgewood ISD is from the 2007-2008 school year.
7Throughout this paper, years refer to the academic calendar indexed by the spring
semester. For example, grant statistics for 2000 cover the 1999-2000 academic year.
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competitive, with grant applications outstripping grant acceptances in each
year of the program.
3.3 Empirical Model and Data Sources
To assess the impact of funding for police on public school students
in Texas, I exploit quasi-experimental variation in federal COPS grants for
school police. My model uses panel data to measure the impact of receiving
a grant within school districts over time, while also controlling for the timing
of the decision to apply for COPS grants. Controlling for elective COPS
grant applications addresses the non-random timing of school district decisions
to expand police presence, which are likely a function of changes in school
disciplinary culture and student behavior. After conditioning on the timing of
a school district’s decision to apply for grants, the timing of a grant acceptance
is a function of the federal government’s decision to fund an SRO program in
a that year relative to a diﬀerent year when the district applied for funding.
The primary limitation of my model is that I am unable to observe
the actual employment levels of police in school districts. School districts
do not directly employ police, instead they are contracted through a third
party, either a municipal police department or an independent school district
police department. Because I do not observe police employment, the empiri-
cal approach does not use COPS grant variation as an instrument for police
presence; instead, I estimate the reduced form impact of receiving funding for
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school police on student outcomes.8
The empirical model is as follows:
ShortTermOutcomeigdt =  1mAcceptdt ⇤MiddleSchoolgt
+ 2mApplydt ⇤MiddleSchoolgt
+ 1hAcceptdt ⇤HighSchoolgt
+ 2hApplydt ⇤HighSchoolgt
+⇡Xigdt +  t +  g +  d + "igdt
LongTermOutcomeidt+k = ↵1AcceptExposuredt + ↵2ApplyExposuredt
+⇡˜Xidt +  ˜t +  ˜d + ⌫idt
where, i indexes students, g indexes grade, d indexes school district,
and t indexes year. Xigdt is a vector of covariates that includes district-grade
enrollment and student characteristics. At the student-level, covariates include
race (Black, Hispanic, White, or other race), gender, and whether the indi-
vidual is classified as a limited English proficiency (LEP) student, a Special
Education student, a gifted and talented student, or an economically disad-
vantaged student, where economic disadvantage is an indicator for a student
receiving a free or reduced lunch at school.  t are year fixed eﬀects, which
8[103] estimates a similar model using COPS grant acceptances as an instrument for
police employment in municipal districts and to determine the impact of police force ex-
pansions on local crime rates. This two-stage model is possible because municipal police
departments report their employment to the Federal Bureau of Investigation each year.
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capture statewide time trends in student outcomes.  g are grade level fixed
eﬀects, which capture diﬀerences in disciplinary actions across grades.
The student level data was obtained through the Texas Education
Research Center (ERC), a research platform that allows researchers to track
the state population of public school students through primary and secondary
school to college and the labor market. This resource combines databases
on K-12 public school students from the Texas Education Agency (TEA),
post-secondary students in Texas higher education institutions from the Texas
Higher Education Coordinating Board (THECB), and individuals employed
in the state through the Texas Workforce Commission (TWC). I utilize infor-
mation on 2.5 million students from 1,167 school districts in cohorts entering
the 7th grade between 1999-2006, following students through middle school,
high school and beyond graduation to college and the labor market.
The primary short-term outcomes of the analysis are whether a
student received a disciplinary action and the types of disciplinary actions
received, in-school suspensions, out-of-school suspensions, and expulsions. In
the long-term outcome model, I focus on 7th grade student observations and
measure high school graduation and college enrollment within 8 years (by age
20), college graduation, employment, and earnings within 12 years (by age 24).
This approach allows me to avoid issues of attrition in the data, as students
may leave school or drop out between the 7th and 12th grade. In the short-term
model, I track cohorts of students beginning 7th grade in 1999-2006 through
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2013, and measure disciplinary outcomes for these student groups in grades
7-12, allowing students to repeat up to two grades. Given the years spanned
by the data, I am restricted to cohorts beginning the 7th grade in 1999-2006
for high school graduation and college enrollment outcomes and 1999-2001 for
college graduation and labor market outcomes.
The critical variables in the short-term model are Acceptdt and
Applydt. These variables are constructed to match the duration of grant
projects, where CIS grants last for 3 years, SOS grants last for 2 years, and
other grants vary in length. In the case of a 3-year CIS grant, the variable
Applydt is an indicator variable for whether a grant application for a school
district was submitted in year t, t  1, or t  2, allowing this variable to be set
to 1 for the duration of the grant period in which funding would be distributed
if an application was accepted. Likewise, for a 3-year CIS grant, the variable
Acceptdt is an indicator for whether a grant application covering a school dis-
trict is accepted for the duration of the grant project period.9 For example, a
school district police department that applies for and receives a CIS grant in
2000 would have both indicators set to 1 during the period 2000-2002; while
if the grant application is denied, the Applydt variable would be set to 1 and
the Acceptdt variable would be set to 0 for this period.10
9In practice, school districts do not directly apply for COPS funding. Grantees are
commonly municipal police departments, independent school district police departments,
or other entities. In some cases, grant applications corresponded to a geographic area that
covered more than one school district. In these instances, I manually matched grants to
school districts as best as possible (see Appendix C.2).
10The start time of a grant is indexed to the current academic year if a grant project (or
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The grant data used in this paper was obtained through a Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA) request to the COPS DOJ Oﬃce. Through this
request, COPS shared information all grant acceptances and rejections since
their oﬃce was founded, with information on grant program, project start
date, and project end date. To identify grants for analysis in this project,
I selected grants based on whether the grant program type was focused on
school police or if the grant applicant had their primary jurisdiction within
public schools (e.g. school district police departments).11
I consider grant variables separately depending on whether the stu-
dent is in middle school (7th and 8th grade) or high school (9th through 12th
grade), entering these variables as interactions with school type. Given this
structure, there are two acceptance variables, Accept ⇤MiddleSchooldgt and
Accept⇤HighSchooldgt, and two comparable application variables in the model.
I add this structure because in most districts students are physically separated
in diﬀerent school buildings across these grades and SROs likely have diﬀerent
capabilities and approaches to interacting with students in middle school and
high school. When SRO programs are established, they typically begin operat-
ing in high schools and then expand to middle schools (and elementary schools)
as they grow in size and scope, and this pattern of growth means that high
application) starts between September and March, and is indexed to the following academic
year if a project starts in April through August. Throughout this project, academic years
are denoted as the year of the spring semester.
11The COPS oﬃce also provided information on the amount of money awarded and the
number of new oﬃcers eligible for funding for accepted grants, although this information
was incomplete.
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schools are more likely to already have an SRO presence before they receive
a grant treatment. In addition to diﬀerences in treatment across middle and
high schools, students have developmental diﬀerences across these grades as
well, which may impact the way that they respond to increased SRO presence.
For the long-term outcome model, the estimation approach consid-
ers future outcomes for cohorts of 7th graders and do not measure concurrent
outcomes as students move through public school. In this alternate setting, the
critical grant variables are defined in terms of years of exposure, as the number
of years in an grant application or acceptance period divided by the student’s
total number of years in middle and high school. Exposure is calculated as
a rate within the 6 years an "on-time" student would take to graduate high
school between the 7th and 12th grades. In the 2000 CIS grant example above,
a student beginning 7th grade in the year 2000 would be exposed to 3 accepted
grant years and have a value of 12 for AcceptExposuredt and ApplyExposuredt.
These values are cumulative and account for all grant applications and accep-
tances that relate to a school district in the sample period, with overlapping
grants only counted once. The exposure values also depend on the year that
a student enters the 7th grade; in the above case, a student in the 2001 7th
grade cohort would be exposed to two years of a grant and have a calculated
exposure of 13 between the 7th and 12th grades.
School districts may be covered by multiple grant applications or
a grant acceptances during the sample period, and school districts can alter-
138
nate between states over time, switching between having an accepted grant,
a rejected grant, or no application. The total reduced form impact of re-
ceiving grant funding for school police is the sum of coeﬃcients on Acceptdt
and Applydt, while the impact of not receiving grant funding is the coeﬃcient
on Applydt. Because grant application decisions are elective choices influ-
enced by changing the changing discipline environment and goals of school
districts, Applydt is a crucial control in the model, while the conditional vari-
able Acceptdt represents the causal reduced form impact of changes in grant
funding for school police. In this framework, Applydt illustrates what happens
to students when a school district wants to increase their police presence but
does not receive an increase in external funding to do so.12
The last important feature of the model are school district fixed
eﬀects,  d.13. These fixed eﬀects are important because they control for un-
observed diﬀerences across school districts that are constant over time. These
time constant diﬀerences across districts may reflect diﬀerences in funding
structures, approaches to school discipline, and school cultures, each of which
are determinants of student outcomes but are unobservable in the data. Be-
12In their evaluation of COPS hiring grants, [34] used variation in the size of the grant
award as an instrument for police force expansions rather than simply whether or not a
grant was received. In this paper, it is not possible to use the size of monetary awards
to measure outcomes because comparable information is not available for grants that were
rejected.
13Students are assigned to the school district they are enrolled in during the 7th grade,
rendering the output of the model "intent-to-treat" estimates. This assignment procedure
assumes that students do not alter their school district in response to school police presence
prior to entering the 7th grade, an assumption that is reasonable given that levels of student
discipline are low in grades K-6.
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cause the analysis includes school district fixed eﬀects, the model does not
make simple cross-sectional comparisons across districts that receive grants
and districts that do not receive grants in a given year. Instead, the model
uses variation across acceptance years, rejected years, and years with no ap-
plication within the same school district. Appendix Figure C.1 depicts how
this variation is used by comparing two hypothetical district grant histories.
The resulting identifying assumption is that conditional on the de-
cision to apply for federal funding for school police in a given year, the timing
of the acceptance of the grant proposal is not a function of changes in stu-
dent outcomes within a school district. While grant variables are defined as
exposure rates in the long-term model, a similar identifying assumption holds
because the timing of acceptances within districts determines the total number
of years of grant exposure for school district cohorts.
After accounting for a school district’s applications for grant funds,
the likelihood that a district wins a grant in one year versus another application
year is a function of the availability of federal funds. Given that there is a high
level of variability in federal appropriations for these grants across years, the
number of possible grants that can be funded in each year varies with federal
interest in the grant programs, and this is a key driver of the probability
that a grant application is accepted for a particular district in a specific year
(Figure 3.1, bottom graph).
A common concern in studies that utilize grant variation is that
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grants may be used for other purposes, or aﬀect other aspects of a grant recip-
ient’s spending that might also aﬀect measured outcomes. In this context, the
fungibility of grant funds is not a primary concern because school districts do
not directly receive grant funds. The organizations that apply for or receive
COPS funding are third party police departments that have finances sepa-
rate from the school districts where they work. In Texas, these third party
contracting police departments are typically municipal police or designated in-
dependent school district police departments (ISD police). However, even ISD
police departments that only operate within a single designated school district
(discussed in Section 3.2.2) have administrations and budgets that are sepa-
rate from those of school districts. This separate administration of police and
school districts allays concerns that school districts themselves directly use
grant funds for other school activities that could aﬀect student educational
outcomes.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Summary Statistics
Table 3.1 provides a summary of the student data used in this
project. The descriptive statistics are weighted by student-years to match
the primary short-term regression analysis. The analysis covers 2.5 million
students and 13.6 million student-year observations in 1,167 school districts
between 1999-2013. The student sample is diverse; student observations are
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42% White, 41% Hispanic, 14% Black, and 3% other race, of which 91% are
Asian. 49% of the sample is categorized as economically disadvantaged, or
low-income, a designation that is derived from whether a student receives a
free or reduced price lunch at school.
Disciplinary actions are common with 27% of students receiving
disciplinary actions each year. On average, 22% of students receive an in-
school suspensions each year and 10% receive out-of-school suspensions, while
less than 1% are expelled.14 Over the long-term, 70% of 7th grade cohorts
graduate from a public high school in Texas, and 47% enroll in college within
7 years following the 7th grade.15 11 years after the 7th grade (or 6 years after
12th grade if a student graduates high school "on-time"), 19% of 7th grade
cohorts in the sample graduate from college and 61% are employed in Texas.
14In the ERC data, not all disciplinary actions are coded as suspensions or expulsions,
and may include removals from class or another sanction that is not specified. Additionally,
students may receive more than one discipline type in a given year (e.g. an in-school
suspension and an out-of-school suspension), allowing the sum of the components not to
equal the total rate of disciplinary actions.
15The high school graduation rates shown in Table 3.1 are lower than the longitudinal
graduation rates reported by the state of Texas, which were 89% in 2014-2015. These rates
are calculated for diﬀerent populations; oﬃcial statistics consider 4-year graduation rates
for cohorts of 9th graders, while I consider graduation rates within 8 years for 7th graders.
While the rates I calculate are lower than the state’s, they are actually more liberally defined;
I allow students two additional years to complete high school and permit them to transfer
to and graduate from any public school district in the state. However, the key diﬀerence
is that oﬃcial statistics remove students from their calculation if they leave school but do
not dropout, removing these students from the denominator of the rate. Students may be
classified as “leavers” if they leave to attend a private school or a school in another state,
begin homeschooling, leave for health reasons, or leave for other unverified reasons. Recent
research shows that school districts have significant latitude when defining graduation rates
and frequently fail to appropriately account for student attrition [e.g. 81].
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COPS grants for police in schools aﬀect a large portion of student-
years in the data, with 41% of observations corresponding to a grant applica-
tion year and 22% of observations corresponding to a grant acceptance year
(Table 3.1). These statistics imply a student-weighted grant acceptance rate
of 54%. Table 3.2 shows statistics on the COPS grants used in analysis, also
weighted by student-years to match the sample used in the analysis. Over the
time frame of the study, there were 1,066 applications for COPS grants that
fund school police and 486 grant acceptances.16 Awarded grants designate
funding for 2.25 eligible SROs per school district on average, with total funds
of $287,102 per school district (weighted by student-years). On a student-
weighted basis, 80% of students attended school districts that applied for an
average of 3 grants, while 68% of students attended school districts that re-
ceived a grant in the sample period.17
16These counts are calculated to reflect counts of new grant-years by school districts.
They do not match the underlying grant data given that some grants cover multiple school
districts and school districts with 2 new grants in a single year are only counted once. The
percentage distribution by grant type does allow for double counting however, reflecting the
fact that school districts may be covered by more than one application or acceptance in a
given year.
17When grant characteristics are not weighted by student observations, 41% of districts
applied for an average of 1 grant during the sample, 24% of all districts were ever accepted
for a grant, and 34% of districts were ever rejected for a grant. These numbers are lower
than the weighted characteristics because larger school districts were more likely to apply
for and receive COPS funding.
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3.4.2 Baseline Results
In the baseline analysis, I estimate the models described in Sec-
tion 3.3. These models consider the impact of the treatment to be uniform
across all student groups, though eﬀects are allowed to vary across middle
schools and high schools.
Table 3.3 displays the baseline results for the short-term discipline
outcomes. The grant acceptance coeﬃcients show that, conditional on apply-
ing for a grant, receiving a grant for police decreases disciplinary actions for
high school students and increases disciplinary actions for middle school stu-
dents. For high school students, COPS grants decrease in-school suspensions
by 5%, and expulsions by 22% relative to the sample mean.18 For middle
school students, the eﬀect of a grant acceptance conditional on application is
a 4% increase in total disciplianry actions and a 8% increase in out-of-school
suspensions. A depiction of the impact of a grant application and acceptance
on disciplinary actions by grade is shown in Appendix Figure C.2.
Table 3.4 measures the impact of grant funding on a more detailed
set of short-term student outcomes. This table shows that the increase in
disciplinary actions for middle school students is primarily driven by a 6%
increase in school conduct code violations. Middle school students also expe-
18Throughout this paper, percentage eﬀects are calculated relative to the outcome mean
for the entire sample period, rather than a "pre-treatment" period because districts may be
treated multiple times within the sample period.
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rience a 10% increase in referrals to Disciplinary Alternative Education Pro-
grams (DAEP), or designated learning centers for students with more than 3
days of an out-of-school suspension. In contrast, disciplinary reductions may
be related to more serious oﬀenses, including declines in substance abuse and
sexual conduct, as well as a 14% decline in referrals to juvenile detention or
Juvenile Justice Alternative Education Programs (JJAEP).
The coeﬃcients on Applydt in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 often oppose the
sign of the coeﬃcients on Acceptdt. An example is the impact on high school
expulsions, which shows an increase in expulsions for students in districts that
applied for grants and an equivalent decrease in districts that received an
acceptance conditional on application. In eﬀect, these coeﬃcients imply that
a district with an accepted grant has a total impact of zero on expulsions,
but that expulsions would have increased if funding were not received. The
application coeﬃcients imply that the timing of applications may be related to
anticipated increases in punishable student behaviors or a change in a district’s
approach to school discipline. This control is critical to estimating the unbiased
eﬀect of an increase in school police funding, as measured by the Acceptdt
variables.
Federal police grants also have a material impact on student atten-
dance and enrollment decisions. Table 3.4 shows that grant receipt increases
the likelihood that middle school students exit school and fail to enroll in a
Texas public school (in any district in the state) in the following year by 8%
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relative to the sample mean. This exit eﬀect has the same magnitude as a de-
cline in students repeating middle school grades.19 For high school students,
the expansion of funding for SROs results in a 10% increase relative to the
sample mean.
Table 3.5 provides the results of exposure to COPS grants on the
long-term outcomes of cohorts of 7th graders. As discussed above, these vari-
ables define the proportion of years that a 7th grader is in a district that
applied for grant funding and the proportion of years that he/she is in a dis-
trict that received a grant.20 The long-term analysis shows that COPS grant
funding for school police significantly reduces high school graduation and en-
rollment in 2-year colleges. If students are exposed to one 3-year CIS grant,
the coeﬃcient magnitudes imply that high school graduation rates will decline
by 1% and enrollment in 2-year colleges will decline by 5%. These largely
negative long-term outcomes counter the short-term discipline gains for high
school students displayed in Table 3.3.
19Given that SRO funding appears to impact student attrition, it is important to under-
stand whether selection in student exits is driving the declines in school discipline in high
school. As part of the analysis for this project, I conducted a number of tests to understand
this relationship, including investigating whether exits are more likely for students with a
history of disciplinary actions as well as restricting the sample to students that remain in
school until the 11th grade. I find limited evidence that selection is driving the decline in
discipline that is observed for high school students. These results are available upon request.
20As noted above, school district assignments throughout the analysis are linked to school
district enrollment in the 7th grade, even if a student transfers to another district. High
school graduation is defined to allow a student to graduate from any public high school in
the state. This school district assignment procedure renders the grant impact as "intent-to-
treat" estimates.
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As discussed above, the primary limitation to this study is that
I am unable to observe the number of police oﬃcers working in schools, and
therefore, I cannot estimate a first stage impact of federal grant receipt on
school police presence. While SROs are contracted to work in schools through
outside police departments, school district budget information can provide
suggestive evidence of changes that result from COPS grants. In Appendix
Table C.1, I estimate the impact of COPS grant variables on various school
district security budget measures, in the same student-weighted regression
framework as the general results. This exercise shows that school districts
that are aﬀected by COPS grants for school police are significantly more likely
to list a security fund line item in their budget records (column 4), while
there are no statistically meaningful impacts on security expense levels or the
ratio of security spending to the total operating budget. This pattern is not
surprising, given that school districts do not directly receive grants for school
police, but grants are instead administered to law enforcement agencies that
contract with schools. Nevertheless, the increase in school districts recording
security expenses when a grant is received suggests that the grants have a
meaningful impact on police and security presence in schools.
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3.4.3 Treatment Heterogeneity
3.4.3.1 Heterogeneous Eﬀects across Race and Income
The baseline results present a puzzle: how is it that increases in
funding for police in public schools reduce high school disciplinary actions
and also reduce ultimate high school graduation and college enrollment? A
closer examination of diﬀerential impacts by student demographic character-
istics helps explain this seeming contradiction in the baseline models.
In Tables 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8, I consider treatment eﬀects for dif-
ferent student demographic groups, split by race and socioeconomic status,
using the economic disadvantage indicator for students that receive a free or
reduced lunch. I consider diﬀerences by race because of the large disciplinary
gaps that have been documented by researchers, policy-makers, and advocates.
Similarly, I consider student poverty because poorer students also experience
higher rates of discipline and are less likely to graduate from high school and
attend college.21
The demographic treatment eﬀects in these tables are striking.
Students not classified as economically disadvantaged experience substantial
21I have also examined how the results vary by characteristics of school districts. This
exercise shows that treatment eﬀects are clustered in school districts that have high levels of
disciplinary actions, low graduation rates, and a high proportion of non-white students, but
are also present in school districts that have high and low levels of economically disadvan-
taged students. Within the school district categories that show eﬀects of grant treatment,
the demographic patterns are generally comparable to those in the broader sample. The
results are omitted due to space constraints but are available on request.
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increases in disciplinary actions across race groups, while disciplinary actions
also increase for White students and other race students that are economically
disadvantaged. For these groups, the treatment coeﬃcients on disciplinary
actions are 1.3 to 3.1 times the size of the average coeﬃcient for the total
middle school population of 0.01 shown in Table 3.3. In high school, students
that are economically disadvantaged are those that experience declines in dis-
ciplinary actions due to increases in COPS funding, with the largest eﬀects for
Black and Hispanic students. With the exception of expulsions, students that
are not economically disadvantaged do not experience the same reductions in
disciplinary actions in high school grades from a grant treatment.
The demographic treatment eﬀects starkly diﬀer from the large
total gaps in discipline by race and socioeconomic class. In Appendix Ta-
bles C.4, C.5, and C.6, I display expanded output of the model that includes
the estimated baseline "main" eﬀects for demographic groups. Separate from
the treatment impacts related to funding for police, the baseline probability
that students categorized as economically disadvantaged receive a disciplinary
action is 4 to 12 percentage points higher than students that are not econom-
ically disadvantaged within each race. Across races, the main eﬀects paint a
stark picture; relative to White students, the probability that Black and His-
panic students receive a disciplinary action is 10-11 and 2-7 percentage points
higher, respectively. Disciplinary diﬀerences by race are more pronounced for
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students that are not classified as economically disadvantaged.22
The demographic treatment patterns in Table 3.6 are echoed in
the more detailed set of short-term student outcomes. Table 3.7 shows that
when school districts receive funding for police, conduct code violations in-
crease for middle school students that are not economically disadvantaged as
well as White students that are economically disadvantaged. Likewise, these
student groups exhibit an increase in days absent from school and referrals to
Disciplinary Alternative Education Program (DAEP) due to the treatment.
In contrast, high school treatment eﬀects for students that are economically
disadvantaged show larger declines for conduct code violations, as well as more
serious violent, and substance abuse oﬀenses.
Turning to the long-term student outcomes, treatment eﬀects for
diﬀerent demographic groups largely align with the short-term discipline re-
sults. The relatively wealthier students that had increases in middle school
disciplinary actions when school districts received police funding likewise have
negative long-term treatment outcomes. These negative treatment impacts
span high school graduation, college enrollment and college graduation. These
negative eﬀects are strongest for Black students that are not economically dis-
advantaged. For these students, exposure to a 3 year grant for police funding
22The omitted reference category in these models are other race students that are not
economically disadvantaged. Each model also includes controls for special education, LEP,
and gifted and talented status (output supressed). Special education and LEP students are
significantly more likely to be disciplined, while gifted and talented students are less likely
to be disciplined.
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reduces the likelihood of college enrollment by 3%, college graduation by 4%,
employment by 2%, and income by 3%. Higher income white students experi-
ence a reduction in enrollment in 4 year colleges, while higher income Hispanic
students show a reduction in enrollment in 2 year colleges.
Likewise, low-income White students, who also experienced in-
creases in disciplinary actions in middle school, show significant reductions
in long-term outcomes. This group drives the reduction in high school grad-
uation rates observed in the total sample in Table 3.5, with the impact of
exposure to a 3 year grant reducing high school graduation rates by 4% for
this group. Low-income whites also experience significant reductions in 2-year
college enrollment as a result of increased funding for school police.
The long-term results for economically disadvantaged Black and
Hispanic students, who experienced general reductions in high school disci-
pline, are mixed. Low-income Black students have no treatment eﬀect on high
school graduation rates, and a reduction in 2-year college enrollment rates,
but also experience a slight increase in 2-year college graduation rates. Eco-
nomically disadvantaged Hispanic students show the most positive treatment
eﬀects, with exposure to a 3 year grant increasing in college graduation by 7%,
employment by 1.5%, and income by 3% for this group.
It is not surprising that funding for police in public schools diﬀeren-
tially impacts students with diﬀerent demographic characteristics, but the ob-
served patterns contrast with a priori concerns that SROs disproportionately
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disadvantage poor minority students. Given that total school discipline levels
are markedly higher for poor and minority students, it is possible that when
schools receive a spike in funds for school police programs, SROs expand their
focus to disciplining students that have relatively lower levels of infractions
but may not show better school behavior. At the same time, the suggestive
positive treatment eﬀects observed for students that are already disciplined
the most may be a result of constructive deterrence. Overall, the demographic
analysis implies that a student’s experience with school discipline at an early
age has ramifications for their academic success in high school, post-secondary
educational attainment, and earnings. Negative school discipline experiences
may shape the way that students are perceived by teachers, school adminis-
trators, and peers, and may also shape a student’s confidence and attachment
to school. Though this study provides insight into the diﬀerential treatment
eﬀects of funding for police in public schools, it is diﬃcult to determine the
precise mechanisms driving these patterns given limitations in the data.23
23I have also split these groups by gender, LEP status, and special education status.
Consistent with the other results in this paper, the treatment eﬀects for these groups do
not always align with the baseline diﬀerences in main eﬀects. In the gender analysis, the
probability that male students are disciplined is 6-13 percentage points higher than the
probability that female students are disciplined. I find that within race and income groups,
male and female students have roughly similar total treatment eﬀects on disciplinary actions,
with the exception of larger increases in disciplinary actions for economically disadvantaged
White females. Economically disadvantaged White female students have more negative
outcomes than their male counterparts, and appear to drive the reductions in high school
graduation rates observed in the average treatment coeﬃcient. In the LEP and special
education analysis, LEP and special education students have worse baseline outcomes and
are more likely to be disciplined than other students within race and income groups. Non-
LEP students that are not economically disadvantaged have higher disciplinary increases
in middle school than LEP students and these treatment eﬀects translate to worse long-
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3.4.4 Robustness Tests of the Baseline Model
In this section, I conduct several robustness tests of the baseline
model. First, I test the validity of the identification assumption, that condi-
tional on grant application decisions, the timing of COPS grant acceptance
is not a function of changes in student outcomes within a school district.
Figure 3.2 interacts the accept and application variables with year indicators
before and after treatment, to examine how treatments are related to changes
in disciplinary outcomes over time. Each of the graphs shows diﬀerent coeﬃ-
cients from the same regression, plotting diﬀerential eﬀects for middle school
and high school students.24
These graphs tell an interesting story. On the left side of Fig-
ure 3.2, it is clear that the timing of COPS grant acceptances are unrelated
to pre-treatment changes in student disciplinary actions for middle school or
high school students. The top left graph shows an increase in aggregate disci-
plinary actions for middle school students in the post treatment period, while
term outcomes. Middle school discipline treatment eﬀects are larger for low-income White
students with special education status, and this treatment gap also results in worse long-
term outcomes for this group. These results are omitted but are available on request.
24Due to computational constraints given the size of my data set, these graphs were
produced using data collapsed to the school district-grade-year level and weighted by the
number of students within these cells. Because a school district may receive multiple grants
within a sample period, these graphs are created by duplicating the data for each possible
treatment year and stacking these data sets to form a "pseudo panel." In each sub-panel of
the analysis, only the designated treatment year is considered over time, and other concur-
rent treatments in adjacent years are included as model controls. In this analysis I include
treatments in 2000-2013, so that each centered treatment year has at least one year of
observed pre-treatment data.
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the bottom left graph shows a decline in disciplinary actions for high school
students following the treatment.
When grant application variables are displayed over time, interest-
ing relationships emerge before and after treatment (right side of of Figure 3.2).
Decisions to apply for school police funding are made following increases in
disciplinary actions for middle school students. School districts appear to be
interested in receiving funding for police when they experience higher levels of
negative student behaviors, or have increased the punitiveness of their school
discipline enforcement. This pre-application increase in disciplinary actions
is not observed for high school students. Consistent with the baseline model
results, school districts also have modest increases in disciplinary actions when
they apply for but do not receive federal funding for school police. These pat-
terns underscore the importance of conditioning the results on the timing of
application decisions, as these decisions are non-random and are related to the
outcomes of interest. By directly controlling for grant applications, I am able
to consider the causal impact of funding for school police, conditional on a
district’s choice to seek this funding. Appendix Figures C.3 and C.4 displays
comparable graphs with similar treatment patterns for in-school suspensions,
out-of-school suspensions, and expulsions.
To examine potential mechanisms, I explore diﬀerential treatment
eﬀects by grant type and grantee type. Appendix Table C.2 shows that COPS
in Schools (CIS) grants drive both the short-term and long-term results on
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student outcomes. Because CIS grants fund police hiring rather than school
police technology, equipment or other initiatives, this analysis suggests that
changes in the level of public school police presence aﬀect students more than
funding for other school police functions.
Next, I split school districts by police department type: police de-
partments designated to operate in independent school districts (ISD Police)
or other police department types (Not ISD Police) (Appendix Table C.3). The
increases in discipline for middle school students arise from districts that do
not have ISD police departments, and consequently, negative long-term stu-
dent outcomes are concentrated in these districts as well. ISD police are likely
to already have a substantial presence in the school districts that they serve, so
grants may cause a larger proportional change in school police presence from
other police department types (non-ISD police), resulting in larger negative
student impacts for these police department types. Non-ISD police depart-
ments may also be more dependent on federal funding to supply oﬃcers to
school districts, meaning that changes in grant funding have more of a direct
impact on the school districts they serve. Alternatively, designated ISD police
may be better equipped to operate in schools relative to non-ISD police be-
cause they may have a greater level of experience working in schools, they may
diﬀer in management structure and focus, or they may have better training
opportunities that prepare them to work in school environments.
In additional tests, I consider sample restrictions based on the grant
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histories of school districts. Tables 3.9 and 3.10 show that the results are sim-
ilar when the sample is restricted to districts that ever applied for grants, ever
received a grant, and were both accepted and rejected for grants (Specifications
2-4). In these specifications, the negative impact of grant exposure on high
school graduation and college enrollment is slightly smaller than in the base-
line model and not always significant, possibly because of the smaller sample
size in these models. In Specification 5, I group districts into four categories of
districts that have only been accepted for grants, only been rejected for grants,
both been accepted and rejected, and never applied, and then include sepa-
rate year time eﬀects for each of these groups. While this specification allows
districts with diﬀerent grant history types to have diﬀerential time trends, the
estimates are similar to the baseline specification.
Finally, I include regressions that collapse the data to the district-
year level and are not weighted by the number of students in a district in
Specification 6. The short-term regressions do not show similar treatment
patterns to the baseline model, with significant reductions in out-of-school
suspensions in middle school. Likewise, the long-term model shows weaker
eﬀects than the baseline. These estimates are consistent with the finding that
the treatment eﬀects are driven by larger school districts.
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3.5 Conclusion
The widespread use of police oﬃcers in public schools is relatively
recent development. While school police programs have gained popularity as
a policy to protect students against rare but tragic school shooting events, in
practice, these oﬃcers are actively involved in the enforcement of school dis-
cipline. When school police oﬃcers are involved in the daily lives of students,
they have the potential to alter student behavior, disciplinary consequences,
attachment to school, and long-term educational attainment. Though the
potential consequences of school police interventions are large, there is little
evidence of their eﬀectiveness.
This study provides the first causal estimate of funding for police
in public schools on students. Using variation in federal COPS grants, I mea-
sure the impact of receiving an increase in grant funding for school police,
conditional on decisions to apply for this federal funding. By comparing stu-
dent outcomes within school districts, I estimate the impact of grant receipt
on students exposed to increases in school police funding relative to students
that were not exposed to this treatment within the same district. This strat-
egy addresses biases related to both the non-random assignment of police to
particular school districts and the non-random timing of investments in police
within school districts.
Using detailed data on 2.5 million public school students in the
state of Texas, I find that increasing funding for school police increases disci-
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plinary actions for middle school students and decreases disciplinary actions
for high school students. Over the long-term, exposure to federal funding for
school police results in small but significant declines in high school graduation
rates and college enrollment.
However, the results of increasing funding for school police vary
substantially across student demographic groups. I find that expansions in
funding for school police increase disciplinary actions for student groups that
have lower baseline levels of involvement with school discipline. Namely, grants
for school police increase middle school disciplinary actions for students that
are relatively higher income, as well as low-income White students. At the
same time, low-income Black and Hispanic students experience a reduction
in high school disciplinary involvement as a result of grant funding. Over
the long-term, outcomes across students reflect this pattern. While long-term
educational attainment treatment eﬀects are mixed for low-income Black and
Hispanic students, these treatment eﬀects are largely negative for relatively
higher income students and low-income White students.
More research is needed to understand the ways that police aﬀect
students, as well as how the utilization of public school police compares to other
approaches to school discipline. Future work should evaluate best practices
in school discipline as well as the cost-eﬀectiveness of diﬀerent disciplinary
approaches.
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3.6 Tables and Figures
Figure 3.1: COPS Grant Funding for School Police in Texas
All grant tabulations above are calculated at the district level and are not weighted by the number of
students in a district, as is done in the remainder of the analysis. Grants are attributed to the year in which
they were awarded and diﬀerent grant types last for diﬀerent project lengths. Hiring grants are attributed to
the years in which they were applied for or awarded. Grant tabulations are conducted at the school district
level, rather than the grant level, to match the variation used in analysis. This means that grants awarded
to multiple districts are counted more than once, and multiple grants awarded to a particular district in
a given year are collapsed. Coded years in these graphs correspond to the spring of an academic year; for
example, the 2000 grant tally covers the 1999-2000 academic year.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Mean S.D.
Number-of-Districts 1,167
Number-of-Students 2,515,026
Number-of-Student<Years 13,596,579
Demographic-Controls
Number-of-Students-in-Grade 2,386 (3,085)
%-Male 0.51 (0.50)
%-White 0.42 (0.49)
%-Black 0.14 (0.35)
%-Hispanic 0.41 (0.49)
%-Limited-English-Proficiency 0.06 (0.24)
%-Special-Education 0.13 (0.34)
%-Gifted 0.11 (0.32)
%-Economically-Disadvantaged 0.49 (0.50)
Grant-Variables
Acceptance<Year 0.29 (0.45)
Application<Year 0.48 (0.50)
High-School-Outcomes
Any-Disciplinary-Action 0.27 (0.44)
Suspension-(In<School) 0.22 (0.42)
Suspension-(Out<of<School) 0.10 (0.30)
Expulsion 0.004 (0.06)
Low-Level-Offense 0.19 (0.40)
High-Level-Offense 0.06 (0.24)
Long<term-Outcomes-(9th-Grade-Cohorts-Only)
Graduate 0.70 (0.46)
Enroll-in-College-within-2-years-after-HS 0.47 (0.50)
Enroll-in-2<year-College-within-2-years-after-HS 0.38 (0.48)
Enroll-in-4<year-College-within-2-years-after-HS 0.21 (0.41)
Graduated-College-within-6-years-after-HS 0.19 (0.39)
Graduated-2<year-College-within-6-years-after-HS 0.06 (0.24)
Graduated-4<year-College-within-6-years-after-HS 0.14 (0.35)
Employed-6-years-after-HS 0.61 (0.49)
Income-6-years-after-HS-($) 12,993 (17,954)
Income-Conditional-on-Employment-6-years-after-HS-($) 21,374 (18,739)
This table displays summary statistics of covariates and outcomes weighted by student-years. Long-term
outcomes are calculated only for 7th grade cohorts and are weighted by the number of students in these
cohorts.
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics, Grant Data Weighted by Student Observations
(Variables*weighted*by*number*of*students*in*a*district) Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Number-of-New-Application/Acceptance8Years 486 1,066
Cops-in-Schools-Grant-(CIS) 0.72 (0.45) 0.77 (0.42)
Secure-Our-Schools-Grant-(SOS) 0.22 (0.41) 0.15 (0.36)
Other-School-Grant 0.14 (0.35) 0.14 (0.35)
Grant-Applying-Group-is-a-School-District-Police-Department 0.40 (0.49) 0.41 (0.49)
Number-of-School-Districts-Per-Grant 5.02 (5.63) 5.19 (6.24)
Eligible-Officers-per-School-District 2.25 (3.65)
Total-Award-per-School-District-($) 287,102 (411,752)
Total-Award-per-Student-($) 12.15 (30.12)
(Variables*weighted*by*number*of*students*in*a*district) Mean S.D.
Number-of-Districts 1,167
Ever-Accepted 0.68 (0.47)
Ever-Rejected- 0.67 (0.47)
Ever-Applied 0.80 (0.40)
Both-Accepted-and-Rejected 0.56 (0.50)
Number-of-Acceptances 1.71 (2.15)
Number-of-Rejections 1.39 (1.30)
Number-of-Applications 3.10 (2.77)
Acceptance Application
This table shows summary statistics for the COPS grants measured in this project. Counts of new grant-
years and districts are not weighted, while the values of grant characteristics are weighted. Grant counts
are calculated at the school district-grant-year level, collapsing multiple acceptances and applications for a
single district in a given year, and duplicating counts for grants that cover multiple school districts. The
percentages of grant type are calculated as portions of the acceptance count and the application count and
are weighted by student observations. These grant type rates account for multiple grants for a single district
in a given year, allowing their sum to exceed 100%. Because values other than grant and district counts are
weighted by student observations, they represent the proportion of students attending districts with certain
grant characteristics, or the weighted average of a value.
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Table 3.3: Short-term Student Discipline Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Disciplinary1
Action
Suspension11111
(In9School)
Suspension1111111
(Out9of9School) Expulsion
Acceptance(Effects
Middle(School: 1Accept 0.010* 0.005 0.009* 90.0001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.0003)
High(School:!Accept 90.007+ 90.010* 90.002 90.0009***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.0003)
Application(Effects
Middle(School: 1Apply 0.002 90.001 0.004 90.0002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.0003)
High(School:!Apply 0.002 0.003 90.003 0.0009***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.0002)
Student9Year1Observations 13,596,577 13,596,577 13,596,577 13,596,577
Accept1Mean 0.286 0.286 0.286 0.286
Y1Mean:1Middle1School 0.281 0.239 0.115 0.004
Y1Mean:1High1School 0.260 0.212 0.093 0.004
3.7% 1.9% 7.5% 93.2%
92.6% 94.8% 92.6% 922.4%
%1Effect1of1Conditional1Grant1Receipt:1
Middle1School
%1Effect1of1Conditional1Grant1Receipt:1High1
School
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1. Robust standard errors clustered at the school district level
are shown in parentheses. All models include a full set of covariates for student population in a school
district-grade, student gender, race (White, Black, Hispanic, or Other Race), economic disadvantage status,
limited english proficiency (LEP) status, special education status, gifted and talented status. Models also
include grade fixed eﬀects, year fixed eﬀects, and school district fixed eﬀects. This table shows concurrent
impacts of a COPS grant application and grant acceptance on student discipline. Apply variables are coded
as indicators of the period when a grant project would be active if a grant is approved. Likewise, Accept
variables are indicators for receipt of for the duration of a grant project period. Middle school eﬀects are
for 7th and 8th grade, while high school eﬀects are for grades 9-12. Means shown are for the entire sample
period.
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Table 3.6: Short-term Student Discipline Outcomes, by Demographic Group
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Disciplinary1
Action
Suspension1
(In9School)
Suspension1111111
(Out9of9School) Expulsion
Middle&School&+&Accept&Effects
Economic&Disadvantage
Black 90.001 90.006 90.002 90.0013
(0.009) (0.014) (0.009) (0.0009)
Hispanic 90.006 90.009 90.004 90.0005
(0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.0006)
White 0.013* 0.005 0.016*** 90.0003
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.0005)
Other1Race 0.031** 0.026* 0.018** 0.0003
(0.011) (0.011) (0.006) (0.0006)
No&Economic&Disadvantage
Black 0.031*** 0.024** 0.018** 90.0001
(0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.0006)
Hispanic 0.022*** 0.014* 0.016** 0.0006+
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.0003)
White 0.017*** 0.011* 0.011*** 0.0002
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.0002)
Other1Race 0.024*** 0.017* 0.014*** 0.0003
(0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.0004)
High&School&+&Accept&Effects
Economic&Disadvantage
Black 90.017** 90.021** 90.016** 90.0017**
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.0006)
Hispanic 90.017** 90.018** 90.003 90.0008
(0.006) (0.007) (0.004) (0.0005)
White 0.0002 90.002 0.004 90.0008+
(0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.0005)
Other1Race 0.011 0.005 0.012+ 90.0009
(0.010) (0.010) (0.006) (0.0006)
No&Economic&Disadvantage
Black 90.002 90.007 90.0001 90.0008*
(0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.0004)
Hispanic 0.004 90.0001 0.003 90.0012***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.004) (0.0004)
White 0.002 90.003 0.001 90.0008***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.0002)
Other1Race 90.001 90.005 0.003 90.0004
(0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.0004)
Student9Year1Observations 13,596,577 13,596,577 13,596,577 13,596,577
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1. Robust standard errors clustered at the school district level
are shown in parentheses. Models include a full set of covariates, year fixed eﬀects, grade fixed eﬀects, and
district fixed eﬀects as in Table 3.3. While not shown due to space constraints, all models include application
variables interacted with the same set of demographic categories as shown above. Demographic interactions
in this table are non-additive and represent mutually exclusive student groups.
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Figure 3.2: Timing of Grant Acceptance and Application Treatment Eﬀects
on Student Discipline
Each of the graphs shows separate coeﬃcient estimates from the same regression. Bars surrounding coef-
ficients represent a 95% confidence interval for each estimate with standard errors clustered at the school
district level and the year preceding treatment omitted. Because a school district may receive multiple
grants within a sample period, these graphs are created by duplicating the data for each possible treatment
year and stacking these data sets to form a "pseudo panel." In each year panel, the designated treatment
year is considered over time, and treatments in adjacent years are included as model controls. Due to com-
putational constraints given the size of my data set, these graphs were produced using data collapsed to the
school district-grade-year level and weighted by the number of students within these cells. The regressions
correspond to the fully specified model, that includes student demographic covariates, student enrollment
in a district-grade-year cell, and fixed eﬀects for grade, year, and school district. I include treatments in
2000-2013, so that each centered treatment year has at least one year of observed pre-treatment data.
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Table 3.9: Robustness Tests, Short-term Student Discipline Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Disciplinary1
Action
Suspension1
(In9School)
Suspension1111111
(Out9of9School) Expulsion
1.#Baseline#Model
Middle1School:1Accept 0.010* 0.005 0.009* 90.0001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.0003)
High1School:1Accept 90.007+ 90.010* 90.002 90.0009***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.0003)
Observations 13,596,577 13,596,577 13,596,577 13,596,577
2.#Apply#Ever#
Middle1School:1Accept 0.012** 0.006 0.010* 90.0001
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.0003)
High1School:1Accept 90.006 90.009* 90.002 90.0009***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.0003)
Observations 10,698,313 10,698,313 10,698,313 10,698,313
3.#Accept#Ever
Middle1School:1Accept 0.009+ 0.003 0.006 90.0001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.0003)
High1School:1Accept 90.004 90.007 90.0012 90.0010***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.0003)
Observations 9,052,378 9,052,378 9,052,378 9,052,378
4.#Both#Accepted#and#Rejected
Middle1School:1Accept 0.012* 0.005 0.009+ 90.0001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.0003)
High1School:1Accept 90.006 90.009+ 90.004 90.0010**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.0003)
Observations 7,419,861 7,419,861 7,419,861 7,419,861
5.#Application#Group#by#Year#Effects
Middle1School:1Accept 0.013** 0.007 0.009* 90.0001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.0003)
High1School:1Accept 90.005 90.008+ 90.002 90.0009***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.0003)
Observations 13,596,577 13,596,577 13,596,577 13,596,577
6.#Unweighted#by#District#Regression
Middle1School:1Accept 90.010 90.005 90.012** 90.0015
(0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.0015)
High1School:1Accept 90.002 0.001 90.003 90.0008
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.0006)
Observations 62,990 62,990 62,990 62,990
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1. Robust standard errors clustered at the school district level
are shown in parentheses. Models include a full set of covariates, year fixed eﬀects, grade fixed eﬀects, and
district fixed eﬀects as in Table 3.3. Specifications 2-4 show regression results restricted to school districts
that applied for a grant during the sample period, were accepted for a grant during the period, or were both
accepted and rejected fro grands during the sample period. Specification 5 replicates the baseline model
using data collapsed at the district-grade-year level that is not weighted by the number of students in a
school district-grade-year.
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Appendix A
Appendix:
“Whose Help is on the Way?”
The Importance of Individual Police Oﬃcers in
Law Enforcement Outcomes
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A.1 Appendix Tables and Figures
Figure A.1: Steps involved in an Incident Response
Dispatcher: 
Address, Dispatch Code, Location 
Type, Select Complainant 
Characteristics 
Oﬃcer A Oﬃcers B & C Oﬃcer D Oﬃcer E Oﬃcers F & G 
Available Oﬃcers 
Arrive at Scene: 
Gather information, Investigate Scene, Assist 
Complainant, Request Additional Help, File Report 
Arrest 
At the scene or 
at a later date 
Unavailable Oﬃcers 
10% 90% 
911 Call 
No Arrest 
This figure displays an outline of an incident response path at the Dallas Police Department. Information on
call response protocols was obtained through conversations with oﬃcers and dispatchers at the department.
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Figure A.2: Police Beats and Police Divisions in Dallas, TX
This figure shows a map of the 234 police beats contained in the 7 police divisions in Dallas.
Police sectors are geographic units that are collections of beats within police divisions (35 total
sectors). Map was obtained from the North Dallas Neighborhood Alliance: http://www.ndna-
tx.org/crimeWatch/dallasPolice/DivMap.aspx.
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Table A.1: Summary Statistics, Oﬃcer Sorting Robustness Samples
Table A.1.A: Summary Statistics: Outcomes, Oﬃcers, and Complainants
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Total,Observations 217,633 116,070 102,203
Total,Incidents 161,531 86,091 87,139
Total,Officers 1,851 1,556 1,505
Outcomes
Arrest 0.11 (0.31) 0.11 (0.31) 0.09 (0.29)
Suspect 0.19 (0.39) 0.19 (0.39) 0.17 (0.37)
Felony,Arrest 0.04 (0.18) 0.03 (0.18) 0.03 (0.17)
Misdemeanor,Arrest 0.08 (0.27) 0.07 (0.26) 0.07 (0.25)
Arrestee,Black 0.04 (0.19) 0.04 (0.19) 0.03 (0.18)
Arrestee,Hispanic 0.01 (0.12) 0.01 (0.12) 0.01 (0.12)
Arrestee,White 0.01 (0.12) 0.01 (0.12) 0.01 (0.11)
Officer,Characteristics
Officer,Arrest,Rate 0.11 (0.05) 0.11 (0.05) 0.11 (0.05)
Two,Responders 0.52 (0.50) 0.51 (0.50) 0.31 (0.46)
Black, 0.24 (0.39) 0.24 (0.40) 0.24 (0.41)
Hispanic 0.21 (0.35) 0.21 (0.35) 0.21 (0.37)
White 0.50 (0.45) 0.50 (0.45) 0.50 (0.47)
Female 0.16 (0.32) 0.16 (0.32) 0.16 (0.34)
Age 38.37 (9.30) 38.30 (9.35) 38.53 (9.75)
Trainee 0.07 (0.20) 0.07 (0.20) 0.06 (0.20)
Sergeant 0.01 (0.10) 0.01 (0.08) 0.01 (0.08)
Salary,($10,000s) 5.88 (1.02) 5.87 (1.02) 5.89 (1.08)
Years,of,Experience 11.82 (8.56) 11.73 (8.60) 11.92 (8.98)
Total,Incidents 171.03 (103.62) 177.34 (101.79) 179.26 (101.22)
Complainant,Characteristics
Victim,with,Injury 0.10 (0.29) 0.09 (0.29) 0.08 (0.28)
Number,of,Complainants 1.59 (0.99) 1.59 (0.99) 1.56 (0.97)
Black 0.36 (0.48) 0.36 (0.48) 0.35 (0.48)
Hispanic 0.35 (0.48) 0.35 (0.48) 0.35 (0.48)
White 0.32 (0.47) 0.32 (0.47) 0.32 (0.47)
Female 0.50 (0.50) 0.50 (0.50) 0.50 (0.50)
,
Unlikely,Response,SampleAnalysis,Sample Low,Availability,Sample
These tables display summary statistics for covariates used in analysis. The first column, “Analysis Sample”,
summarizes the primary analysis sample. The second column, “Low Availability Sample,” consists of observa-
tions where fewer oﬃcers are available to respond to at the time of the incident. The third column, “Unlikely
Response Sample,” consists of observations where the predicted probability that an oﬃcer responds to the
incident is low, given other observables in the model. More details on the construction of these samples can
be found in Section 1.5.1.1. Oﬃcer arrest rate and number of incidents is calculated over all observations in
the raw data. Complainant characteristics are shown for observations that have information on complainant
demographics, which corresponds to 95% of the sample. Information for suspect outcomes is only available
prior to 2017 and is summarized for the period available. Robustness samples are restricted to oﬃcers with
at least 25 observations within the relevant sub-sample.
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Table A.1.B: Summary Statistics: Incident Urgency, Location Type, and Dispatch
Code
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Total,Observations 217,633 116,070 102,203
Total,Incidents 161,531 86,091 87,139
Total,Officers 1,851 1,556 1,505
Call$Urgency
Time,to,Dispatch,(Minutes) 24.09 (27.94) 24.20 (27.96) 25.31 (28.54)
Location$Type
Apartment 0.13 (0.33) 0.13 (0.33) 0.12 (0.33)
Residence,Other 0.15 (0.36) 0.15 (0.36) 0.15 (0.36)
Bar/Club/Entertainment 0.03 (0.17) 0.03 (0.17) 0.03 (0.17)
Retail 0.07 (0.25) 0.07 (0.25) 0.06 (0.24)
Business,Other 0.05 (0.22) 0.05 (0.22) 0.05 (0.21)
Govt/Health/School/Religion 0.01 (0.10) 0.01 (0.10) 0.01 (0.10)
Motor,Vehicle 0.02 (0.15) 0.02 (0.14) 0.02 (0.14)
Parking,Lot 0.24 (0.43) 0.24 (0.43) 0.25 (0.43)
Street 0.20 (0.40) 0.20 (0.40) 0.21 (0.40)
Outdoor,Other 0.05 (0.22) 0.05 (0.22) 0.05 (0.22)
Other,Location 0.05 (0.21) 0.05 (0.21) 0.05 (0.21)
Dispatch$Code$Type
Criminal,Assault 0.01 (0.12) 0.02 (0.12) 0.01 (0.11)
Armed,Encounter/Active,Shooter 0.02 (0.13) 0.02 (0.13) 0.02 (0.12)
Injured,Person 0.01 (0.11) 0.01 (0.11) 0.01 (0.11)
Robbery 0.06 (0.24) 0.06 (0.24) 0.05 (0.22)
Burglary,of,Business 0.05 (0.22) 0.05 (0.22) 0.05 (0.22)
Burglary,of,Residence 0.11 (0.32) 0.11 (0.32) 0.12 (0.32)
Burglary,of,Motor,Vehicle 0.17 (0.38) 0.17 (0.38) 0.18 (0.39)
Unauthorized,Use,of,Motor,Vehicle 0.05 (0.22) 0.05 (0.23) 0.06 (0.23)
Theft 0.07 (0.26) 0.07 (0.26) 0.08 (0.27)
Criminal,Mischief 0.07 (0.25) 0.07 (0.26) 0.07 (0.26)
Major,Disturbance 0.11 (0.32) 0.11 (0.32) 0.10 (0.30)
Major,Accident 0.04 (0.21) 0.04 (0.20) 0.04 (0.20)
Minor,Accident 0.09 (0.29) 0.09 (0.29) 0.10 (0.30)
Other,Y,Serious 0.07 (0.26) 0.07 (0.26) 0.06 (0.24)
Other,Y,Minor 0.04 (0.21) 0.04 (0.21) 0.04 (0.20)
Unlikely$Response$SampleAnalysis$Sample Low$Availability$Sample
These tables display summary statistics for covariates used in analysis. The first column, “Analysis Sam-
ple”, summarizes the primary analysis sample. The second column, “Low Availability Sample,” consists of
observations where fewer oﬃcers are available to respond to at the time of the incident. The third col-
umn, “Unlikely Response Sample,” consists of observations where the predicted probability that an oﬃcer
responds to the incident is low, given other observables in the model. More details on the construction of
these samples can be found in Section 1.5.1.1.Call Urgency or Time to Dispatch (Minutes) is a variable
that captures the priority level or severity of a given call at the time of dispatch. Robustness samples are
restricted to oﬃcers with at least 25 observations within the relevant sub-sample.
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Table A.3: Oﬃcer Eﬀects and Oﬃcer Demographics, Additional Policing Out-
comes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Outcome:)Officer)Effect Arrest Suspect
Felony999999
Arrest
Misdemeanor9
Arrest
Arrest,99999
Single9
Responder
Arrest,9
Urgent9Calls
Arrest,999999
NonEUrgent9
Calls
Time9to9
Clearance9
(Minutes)
Black 0.002 E0.004 0.0004 0.002 0.0001 0.001 0.001 8.21
(0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (5.39597)
Hispanic E0.002 E0.008 0.001 E0.002 E0.003 0.002 E0.006 4.70
(0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (5.45542)
White 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.006 0.001 0.661
(0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (5.15985)
Female E0.004+ E0.002 E0.003+ E0.0009 E0.004* E0.002 E0.001 E0.383
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (2.86040)
Age E0.0004* E0.0003 E0.0002* E0.0001 E0.0002 E0.0001 E0.0004* 0.711**
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.22680)
Trainee E0.010** E0.010* E0.006*** E0.005* E0.005 E0.003 E0.011** 2.01
(0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (4.00223)
Sergeant E0.005 E0.014+ E0.003 E0.002 E0.009+ E0.001 E0.017* E7.23
(0.005) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (6.14398)
Experience 0.0019*** 0.002*** 0.0004+ 0.001** 0.0015** 0.0022** 0.0018*** E0.760
(0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.600)
Experience^2 E0.00004*** E0.00005*** E0.00001 E0.00003** E0.00003** E0.00005** E0.00004*** E0.002
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00002) (0.00001) (0.015)
Observations 1,832 1,736 1,832 1,832 1,181 1,541 1,441 1,832
REsquared 0.041 0.029 0.021 0.021 0.023 0.021 0.038 0.013
Fixed9Effect9Mean E0.001 E0.001 E0.002 E0.002 E0.003 E0.002 E0.002 E8.564
Fixed9Effect9S.D. 0.036 0.046 0.020 0.029 0.031 0.053 0.035 46.350
Outcome9Mean 0.109 0.191 0.035 0.076 0.060 0.134 0.080 147.200
Outcome9S.D. 0.311 0.393 0.185 0.266 0.237 0.341 0.271 765.400
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
This table shows regression results of oﬃcer eﬀects regressed on fixed oﬃcer characteristics, at the oﬃcer
level. Each column uses the oﬃcer eﬀects derived from the specifications in Table A.2. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses. Other race oﬃcers are the omitted race category. Oﬃcers without demographic
information are excluded from the regressions. Information for suspect outcomes is only available prior to
2017. Each specification includes oﬃcers with at least 25 observations for the relevant sample.
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Table A.4: Oﬃcer Eﬀects and Oﬃcer Demographics, Robustness Specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Outcome:)))))))))))))))
Officer)Effect Base/Model
Add/////
Reporting/Area/
Fixed/Effects
Add/
Sector*Month/
Fixed/Effects
Add/////
Individual/Shift/
Effects
Add//////////////////////
Full/Set/of/
Dispatch/Codes
First/Stage/
Fixed/Effects:/
>100/N
First/Stage/
Fixed/Effects:/
Weighted/by/N
First/Stage/
Fixed/Effects:/
Unadjusted
Black 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.0002 0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Hispanic U0.002 U0.003 U0.002 U0.001 U0.001 0.001 U0.003 U0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
White 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.002 0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005)
Female U0.004+ U0.004+ U0.004+ U0.004+ U0.004* U0.002 U0.002 U0.005+
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Age U0.0004* U0.0004* U0.0003* U0.0005* U0.0002 U0.0004 U0.0003 U0.0006**
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Trainee U0.010** U0.010** U0.010** U0.012** U0.008** U0.007 U0.010** U0.014**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Sergeant U0.005 U0.008 U0.004 U0.003 U0.006 U0.010 U0.005 U0.005
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Experience 0.0019*** 0.0021*** 0.0019*** 0.0028*** 0.0019*** 0.0027*** 0.0022*** 0.0029***
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0006)
Experience^2 U0.00004*** U0.00004*** U0.00004*** U0.00006*** U0.00004*** U0.00005*** U0.00005*** U0.00006***
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00002) (0.00001) (0.00001)
Observations 1,832 1,832 1,832 1,832 1,832 941 1,832 1,832
RUsquared 0.041 0.042 0.039 0.047 0.043 0.043 0.030 0.040
Fixed/Effect/Mean U0.001 U0.001 U0.001 0.000 U0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001
Fixed/Effect/S.D. 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.044 0.033 0.039 0.041 0.050
Outcome/Mean 0.109 0.109 0.109 0.109 0.109 0.103 0.109 0.109
Outcome/S.D. 0.311 0.311 0.311 0.311 0.311 0.305 0.311 0.311
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
This table shows regression results of oﬃcer eﬀects regressed on fixed oﬃcer characteristics, at the oﬃcer
level. Each column uses the oﬃcer eﬀects derived from the specifications in Table A.2. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses. Other race oﬃcers are the omitted race category. Oﬃcers without demographic
information are excluded from the regressions.
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Table A.5: Summary Statistics, Racial Bias Test Sample
Table A.5.A: Summary Statistics: Outcomes, Oﬃcers, and Complainants
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Total,Observations 156,361 39,770 26,571 85,573
Total,Incidents 129,482 34,020 22,560 68,551
Total,Officers 1,613 423 314 828
Outcomes
Arrest 0.09 (0.29) 0.09 (0.28) 0.08 (0.27) 0.10 (0.30)
Arrestee,Black 0.03 (0.18) 0.04 (0.20) 0.02 (0.15) 0.03 (0.18)
Arrestee,Hispanic 0.01 (0.11) 0.01 (0.10) 0.01 (0.11) 0.01 (0.12)
Arrestee,White 0.01 (0.11) 0.01 (0.09) 0.01 (0.09) 0.02 (0.12)
Officer,Characteristics
Officer,Arrest,Rate 0.10 (0.05) 0.10 (0.05) 0.10 (0.05) 0.11 (0.06)
Two,Responders 0.34 (0.47) 0.29 (0.45) 0.30 (0.46) 0.40 (0.49)
Black, 0.25 (0.44) 1.00
Hispanic 0.17 (0.38) 1.00
White 0.55 (0.50) 1.00
Female 0.16 (0.34) 0.25 (0.40) 0.15 (0.32) 0.12 (0.30)
Age 39.45 (9.75) 40.69 (9.91) 37.00 (9.63) 39.73 (9.68)
Trainee 0.04 (0.18) 0.04 (0.17) 0.05 (0.19) 0.05 (0.17)
Sergeant 0.01 (0.10) 0.02 (0.13) 0.01 (0.08) 0.01 (0.08)
Salary,($10,000s) 6.00 (1.07) 6.02 (1.09) 5.80 (1.04) 6.06 (1.08)
Years,of,Experience 12.87 (9.08) 13.01 (8.70) 10.79 (8.71) 13.56 (9.40)
Total,Incidents 181.02 (108.91) 166.86 (103.42) 175.25 (97.01) 187.88 (114.99)
Complainant,Characteristics
Victim,with,Injury 0.08 (0.27) 0.07 (0.25) 0.08 (0.27) 0.09 (0.29)
Number,of,Complainants 1.55 (0.94) 1.50 (0.85) 1.50 (0.92) 1.59 (0.99)
Black 0.35 (0.48) 0.46 (0.50) 0.31 (0.46) 0.31 (0.46)
Hispanic 0.35 (0.48) 0.30 (0.46) 0.43 (0.49) 0.34 (0.47)
White 0.33 (0.47) 0.25 (0.43) 0.29 (0.45) 0.37 (0.48)
Female 0.49 (0.50) 0.51 (0.50) 0.49 (0.50) 0.48 (0.50)
,
White,OfficersHispanic,OfficersRacial,Bias,Test,Sample Black,Officers
These tables display summary statistics the racial bias test analysis. The first column, “Racial Bias Test
Sample”, summarizes the primary analysis sample. This sample is restricted to observations where there
is a single race for responding oﬃcers (if there are multiple oﬃcers) and each oﬃcer has more than 25
observations. Oﬃcer arrest rate and number of incidents is calculated over all observations in the raw data.
Columns (2) - (4) describe characteristics of observations for Black, Hispanic, and White oﬃcers within the
“Racial Bias Test Sample.” Complainant characteristics are shown for observations that have information
on complainant demographics, which corresponds to 95% of the sample.
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Table A.5.B: Summary Statistics: Incident Urgency, Location Type, and Dispatch
Code
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Total,Observations 156,361 39,770 26,571 85,573
Total,Incidents 129,482 34,020 22,560 68,551
Total,Officers 1,613 423 314 828
Call$Urgency
Time,to,Dispatch,(Minutes) 24.99 (28.37) 25.56 (28.66) 26.17 (29.02) 24.16 (27.89)
Location$Type
Apartment 0.12 (0.33) 0.13 (0.34) 0.12 (0.32) 0.12 (0.32)
Residence,Other 0.15 (0.36) 0.17 (0.37) 0.17 (0.38) 0.14 (0.35)
Bar/Club/Entertainment 0.03 (0.17) 0.03 (0.16) 0.03 (0.16) 0.03 (0.17)
Retail 0.06 (0.24) 0.06 (0.24) 0.05 (0.23) 0.07 (0.25)
Business,Other 0.05 (0.22) 0.04 (0.19) 0.05 (0.21) 0.06 (0.23)
Govt/Health/School/Religion 0.01 (0.10) 0.01 (0.10) 0.01 (0.11) 0.01 (0.10)
Motor,Vehicle 0.02 (0.14) 0.03 (0.17) 0.02 (0.13) 0.02 (0.13)
Parking,Lot 0.25 (0.44) 0.24 (0.43) 0.25 (0.43) 0.26 (0.44)
Street 0.20 (0.40) 0.16 (0.37) 0.20 (0.40) 0.22 (0.42)
Outdoor,Other 0.05 (0.22) 0.07 (0.26) 0.07 (0.25) 0.04 (0.19)
Other,Location 0.05 (0.21) 0.06 (0.24) 0.04 (0.20) 0.04 (0.20)
Dispatch$Code$Type
Criminal,Assault 0.01 (0.11) 0.01 (0.10) 0.01 (0.11) 0.01 (0.12)
Armed,Encounter/Active,Shooter 0.01 (0.12) 0.01 (0.12) 0.02 (0.12) 0.01 (0.12)
Injured,Person 0.01 (0.11) 0.01 (0.12) 0.01 (0.10) 0.01 (0.11)
Robbery 0.05 (0.22) 0.05 (0.21) 0.05 (0.22) 0.05 (0.23)
Burglary,of,Business 0.05 (0.22) 0.05 (0.21) 0.05 (0.23) 0.06 (0.23)
Burglary,of,Residence 0.12 (0.32) 0.13 (0.33) 0.13 (0.33) 0.11 (0.31)
Burglary,of,Motor,Vehicle 0.19 (0.39) 0.19 (0.39) 0.19 (0.40) 0.18 (0.39)
Unauthorized,Use,of,Motor,Vehicle 0.06 (0.23) 0.06 (0.24) 0.06 (0.24) 0.05 (0.22)
Theft 0.08 (0.27) 0.10 (0.30) 0.08 (0.27) 0.07 (0.26)
Criminal,Mischief 0.07 (0.26) 0.09 (0.29) 0.08 (0.27) 0.07 (0.25)
Major,Disturbance 0.10 (0.29) 0.11 (0.31) 0.09 (0.29) 0.09 (0.29)
Major,Accident 0.04 (0.20) 0.03 (0.17) 0.04 (0.21) 0.05 (0.22)
Minor,Accident 0.10 (0.30) 0.07 (0.26) 0.09 (0.28) 0.11 (0.32)
Other,Y,Serious 0.06 (0.24) 0.05 (0.22) 0.05 (0.22) 0.07 (0.25)
Other,Y,Minor 0.04 (0.20) 0.05 (0.21) 0.04 (0.20) 0.04 (0.20)
White$OfficersHispanic$OfficersRacial$Bias$Test$Sample Black$Officers
These tables display summary statistics the racial bias test analysis. The first column, “Racial Bias Test
Sample”, summarizes the primary analysis sample. This sample is restricted to observations where there
is a single race for responding oﬃcers (if there are multiple oﬃcers) and each oﬃcer has more than 25
observations. Columns (2) - (4) describe characteristics of observations for Black, Hispanic, and White
oﬃcers within the “Racial Bias Test Sample.” Complainant characteristics are shown for observations that
have information on complainant demographics, which corresponds to 95% of the sample. Call Urgency or
Time to Dispatch (Minutes) is a variable that captures the priority level or severity of a given call at the
time of dispatch.
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Table A.6: Racial Bias Test, Oﬃcer Characteristics in First Stage
Table A.6.A: Racial Bias Test, Oﬃcer Characteristics in First Stage, Full Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Outcome=Officer,Effects
Arrest
Arrest,,,
Black
Arrest,
Hispanic,
Arrest,,
White
A.#Full#Sample
Black,Officer 0.0004 0.002 0.002 0.001
(0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Hispanic,Officer =0.004 =0.001 =0.0002 0.001
(0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
White,Officer 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001
(0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Black=Hispanic:,,, F=Test 1.61 2.72 4.93 0.01
P=Value 0.20 0.10 0.03 0.92
Black=White:,,,,,,,, F=Test 0.89 0.24 0.37 0.23
P=Value 0.35 0.63 0.55 0.63
Hispanic=White:,,, F=Test 5.10 6.63 3.52 0.11
P=Value 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.74
Observations 156,361 156,361 156,361 156,361
Arrest,Mean 0.091 0.033 0.013 0.012
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
This table is comparable to Table 1.5. Here, the regressions omit oﬃcer fixed eﬀects, ✓i, and measure the
direct eﬀect of oﬃcer demographic characteristics in the first stage regression. Each regression controls
for demographic characteristics of i and includes fixed eﬀects for co-responders, ✓j . Standard errors are
clustered at the level of the focal oﬃcer, i, and the shift cell,  gt, to account for error correlations within
oﬃcers and shifts. Each arrestee race outcome is defined unconditionally as 1 if an individual of that race
was arrested and 0 otherwise. Standard errors are clustered at the focal oﬃcer level, ✓i, and the shift cell,
 gt. The full sample, Panel (A), is restricted to observations where responding oﬃcers have a single race, and
each oﬃcer has more than 25 observations within this restriction. The interaction of arrestee outcome race
and oﬃcer race through the regression coeﬃcients represents a test of oﬃcer and arrestee race interaction
eﬀects. F-Tests measure whether oﬃcers of diﬀerent races are more likely to make arrests of individuals of
diﬀerent races.
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Figure A.3: Power of Racial Bias Test, Bootstrap Simulation
Figure A.3.A: Power of the Test, Deviations in Black Oﬃcer Race Coeﬃcient
This figure shows results from a bootstrap simulation exercise that estimates the power of the racial bias test
used in the paper. This graph plots the rejection rate of the racial bias test when an alternative hypothesis
of racial bias is imposed, or the power of the test. The X-axis portrays diﬀerent alternative hypotheses,
expressed as a constant percentage deviation in arrest race outcomes caused by the altered oﬃcer race
coeﬃcient, relative to the arrest average for oﬃcers of other races. The deviation is an increase for arrestee
outcomes when the oﬃcer and arrestee are diﬀerent races, and a decrease when the oﬃcer and arrestee are
the same race.
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Figure A.3.B: Power of the Test, Deviations in Hispanic Oﬃcer Race Coeﬃcient
This figure shows results from a bootstrap simulation exercise that estimates the power of the racial bias test
used in the paper. This graph plots the rejection rate of the racial bias test when an alternative hypothesis
of racial bias is imposed, or the power of the test. The X-axis portrays diﬀerent alternative hypotheses,
expressed as a constant percentage deviation in arrest race outcomes caused by the altered oﬃcer race
coeﬃcient, relative to the arrest average for oﬃcers of other races. The deviation is an increase for arrestee
outcomes when the oﬃcer and arrestee are diﬀerent races, and a decrease when the oﬃcer and arrestee are
the same race.
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Figure A.3.C: Power of the Test, Deviations in White Oﬃcer Race Coeﬃcient
This figure shows results from a bootstrap simulation exercise that estimates the power of the racial bias test
used in the paper. This graph plots the rejection rate of the racial bias test when an alternative hypothesis
of racial bias is imposed, or the power of the test. The X-axis portrays diﬀerent alternative hypotheses,
expressed as a constant percentage deviation in arrest race outcomes caused by the altered oﬃcer race
coeﬃcient, relative to the arrest average for oﬃcers of other races. The deviation is an increase for arrestee
outcomes when the oﬃcer and arrestee are diﬀerent races, and a decrease when the oﬃcer and arrestee are
the same race.
This simulation is conducted using the following steps (for the White coeﬃcient example). Allow each oﬃcer
race coeﬃcient in the second stage to be denoted by ↵r. I first regress the second stage ✓i,r outcomes on oﬃcer
demographics excluding the White oﬃcer race coeﬃcient,Whitei,r and recover a predicted ✓ˆ0i,r estimate and
a predicted residual rˆi,r. In each bootstrap iteration, I draw a wild bootstrap weight wb 2 { 1, 1} with equal
probability for each weight. I then impose an alternative hypothesis on the Whitei,r coeﬃcient to construct
a simulated value for each oﬃcer eﬀect, ✓˜bi,r = ✓ˆ
0
i,r + Whitei,r +wbrˆi,r. I set the magnitude of   to be a
constant percent increase for Black and Hispanic arrestee outcomes and an equivalent percent decrease in the
White arrestee outcome, so that the alternative hypothesis is a true diﬀerence in White oﬃcer ranking across
the arrestee race outcomes. These percent changes are set relative to Black or Hispanic oﬃcer averages for
the total arrest outcome, using the higher of the two oﬃcer groups (Black or Hispanic) for percent increases
and the lower of the two for the percent decrease. In other words, a   of a 5 percent deviation will equal the
  = ↵Black + 0.05/(mean(ArrestHispanic) + ↵Black) for the ✓i,Hispanic regression if Black oﬃcers were
the reference category with larger coeﬃcient, and   = ↵Hispanic 0.05/(mean(ArrestWhite)+↵Hispanic)
for the ✓i,White regression if Hispanic oﬃcers were the reference category with the smaller coeﬃcient. Using
these simulated bootstrap values, ✓˜bi,r, I regress oﬃcer eﬀects on the full set of oﬃcer demographic variables
and use F-tests to determine whether the ranking of oﬃcer race groups changes across arrestee race outcomes.
The test is rejected when F-tests are significant at the 10% level and show diﬀerent oﬃcer race rankings
across the arrestee race outcomes.
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Table A.7: Replication of Racial Bias Tests in Prior Literature
A.#Population#Benchmark#Tests
Total Black Hispanic# White#
Dallas%Population 1,260,688 24.1% 41.7% 29.4%
Proportion%of%Arrests%to%Total%Arrests 9,033 54.7% 24.1% 21.2%
Arrest&Rates&Fit&Population&Distribution
ChiASquared%Statistic 4373
PAValue 0
B.#Knowles,#Persico#&#Todd#(2001)
Total Black Hispanic# White#
Arrests%as%a%Fraction%of%Suspects 50.2% 48.9% 49.5% 54.5%
Conditional&Arrest&Rates&Equal
ChiASquared%Statistic 37.13
PAValue 0
C.#Anwar#&#Fang#(2006)
Black#Officers Hispanic#Officers White#Officers
Arrests%of%Black%Suspects 49.0% 50.0% 48.6%
Arrests%of%Hispanic%Suspects 51.2% 50.2% 48.7%
Arrests%of%White%Suspects 56.3% 55.4% 53.7%
Rank&of&Arrest&Rates&across&Officer&Race&Independent&of&Suspect&Race
Officer&Arrest&Rate&Order&for&each&Suspect&Race:
&Black≥Hispanic≥White
Total%Number%of%Tests 6
Number%of%Tests%that%Reject%the%Null%Hypothesis 0
D.#Antonovics#&#Knight#(2009)
Black#Officers Hispanic#Officers# White#Officers
Race%Match%Arrest%Rate%as%a%Fraction%of%Suspects 50.2% 53.3% 54.5%
Race%MisAMatch%Arrest%Rate%%as%a%Fraction%of%Suspects 50.0% 50.9% 50.4%
Arrest&Rates&Equal:&
Officer/Suspect&Match&and&Mismatch&(Race&or&Gender)
ChiASquared%Statistic 1.229 2.71 16.68
PAValue 0.268 0.100 0
This table shows the results of racial bias tests used in the prior literature when applied to the data in
this study. Conditional arrest rates are defined as number of incidents with arrests divided by number of
incidents with suspects. Each test measures diﬀerences in raw aggregated statistics in the data, that are
not adjusted for contextual factors related to incidents through regression. Panel (A) is calculated at the
incident level, with suspect race categorized as a maximum value if there are multiple suspects. Panel (C)
uses a maximum value to categorize oﬃcer race at the incident level. Panel (B) and (D) allow for multiple
arrestee, suspect, or oﬃcer races per incident. In this way, the tests shown here are simplified versions of
tests in the prior literature, because in some of the source papers, the authors also conduct tests that adjust
for other factors related to incidents in addition to race. The tests only use information prior to 2017, given
the availability of the suspect outcome.
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A.2 Coeﬃcients in the First Stage of Model
In the body of the paper, I restrict attention to aspects of oﬃcer
eﬀects because this paper focuses on estimating diﬀerences in oﬃcer arrest
behavior, ✓ˆi, and the importance of oﬃcers in predicting arrests. This appendix
discusses other components of the arrest prediction model.
Table A.8 shows the first stage coeﬃcients for incident character-
istics, Xkt. First, the probability of an arrest is increasing in call severity
or urgency, at a decreasing rate. This is shown by the "Time to Dispatch"
variables that measure the number of minutes that lapse between when a call
is made by the complainant and when an oﬃcer is dispatched to the scene.
An increase of 10 minutes in this time gap decreases the likelihood that an
arrest is made by 4%. The average call in the data has a time diﬀerence of 24
minutes between the call and dispatch time, which corresponds to a decrease
the likelihood of arrest by 9% relative to an instantaneously dispatched call.
Next, the model includes direct controls for complainant demo-
graphic information, relative to the omitted category of complainants with
no demographic data. The likelihood of arrest increases when there are more
complainants, and is largest if the complainant is Black. All race categories
can be included as controls because some calls have multiple complainants of
diﬀerent races. Arrests are no more likely when the complainant is female.
Lastly, arrests are less likely when there is demographic information for the
complainant and when there is a victim injury. Complainants without listed
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demographics are often businesses, so the negative complainant demographic
information coeﬃcient suggests that arrests are more likely when oﬀenses occur
in business establishments.
The third set of incident controls in the model are dispatch and
location type codes. These variables are generally more positive for crimes
that are more serious or are likely to have the evidence necessary to make
an arrest. Relative to minor incidents (other minor), arrests are 7 percentage
points higher for criminal assaults, shootings, or armed encounters. At the
same time, while a robbery is a serious violent oﬀense, these incidents have
a lower likelihood of arrest, possibly because suspects are diﬃcult to identify
in these incidents. Likewise, burglaries and thefts are less likely to result
in arrest than the omitted category. For location, incidents that occur in a
business setting appear more likely to result in arrest, while crimes that occur
on the street are the least likely to involve an arrest. This may be related to
security surveillance systems used in businesses.
Lastly, the model includes indicator variables for the hour within
each shift. Interestingly, arrests are less likely in the sixth and seventh shift
hour than in the last hour of a shift. This likely relates to oﬃcer overtime pay
incentives. If oﬃcers make arrests in the last hour of their shift, they are more
likely to receive overtime pay for activities related to filing the arrest, including
booking the individual in the county jail and writing the arrest report for the
incident. Oﬃcers are 10% more likely to make arrests in the last hour of their
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shift than the second to last hour of their shift, relative to the average arrest
rate in the sample.
Overall, the incident context controls are important predictors of
whether an incident results in an arrest. As noted above, these variables
collectively account for ⇡ 60   70% of the explainable variation in arrest
outcomes.
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A.3 Empirical Bayes Shrinkage Estimates
As outlined in the text, the estimates of permanent oﬃcer arrest
propensity are adjusted using Empirical Bayes techniques. Empirical Bayes
techniques are useful when a statistician observes a large number of diﬀerent
estimates of parameters that are drawn from the same underlying distribu-
tion, and each estimate is measured with error. These techniques are detailed
in work by [79], and are commonly employed in the economics of education
literature on teacher value added [e.g. 49, 66, 16, 62, 1]. A number of diﬀerent
variants of Empirical Bayes techniques have been used in the prior literature,
the estimation in this paper shares features with [49, 16, 1]. In robustness
checks in the paper, I show that the results do not change when a number of
alternate precision adjustments are used.
In this paper, I observe sample estimates of oﬃcer arrest propen-
sity, r¯i, which are derived from a first stage regression model. Each of these
estimates is an approximation of a “true” oﬃcer arrest propensity, ✓i, though
some oﬃcer estimates are derived from more observations and are thus more
precise than others. The underlying parameters, ✓i, can also be thought of
as random variables which are derived from a separate distribution of poten-
tial oﬃcer arrest propensities. Empirical Bayes techniques develop a “prior”
distribution for the underlying distribution of ✓i that is estimated empirically
from the data on all oﬃcers. The estimation constructs a weighted mean of
the observational estimate and the “prior.” The underlying distribution of ✓i
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is known to be centered at 0, given that oﬃcer arrest propensity is defined in
relative terms and the first stage model includes an intercept.
Each ✓i is assumed to be independent and identically distributed
across G total oﬃcers. The underlying distribution of each r¯i and the total
distribution of ✓i across i are given by:
r¯i|✓i ⇠ N(✓i,
 2",i
Ni
)
✓i|µ,  2A ⇠ N(0,  2A)
The mean of the distribution of ✓i is known to be 0 in this setting, given
the normalization of the fixed eﬀects in the model. Given a “prior” for the
distribution of ✓i, the posterior distribution of ✓i|r¯i give the adjusted estimates
of ✓ˆEBi used in this paper:
✓EBi |r¯i,  2",i,  2A ⇠ N(Br¯i, B
 2",i
Ni
)
where B =
 2A
 2A +
 2",i
Ni
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I derive estimates of oﬃcer arrest propensity, ✓ˆEBi , using the following steps:
1. Estimate the first stage of the model and calculate rˆikgt and r¯i. I include
all oﬃcer fixed eﬀects in the first stage regression to allow for arbitrary
correlations between responding oﬃcers and the other covariates in the
model to improve the estimation of the residuals. This procedure is
similar to the first stage approach used in [16].
Arrestikgt = ✓i + ✓j + ⇡Xkt +  gt +  g + "ikgt
rˆikgt = ✓ˆi + "ˆikgt
r¯i =
1
Ni
X
Ni
rˆikgt
2. Calculate individual variance estimates,  ˆ2",i and solve for a sample analog
of the prior variance of ✓i,  ˆ2A.
 ˆ2",i =
1
Ni   1
X
Ni
(rˆikgt   r¯i)2
 2A = E[r
2
ikgt]  E["2ikgt]
 ˆ2A =
1
N  G K
X
G
X
Ni
rˆ2ikgt  
1
N  G
X
G
Ni ˆ
2
",i
with N  G K are the degrees of freedom in the first stage regression,
given G oﬃcers and K regressors in the first stage model.1
1Given that I absorb four sets of fixed eﬀects in the model, ✓i, ✓j ,  gt, and  g, K contains
the number of group categories in the non-focal fixed eﬀects. In practice, the degrees of
freedom must also be adjusted for the number of omitted reference categories in the model,
or the number of "mobility groups", M . M is estimated to be 9 in this setting. The actual
degrees of freedom used is N  G K +M .
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3. Calculate the posterior estimates ✓ˆEBi by applying the shrinkage factor
Bˆ. The shrinkage factor is always less than 1 and is increasing in Ni and
decreasing in  2",i. This factor gives higher weight to police oﬃcer arrest
propensity estimates that are more precisely measured and shrinks less
precise estimates toward 0, the center of the distribution.
✓ˆEBi =
 ˆ2A
 ˆ2A +
 ˆ2",i
Ni
· r¯i
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The following figure displays the relationship between the unadjusted and
adjusted estimates of oﬃcer eﬀects and the number of observations per oﬃcer:
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Figure A.4: Adjusted and Unadjusted Oﬃcer Eﬀects
Figure shows unadjusted oﬃcer fixed eﬀects overlaid with the adjusted oﬃcer eﬀects estimates used in this
paper. The correlation between the adjusted and unadjusted estimates is 0.971.
198
A.4 Economic Model for Racial Bias Test
In this section, I outline a model used to test for the presence of
racial bias among oﬃcers. The model is adapted from the test of racial bias
in [6] to the setting of police calls for service, where the econometrician does
not directly observe oﬃcer eﬀort choices or suspect race.
Relative Ranking of Arrest Rates by Oﬃcer Race
There are two races for oﬃcers and suspects in the model, r 2
{M,W}. The model examines oﬃcer responses to incidents of a similar type,
with the same observable characteristics. When oﬃcers arrive to respond to an
incident they observe the suspect’s race but this information is not observed
by the econometrician.2 The likelihood that a call has a suspect of a given
race, rs, is  rs . Note that  M +  W  1 if some calls for service do not have
any relevant suspect, which may occur for accidents or incidents that do not
have a clear party that is at fault.
For each suspect race, rs, ⇡rs is the likelihood that an arrest is
feasible if an oﬃcer exerts eﬀort to respond. An arrest is feasible if there is a
minimum basis for an arrest. Feasibility is a function of the total amount of
2The data does include some information about suspects. The data includes records of
suspects identified by oﬃcers prior to 2017, as well as characteristics of suspects unknown
to oﬃcers at the conclusion of a response. However, suspect information is always recorded
by oﬃcers as part of a response to a call, so it is treated as an outcome of a response rather
than a given characteristic of an incident.
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evidence that is capable of being recovered for an incident, which may vary
according to suspect characteristics that may be correlated with suspect race.
Alternatively, the basis for an arrest could be higher if a suspect has a criminal
history that may be discovered during a response. Criminal history is a suspect
characteristic that may also be correlated with suspect race.
More severe oﬀenses will also have a higher basis for an arrest.
The regression application of this test will directly control for observable com-
ponents of the severity or arrest feasibility of incidents. However, there may
be unobservable characteristics of incidents that aﬀect arrest feasibility. If the
composition of unobservable characteristics is correlated with suspect race, ⇡rs
will also vary across suspect race.
When an oﬃcer responds to an incident, he observes information
related to the oﬀense that provides a signal of whether an arrest is feasible.
This information may include evidence immediately available at the scene, co-
operation of the victim, location of the incident, etc. The information at the
scene is summarized by an index s 2 [0, 1]. If an arrest is feasible, s is randomly
drawn from the distribution f rsa (s), while if the arrest is not feasible, s is ran-
domly drawn from the distribution f rsn (s). These distributions are allowed to
diﬀer across suspect race, rs, reflecting the fact that total information content
in responses may diﬀer for diﬀerent suspect races.
The distributions f rsa (s) and f rsn (s) have the following properties:
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• Both are defined over the full support of s 2 [0, 1]
• Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property: frsa (s)frsn (s) is strictly increasing in
s. This implies that a higher s means an arrest is more likely to be
feasible.
• Unbounded Likelihood Ratio: frsa (s)frsn (s) ! 1 as s ! 1. This implies
that very high signals ✓ provide nearly certain information that an
arrest is feasible.
• F rsa (s) first order stochastically dominates F rsn (s).
Oﬃcers make a discrete eﬀort choice E 2 {0, 1} after viewing the suspect
race and the signal, {rs, s}. If an oﬃcer chooses to exert eﬀort, the posterior
likelihood of arrest is increasing in s and is given by Bayes’ Rule:
P (A|rs, s) = ⇡
rsf rsa (s)
⇡rsf rsa (s) + (1  ⇡rs)f rsn (s)
Each oﬃcer will receive a benefit if an arrest is made that is normalized to
1 and faces a cost of eﬀort that varies by both suspect race and oﬃcer race,
t(rs, rp) 2 [0, 1]. If the oﬃcer chooses not to exert eﬀort, he receives a benefit
of zero. Each oﬃcer maximizes his utility as a choice between eﬀort and no
eﬀort:
max{P (A|rs, s)  t(rs, rp), 0}
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Oﬃcers will exert eﬀort in response to an incident when P (A|rs, s)   t(rs, rp).
As a result, it can be shown that oﬃcers will exert eﬀort on a suspect of
race, rs, if the value of s   s⇤(rs, rp), where the threshold s⇤(rs, rp) satisfies
P (A|rs, s⇤(rs, rp)) = t(rs, rp). This eﬀort threshold is monotonically increasing
in t(rs, rp).
In the setting of calls for service, both oﬃcer eﬀort choices and
suspect race are not observed in the data. Instead, the econometrician can
observe the number of arrestees of a given race adjusted by the total number
of incidents in the data, or “unconditional” arrestee race outcomes. Allow these
unconditional arrestee race outcomes to be denoted as the “arrest rate” for an
arrestee race group and oﬃcer race combination.
In terms of the model, the arrestee race outcome for arrestees of
race, rs, and oﬃcers of race, rp, is:
A(rs, rp) =  
rs⇡rs [1  F rsa (s⇤(rs, rp))]
This arrest rate is decreasing in the signal threshold s⇤(rs, rp) and is also
decreasing in the cost of eﬀort t(rs, rp).
The following definitions characterize oﬃcer race specific costs:
1. Racial Bias: Oﬃcers are racially biased with respect to suspects if
for some oﬃcer race, rp, t(M, rp) 6= t(W, rp).
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2. Monolithic Behavior: Oﬃcers are not monolithic in their behavior
if oﬃcer costs diﬀer across oﬃcer race for a given suspect race, or
t(rs,M) 6= t(rs,W ).
3. Statistical Discrimination: Assume t(M, rp) = t(W, rp), or oﬃcers
are not racially biased. Then race rp oﬃcers will exhibit statistical
discrimination if s⇤(M, rp) 6= s⇤(W, rp).
If oﬃcers are not racially biased and exhibit monolithic behavior across oﬃcer
race, then t(M,M) = t(M,W ) = t(W,W ) = t(W,M). It follows that arrest
rates within suspect race will be constant across oﬃcer race, but that total
arrest rates for diﬀerent suspect races may diﬀer if s⇤(M, rp) 6= s⇤(W, rp), or
there is statistical discrimination.
If oﬃcers do not exhibit monolithic behavior but are also not prej-
udiced, then the ranking of arrest rates across oﬃcer race within suspect race
will be independent of suspect race, or constant across suspect race.
For example, allow minority oﬃcers to have a higher cost of eﬀort
than White oﬃcers for any race of suspect. Then:
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t(M,M) > t(M,W ) & t(W,M) > t(W,W )
t(M,M) = t(W,M) & t(M,W ) = t(W,W )
s⇤(M,M) > s⇤(M,W )
& s⇤(W,M) > s⇤(W,W )
A(M,M) < A(M,W )
& A(W,M) < A(W,W )
Or in this case, minority oﬃcers will be less likely to make arrests than White
oﬃcers for both suspect races. In other words, the relative ranking of minority
and White oﬃcers is the same for both suspect groups. We can conclude that
if both races of oﬃcers are not biased, the relative ranking of arrest rates across
oﬃcer race should be the same for incidents within each suspect race.
Generally, the test proposed in this paper allows total arrest rates
to diﬀer across arrestee race by focusing attention on relative rankings of oﬃcer
arrest rates rather than total levels of oﬃcer arrest rates. This feature allows
oﬃcers to behave in a manner that is consistent with statistical discrimination
and isolates oﬃcer behavioral patterns associated with taste-based racial bias.
Statistical discrimination will occur in this model if total arrest rates for one
suspect group is higher than the other suspect group but the relative ranking
of oﬃcer arrest rates is the same for both suspect groups. For example, it
may be the case that minority suspects are more likely to have a criminal
204
history and this causes the total signal threshold to be lower for incidents with
minority suspects, s⇤(M, rp) < s⇤(W, rp). In the example above, this will occur
if both White and minority oﬃcers make more arrests of minority suspects
than White suspects, A(M,M) > A(W,M) and A(M,W ) > A(W,W ), but
White oﬃcers always arrest suspects at higher rates than minority oﬃcers,
A(M,W ) > A(M,M) and A(W,W ) > A(W,M).
If arrests are higher for White oﬃcers relative to minority oﬃcers
when responding to incidents with minority suspects, A(W,W ) < A(W,M),
and arrests are higher for minority oﬃcers relative to White oﬃcers when
responding to White suspects, A(M,M) < A(M,W ), we can conclude that
one or both oﬃcer race groups is biased. This opposing rank order violates
the null hypothesis of no racial bias among oﬃcers.
This is illustrated by the following stylized example:
t(M,M) > t(W,M) & t(W,W ) > t(M,W )
& t(W,W ) = t(M,M) & t(W,M) = t(M,W )
s⇤(M,M) > s⇤(M,W )
& s⇤(W,M) < s⇤(W,W )
A(M,M) < A(M,W )
& A(W,M) > A(W,W )
[6] show that the test will eﬀectively identify racial bias when [t(W,W )  
t(W,M)][t(M,W )  t(M,M)] < 0, or oﬃcers of diﬀerent races have opposing
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cost diﬀerences for diﬀerent suspect races. The test will fail to identify racial
bias when [t(W,W )   t(W,M)][t(M,W )   t(M,M)] > 0, or one oﬃcer race
group has higher costs for all suspect groups than the other oﬃcer race group.
The test also allows oﬃcers to have diﬀering total costs of eﬀort
that vary by oﬃcer race, or behave in a manner that is not monolithic. The first
half of this paper assesses whether individual oﬃcers behave diﬀerently from
one another in their responses to similar incidents, which can be interpreted
as evidence that individual oﬃcers are not monolithic in their behavior.
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A.5 Data Appendix
Several diﬀerent data files were used for this project. This Ap-
pendix summarizes the decisions made in cleaning and constructing the data
set used for this project.
Incident Data The base file used in this project is the DPD “Police Inci-
dents” file accessed through the Dallas Open Data portal. Data sets compiled
and released through this portal are updated daily, with each new data set
consisting of a moving time window of records. Because old records are re-
placed with new records in this interface, I have periodically downloaded new
versions of the data (on an approximate monthly basis), updating the existing
records with new downloads. Throughout this project, I use the most recently
updated record for each incident in the data when there are duplicate records
for the same incident across downloaded versions. I allow a grace period of
one month to pass before using an incident record, as records may be cor-
rected retrospectively. This procedure allows me to use the most complete
set of information for each observation and increase fidelity in comparisons of
incidents over time, as some records may be collected, modified, or updated
retrospectively. This data updating process is important because DPD releases
the records as they occur and some records may be incomplete or inaccurate.
The data in this project covers the time window of December 2014 through
mid-October 2017.
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The data includes all incidents that are reported to DPD by a re-
porting party or complainant, with the exception of sexually oriented oﬀenses,
oﬀenses involving juveniles, and social service referral oﬀenses. While the data
encompasses calls for service, it also includes other incidents reported by com-
plainants through other means, as well as some oﬃcer-initiated interactions. I
use information included in several of the data fields to narrow the set of ob-
servations to include only records that are both “highly likely” to correspond
to calls for service and are relatively complete.
First, I exclude observations that do not have information on the
time that a call was received or dispatched. Second, I exclude calls that do not
have a listed police division where the call occurred or have a missing address.
Third, I exclude incidents that were dispatched more than 2 hours
after a call was received. I am unable to distinguish between 9-1-1 calls and 3-
1-1 calls in the data. While 3-1-1 calls are placed for less serious incidents than
9-1-1 calls, they are connected to the same call-taker lines as emergency 9-1-1
calls and follow the same protocols for response if a response is warranted.
Because I only consider calls that received a response and were dispatched
within 2 hours that the call was received, the observations are weighted toward
9-1-1 calls. Additionally, by including a control for the urgency of a call in the
estimation model I am able to generally distinguish between these two types
of calls in the model.
Fourth, I exclude any incident that does not include a complainant
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record, or that has a complainant listed as the City of Dallas, the Dallas Police
Department, or another police department or sheriﬀ, as these calls are unlikely
to involve a civilian complainant. Next, through conversations with oﬃcers
and dispatchers at DPD, I identify a set of dispatch codes that were unlikely to
originate with a call from a complainant. These include calls where an oﬃcer
is not the first responder but is called to join another oﬃcer on an existing
call, such as assisting another oﬃcer that needs help or is injured, assisting in
a chase or foot pursuit, assisting an oﬀ-duty oﬃcer, providing warrant service
for an individual interacting with police, and responding to a fire or aiding a
fire department response at their request. Further, I do not include calls to
respond to a suspect operating a car that was planted or is being monitored
by DPD (“bait” car or ETS activation responses). I also exclude calls that
originate with complainants walking into a police station to alert police about
an incident as well as 9-1-1 hang-up calls. Lastly, I exclude calls where an
oﬃcer may have discovered an incident or complainant during patrol that
was unlikely to be called in and dispatched to a larger set of oﬃcers. These
dispatched call types are routine investigations, traﬃc stops, and public park
checks.
To clean the data, I conduct the following steps. I calculate the
diﬀerence between the time a call is made and the time that the call is dis-
patched in minutes to form a call severity or call urgency variable, using time
stamps in the data. In a very small number cases where there are negative
time diﬀerences, I assume that these time stamps were mistakenly swapped
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and take the absolute value of the diﬀerence. I follow a similar procedure to
calculate the time of an oﬃcer response after dispatch, but replace negative
values as zeros in this case. While there are codes for shifts or “watches” in the
data, these often do not align with the general time slots for shifts. I construct
a more strict and usable definition of shifts to eliminate shift overlap; these
shifts are 12am-8am, 8am-4pm, and 4pm-12am. Next, I combine the remain-
ing 116 dispatch codes into 15 groupings, to increase power and remove very
small categories. Similarly, I combine the 34 location type codes in the data
into 11 groupings.
Throughout the analysis, I use dispatch codes as incident controls
rather than oﬀense types, because dispatch codes are available to oﬃcers before
they respond to incidents while incident oﬀense types are designated by patrol
oﬃcers after they arrive at the scene of an incident, and therefore are a choice
variable.
Persons Involved and Arrest Data I use three additional DPD open data
files to supplement information on arrests and complainants in the main “Police
Incidents” file: “Police Arrests”, “Police Arrest Charges”, and “Police Person”.
These files oﬀer diﬀerent coverage of arrests than the “Police Incidents.”, and
I use the diﬀerences across the files to create a comprehensive measure of
arrests. These files contain more detailed records of arrestees, including the
time and place of arrest, arrestee name and demographics, and arrest charge.
The “Police Person” data includes names and demographic information for
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arrestees as well as suspects and complainants associated with incidents (but is
only available through 2017). The “Police Incident” data includes demographic
information for complainants and badge identifiers and names for oﬃcers. The
data contains identifiers that allow records to be merged across files.
The main outcome in this paper is whether any arrest occurred in
association with a particular incident. I consider an arrest to have occurred
if there is a record of an arrest in the “Police Incidents” file or any of the
three supplementary arrests files. Because the supplementary arrest files are
typically compiled after the incident file and include more detailed information
about arrestees, I consider an arrest as being verified if there is a record of the
arrest in any of the supplementary files.
I use complainant records in the “Police Person” to supplement
the complainant records in the main incident file, and use these combined
records to exclude records that do not have a civilian complainant. When
there are multiple complainants, arrestees or suspects, associated with a call,
demographic characteristics are measured as the maximum of these variables
across the relevant group. For example, the indicator for a Black complainant
is set to 1 if any of the complainants associated with the call are Black. I
calculate whether there was a victim injury in a similar way, using information
on complainants from both the “Police Person” and incident files.
I determine whether an arrest was for a felony or misdemeanor
oﬀense using arrest charge and oﬀense severity codes in both the “Incident”
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and “Police Arrest Charges” file. Incidents may have both a felony and misde-
meanor arrest if a suspect was arrested for multiple oﬀenses or there is more
than one arrestee associated with an incident.
Oﬃcer Demographics Data Lastly, I complement the open data files
available from DPD with oﬃcer information obtained through a Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) request to the city of Dallas. Through this FOIA re-
quest, I acquired records of all police department employees from 2014 to the
present that include oﬃcer names, badge number, job title, hire date, leave
date (if applicable), ethnicity or race, gender, age, and salary. I match the
FOIA request records to the incident file using oﬃcer badge numbers, and
match oﬃcers by name if badge numbers are not available.
Because the FOIA request file includes employee title and badge
number, I also use this information to exclude observations with responding
oﬃcers that are civilian police employees, as these incidents likely involved
only a phone response and did not entail a physical patrol oﬃcer response to
the scene. I also exclude observations for individuals that are not employed
by DPD (e.g. county police, firefighters, volunteer police oﬃcers).
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Appendix B
Appendix:
Safety in Police Numbers:
Evidence of Police Eﬀectiveness from COPS
Grant Applications
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B.1 Appendix Tables and Figures
Table B.1: Impact of Police on Crime, Influence of Model Type and Covariates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS
Police 0.752*** 0.542*** 0.265*** 0.263*** 6.405*** 5.933*** 2.205*** 2.173***
(0.065) (0.060) (0.048) (0.048) (0.446) (0.467) (0.403) (0.405)
Elasticity 0.508 0.366 0.179 0.178 0.474 0.439 0.163 0.161
First)Stage:)Police)Rate
Accept<Hiring 1.586*** 1.199*** 0.636*** 0.648*** 1.56*** 1.19*** 0.646*** 0.658***
(0.269) (0.247) (0.072) (0.073) (0.27) (0.248) (0.072) (0.073)
F<Test:<Accept<Hiring 34.88 23.64 77.84 79.63 33.48 23.07 80.32 82.23
%<Effect:<Accept<Hiring 6.74% 5.10% 2.70% 2.75% 6.63% 5.06% 2.74% 2.80%
Reduced)Form
Accept<Hiring 17.88*** 14.92*** F1.428** F1.227** 78.68*** 62.91*** F7.433** F6.52**
(0.946) (0.951) (0.456) (0.461) (5.01) (4.997) (2.308) (2.331)
%<Effect:<Accept<Hiring 51.4% 40.8% F4.10% F3.53% 24.7% 19.8% F2.34% F2.05%
IV
Police 11.27*** 12.438*** F2.244** F1.892* 50.45*** 52.86*** F11.5** F9.904**
(1.801) (2.572) (0.768) (0.75) (8.175) (10.8) (3.92) (3.808)
Elasticity 7.62 8.41 F1.517 F1.280 3.732 3.911 F0.851 F0.733
Year<FE X X X X X X
Year<X<City<Size<FE X X
Covariates X X X X X X
Police<Department<FE X X X X
Police<Rate<Mean 23.53 23.53 23.53 23.53 23.54 23.54 23.54 23.54
Crime<Rate<Mean 34.8 34.8 34.8 34.8 318.1 318.1 318.1 318.1
Observations 93,081 93,081 93,081 93,081 93,296 93,296 93,296 93,296
Number<of<Departments 6,966 6,966 6,966 6,966 6,964 6,964 6,964 6,964
Violent<Crime Property<Crime
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
Standard errors in each model are robust and clustered at the police department level in models with police
department fixed eﬀects. Crime outcomes and police variables are per 10,000 residents in a municipality.
Each specification successively controls for more variables. Demographic variables include population, age
distribution, racial distribution, proportion male, unemployment rate and average pay. All models control
for hiring application and applications and acceptances of other COPS grants. The preferred specification
throughout the paper corresponds to (4) and (8).
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Table B.2: Impact of Police on Index I Arrests, By Demographic Group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Total White Black6 Male6 Age60;15 Age615;24 Age625;39
Murder ;0.024 ;0.016 ;0.007 ;0.021 0.000 0.006 ;0.025+
(0.026) (0.017) (0.017) (0.024) (0.003) (0.016) (0.014)
Elasticity ;1.973 ;2.664 ;1.359 ;2.048 0.0724 1.130 ;6.160
Y6Mean 0.280 0.143 0.128 0.243 0.00358 0.126 0.0964
Rape 0.033 0.019 ;0.004 0.027 0.012 0.030 ;0.024
(0.044) (0.032) (0.023) (0.043) (0.011) (0.025) (0.020)
Elasticity 0.955 0.753 ;0.405 0.782 5.577 1.965 ;2.138
Y6Mean 0.813 0.575 0.209 0.800 0.0493 0.351 0.259
Robbery 0.026 ;0.004 0.025 0.016 0.002 0.076 ;0.032
(0.085) (0.048) (0.063) (0.077) (0.014) (0.064) (0.036)
Elasticity 0.240 ;0.0780 0.475 0.174 0.576 1.253 ;1.064
Y6Mean 2.477 1.179 1.242 2.191 0.100 1.407 0.706
Assault ;0.161 ;0.060 ;0.119 ;0.188 ;0.072+ ;0.128 ;0.009
(0.346) (0.242) (0.183) (0.274) (0.043) (0.148) (0.153)
Elasticity ;0.265 ;0.143 ;0.697 ;0.388 ;2.720 ;0.607 ;0.0422
Y6Mean 14.18 9.702 3.990 11.28 0.621 4.903 5.118
Observations 81,605 81,605 81,605 81,605 81,605 81,605 81,605
Burglary 0.197 0.201 0.041 0.058 ;0.055 0.076 0.056
(0.237) (0.194) (0.110) (0.208) (0.082) (0.153) (0.088)
Elasticity 0.447 0.633 0.376 0.152 ;1.209 0.330 0.492
Y6Mean 10.27 7.425 2.538 8.916 1.058 5.377 2.640
Larceny 3.215 0.761 ;0.585 0.725 ;0.519** 3.777 ;0.001
(3.018) (0.810) (0.366) (1.534) (0.178) (2.894) (0.389)
Elasticity 1.501 0.490 ;1.221 0.561 ;2.894 3.900 ;0.00144
Y6Mean 49.96 36.22 11.18 30.12 4.183 22.58 14.17
Vehicle 2.631 ;0.075 ;0.106* 1.190 2.803 ;0.136* ;0.046
(2.841) (0.083) (0.052) (1.421) (2.841) (0.068) (0.044)
Elasticity 15.98 ;0.797 ;3.613 9.736 61.30 ;2.047 ;1.233
Y6Mean 3.838 2.197 0.681 2.851 1.066 1.551 0.873
Observations 81,786 81,786 81,786 81,786 81,786 81,786 81,786
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
Standard errors in each model are robust and clustered at the police department level. Crime outcomes,
arrest outcomes and police variables are per 10,000 residents in a municipality. Arrest rates in each column
are total arrests for a given demographic group per 10,000 total residents in a municipality. All models
shown have the preferred set of covariates, including demographic covariates, application and acceptance
controls for other grants, year by city size fixed eﬀects and police department fixed eﬀects. Demographic
variables include population, age distribution, racial distribution, proportion male, unemployment rate and
average pay. All models control for hiring application and applications and acceptances of other COPS
grants. Arrest outcomes are not expressed relative to reported crime rates but as total arrests per 100,000
residents. The sample size is diﬀerent for each arrest type, given the sample cleaning procedure (see Data
Appendix C.2).
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Table B.3: Impact of Police on Other Arrests, By Demographic Group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Total White Black6 Male6 Age60;15 Age615;24 Age625;39
Marijuana(Sale 0.623** 0.374* 0.234** 0.546** ;0.004 0.387** 0.216***
(0.198) (0.159) (0.076) (0.173) (0.017) (0.138) (0.062)
Elasticity 3.815 2.845 0.880 3.286 0.0942 2.460 0.917
Y6Mean 3.806 3.066 6.199 3.878 ;1.058 3.671 5.497
Marijuana(Possess 2.249* 1.948* 0.471 2.014** 0.019 1.141* 0.682*
(0.943) (0.824) (0.324) (0.771) (0.050) (0.533) (0.336)
Elasticity 1.665 1.899 1.822 1.766 0.591 1.403 1.891
Y6Mean 31.50 23.92 6.026 26.60 0.757 18.98 8.417
Narcotics(Sale ;0.431* ;0.107 ;0.358** ;0.334* ;0.009 ;0.238** ;0.113
(0.192) (0.099) (0.130) (0.153) (0.007) (0.087) (0.082)
Elasticity ;3.984 ;2.231 ;6.077 ;3.765 ;10.68 ;5.563 ;2.584
Y6Mean 2.526 1.114 1.373 2.070 0.0194 0.999 1.022
Narcotics(Possess ;1.302*** ;0.447+ ;0.858*** ;1.050*** ;0.020* ;0.668*** ;0.461**
(0.384) (0.256) (0.206) (0.300) (0.009) (0.158) (0.171)
Elasticity ;4.240 ;2.205 ;8.600 ;4.451 ;13.56 ;6.695 ;3.575
Y6Mean 7.163 4.733 2.326 5.500 0.0340 2.327 3.008
Observations 81,423 81,423 81,423 81,423 81,423 81,423 81,423
Simple(Assault ;0.151 ;0.315 0.012 ;0.364 ;0.484** ;0.102 0.116
(0.864) (0.619) (0.443) (0.652) (0.170) (0.355) (0.345)
Elasticity ;0.0700 ;0.202 0.0223 ;0.228 ;3.504 ;0.134 0.147
Y6Mean 50.37 36.24 12.38 37.18 3.221 17.76 18.43
DUI 3.371* 3.055* 0.600+ 2.838** ;0.000 0.766+ 1.291*
(1.311) (1.187) (0.320) (1.058) (0.007) (0.398) (0.597)
Elasticity 1.217 1.286 2.600 1.275 ;0.369 1.067 1.147
Y6Mean 64.55 55.36 5.378 51.86 0.0232 16.73 26.25
Observations 82,438 82,438 82,438 82,438 82,438 82,438 82,438
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
Standard errors in each model are robust and clustered at the police department level. Crime outcomes,
arrest outcomes and police variables are per 10,000 residents in a municipality. Arrest rates in each column
are total arrests for a given demographic group per 10,000 total residents in a municipality. All models
shown have the preferred set of covariates, including demographic covariates, application and acceptance
controls for other grants, year by city size fixed eﬀects and police department fixed eﬀects. Demographic
variables include population, age distribution, racial distribution, proportion male, unemployment rate and
average pay. All models control for hiring application and applications and acceptances of other COPS
grants. Arrest outcomes are not expressed relative to reported crime rates but as total arrests per 100,000
residents. The sample size is diﬀerent for each arrest type, given the sample cleaning procedure (see Data
Appendix C.2).
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B.2 Data Appendix
Grant Data I obtained data on all accepted and rejected grant applications sub-
mitted to the COPS Oﬃce between 1994-2014 through a Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) request. Both accepted and rejected grant files included information on the
agency address, grant program, proposed project start date, and project end date.
The accepted grant file additionally included the amount of money awarded, and the
number of oﬃcers funded by the grant, although this information was not always
complete. The 54 grant programs administered in this period were consolidated
into groups based on grant purpose: police hiring grants and other grants. Multiple
grant acceptances and applications were taken consolidated within police depart-
ment, year, and grant category cells. If a department had any acceptance within a
department-year-category, the observation was coded as an acceptance within that
category.
Because police employment data is recorded as a snapshot statistic on
October 31st of each year, the start dates of each grant were adjusted such that
grants beginning in November and December were Indexed to begin in the following
year. Within each grant program, the project length of grants was determined by
taking the modal project time across accepted grants. Next, to improve the merge
between COPS data and the crime data in this project, I manually inspected over
500 grant observations that did not merge to the administrative crime data and
corrected ORI police department ids whenever possible.
The COPS grant database includes 3 categories of application status
for the municipal police departments in the analysis sample: approved, rejected,
and withdrawn. The withdrawn category represents grants that were stopped after
being approved and were included within the accepted grant data file compiled in the
FOIA request. Approximately 15% of all accepted grants were withdrawn between
1994-2014. I treat withdrawn grants as accepted grants in the analysis, though the
results are not sensitive to this designation (see Table 2.6).
Crime, Police and Arrest Data The UCR micro data includes information
on a number of diﬀerent police department types, including state police, county
police, campus police and tribal police. In this project, analysis is restricted to
municipal police agencies in order to best link the crime data to geographically
based demographic data, using information on police department type from the
2005 UCR Crosswalk file. Agencies were included if their government type was
classified as "township" or "municipal," or if their agency type was classified as
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"municipal police." In geographic units (Census Places) with no municipal police
agencies, "sheriﬀs" were included as municipal police districts. A number of districts
were recoded where errors were found, either because of mismatches in codes to the
UCR micro data or because of multiple municipal agencies attributed to the same
Census Place.
As discussed in the Data Section above, the UCR Oﬀenses Known and
Clearances by Arrest contains crime and clearance data is voluntarily submitted by
police agencies and is not formally audited. This data has several gaps and likely
contains a large number of reporting errors. As a first step in cleaning the data, I
identified values that may have been entered to signify missing data even though
these values were not specified in the codebooks (e.g. high frequency occurrences of
999, 9999 etc.) and replaced negative reported crime and crime clearance values as
missing. Next, I replaced agency year observations as missing if all reported crimes
in that year were zero and the agency had high average levels of crime over time,
or the average non-zero crime level for the agency was above the median (over all
agencies) of agency average crime levels (averaged across years) in any of the 7 violent
and property crime categories. Lastly, I marked observations as missing that had a
greater number of cleared crimes than prior unsolved crimes for a given agency or
that had cleared crimes that were more than ten times the number of reported crimes
reported in a category in a given year. After this data was merged to the other data
sets used in this paper, an algorithm was used to identify additional outliers and
mark these outliers as missing as well (see below for a description). All observations
with missing values were omitted from the final analysis sample used in the paper.
The policing data was drawn from the UCR Law Enforcement Oﬃcers
Killed and Assaulted (LEOKA) database, which includes records of the number of
sworn police and civilians employed by police agencies in each year. Before merging
this data with the other data sets, police agencies that recorded having zero police
oﬃcers were coded as missing, as this case is not possible for an agency that is
reporting data.
Arrest data was drawn from the UCR Arrest Files. The arrest data is
diﬃcult to clean because agencies do not commonly report arrest categories for which
they did not arrest any individuals. This makes it tricky to discern whether a missing
value is a true zero or is actually missing. To deal with this, I organized commonly
reported crimes into groupings, and made the assumption that if an agency reported
one type of a crime within a crime group and not others within the same group,
the missing categories were likely zero. The crime groupings used were the 7 Index
violent and property crimes (group 1), common drug crimes (sale and possession of
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marijuana, narcotics and other drugs) (group 2), as well as simple assaults and driv-
ing under the influence of alcohol or DUIs (group 3). Group 1 includes zeros rather
than missing values when any of the categories within group 1 or other groups are
positive and non-missing. Groups 2 and 3 include zeros when one of their subcate-
gories is positive and non-missing or there is a positive and non-missing category in
group 1. Lastly, the arrest data includes counts of arrests by gender, race and age
group. Zero values for these group counts were imputed to match the total arrest
categories for each recorded crime.
Demographic Data Demographic data used to create covariate controls in this
paper was derived from the Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
The geographic unit of analysis in this paper is the Census FIPS Place level, which
corresponds to the geographic borders of towns, municipalities, and cities. Popula-
tion counts are available at the Place level in each year from the Census, but all other
demographic information is only available at the county level. Counties may contain
Places or overlap with them, so a Census data set that includes population counts of
individuals in each county within a Place was used to create weighted averages of de-
mographic variables at the county level. The demographic variables included in the
Census county files are race, age and gender. Similarly, BLS data on unemployment
rates and income levels at the county level were used to construct county weighted
measures of these variables at the Census Place level. In some cases, population
and other demographic data at the county level was missing in some county-years.
This data was interpolated as the average of adjacent years when an observation was
missing but data was available for the prior and following years.
Omitting Outliers Authors of academic papers that use the UCR crime and
police data have used a number of diﬀerent procedures to identify outliers and clean
the data to exclude outliers. The algorithm used in this paper is based oﬀ of the
procedure used in [34]. Though only the years 2000-2014 are used for the main
analyses in this paper, I cleaned and merged data from 1990 to 2014 for analysis
(the longer sample is used as a robustness check). For each police department in the
sample with at least 10 years of observations, I ran a separate regression of violent
crime, property crime, police oﬃcers, violent arrests, property arrests, drug arrests
and other arrests (where each outcome is a sum of crimes within a category) on a
quartic time trend. The fitted values were then used to identify outliers. In [34],
the authors visually inspect each observation where the diﬀerence in the observed
outcome and the predicted outcome is more than 50% and then correct the data
where they can. However, in [34], the authors also restrict their sample to cities with
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over 10,000 residents using the rationale that they may have fewer reporting errors.
This paper includes all towns with populations over 1,000 residents, and because
of this larger sample, identified outliers are not visually inspected or replaced with
imputed values. Instead, each identified outlier is replaced as missing and is omitted
from the final analysis sample.
Because reported crime values are noisier in smaller towns, the 50%
threshold for diﬀerences between predicted and actual values is too strict for the
smaller towns in the sample. To address this feature of the data, the threshold
of exclusion is set to be the maximum of the 99th percentile of percent diﬀerence
between observed and predicted values of all observations in a population group, or
the 50 percent diﬀerence. Population groups are defined as 1,000 to 1,999 residents,
2,000 to 4,999 residents, 5,000 to 9,999 residents, 10,000 to 24,999 residents, 25,000
to 49,999 residents, 50,000 to 99,999 residents and 100,000 residents or more. Cities
are grouped by using the modal population category of a city across years in the
sample. Once the outlier values have been identified and replaced as missing for
the violent and property sum crime outcomes, subcategories within each group are
marked as missing if the total is missing. This procedure creates a diﬀerent sample
size for violent and property crime outcomes and groupings of arrest outcomes.
Over 10% of the analysis sample was identified as outliers for districts with 1,000
to 1,999 residents, while this proportion was approximately 1% for districts with
greater than 100,000 residents. This methodology reduces the analysis sample size
by approximately 7%.
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Appendix C
Appendix:
Patrolling Public Schools:
The Impact of Funding for School Police on
Student Discipline and Long-term Education
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Outcomes
C.1 Appendix Tables and Figures
Figure C.1: Depiction of Model Identification, Comparison of Two Hypothet-
ical Districts
District'A'
Year' 1999' 2002'2000' 2001' 2003' 2004' 2005' 2006' 2007' 2008' 2009' 2010' 2011' 2012' 2013'
District'B'
Apply:'3;year'grant'
Accept:'3;year'grant'
Apply:'3;year'grant' Apply:''2;year'grant'
Accept:''
2;year'grant'
Apply:'3;year'grant'
Accept:'3;year'grant'
Apply:'3;year'grant'
Β1m,1h%:%This'is'the'condiBonal'acceptance'coeﬃcient'of'interest.'It'compares'“Accept”'years'to'“No'Apply”'years.'For'
example,'this'coeﬃcient'measures'the'diﬀerence'in'outcomes'between'2001'and'2002'within'District'A'or'1999'and'
2000'within'District'B.'
'
Β2m,2h%:%This'is'the'applicaBon'control.'It'nets'out'the'eﬀect'of'district'applicaBon'choices'on'outcomes.'Compares'
“Apply”'years'to'“No'Apply”'years.'This'coeﬃcient'also'descripBvely'shows'how'outcomes'change'when'districts'are'
rejected'for'grants.'For'example,'diﬀerence'in'outcomes'between'2003'and'2004'within'District'A'or'2009'and'2010'
within'District'B.'
'
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Figure C.2: Discipline Grant Treatment Eﬀects, by Grade
This figure shows the impact of grant variables split by student grade level. Both figures show coeﬃcients
from the same regression, which corresponds to the fully specified model with student covariates, student
grade enrollment, and fixed eﬀects for grade, year, and school district. Bars around estimates represent the
95% confidence interval, corresponding to standard errors that are clustered at the school district level.
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Table C.1: Grant Eﬀects on School District Budget Data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Security/
Expense
Security/Expense/
per/Student
Security/
Expense/Ratio
Have/a/
Security/Fund
Accept =182,478 =0.71 0.0001 0.013**
(362,092) (2.29) (0.00008) (0.004)
Apply/ 378,159+ 2.50+ =0.00001 =0.007
(199,546) (1.35) (0.00006) (0.004)
Observations 13,498,605 13,497,676 13,498,367 13,498,605
Y/Mean 2,679,000 53.0 0.002 0.953
X/Mean 0.288 0.288 0.288 0.288
%/Effect/of/Conditional/
Grant/Receipt =6.8% =1.3% 5.3% 1.4%
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1. Robust standard errors clustered at the school district level
are shown in parentheses. The suggestive "first stage" regressions above measure budget outcomes at the
district-year level for the student-level data sample used in the primary analysis. To make the models
comparable to the primary results, the covariates and specification is the same as the preferred specification
in the short-term model, with controls for student-district-grade enrollment, student race, gender, economic
disadvantage status, special education status, LEP status, and gifted and talented status. Models also
include grade and year fixed eﬀects.
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Figure C.3: Middle School: Timing of Grant Acceptance and Application
Treatment Eﬀects on Student Discipline,
Graphs are produced in a comparable procedure to Figure 3.2. Each of the graphs shows separate coeﬃcient
estimates from the same regression. Bars surrounding coeﬃcients represent a 95% confidence interval for
each estimate with standard errors clustered at the school district level and the year preceding treatment
omitted. Because a school district may receive multiple grants within a sample period, these graphs are
created by duplicating the data for each possible treatment year and stacking these data sets to form a
"pseudo panel." In each year panel, the designated treatment year is considered over time, and treatments
in adjacent years are included as model controls. Due to computational constraints given the size of my data
set, these graphs were produced using data collapsed to the school district-grade-year level and weighted
by the number of students within these cells. The regressions correspond to the fully specified model, that
includes student demographic covariates, student enrollment in a district-grade-year cell, and fixed eﬀects
for grade, year, and school district. I include treatments in 2000-2013, so that each centered treatment year
has at least one year of observed pre-treatment data.
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Figure C.4: High School: Timing of Grant Acceptance and Application Treat-
ment Eﬀects on Student Discipline,
Graphs are produced in a comparable procedure to Figure 3.2. Each of the graphs shows separate coeﬃcient
estimates from the same regression. Bars surrounding coeﬃcients represent a 95% confidence interval for
each estimate with standard errors clustered at the school district level and the year preceding treatment
omitted. Because a school district may receive multiple grants within a sample period, these graphs are
created by duplicating the data for each possible treatment year and stacking these data sets to form a
"pseudo panel." In each year panel, the designated treatment year is considered over time, and treatments
in adjacent years are included as model controls. Due to computational constraints given the size of my data
set, these graphs were produced using data collapsed to the school district-grade-year level and weighted
by the number of students within these cells. The regressions correspond to the fully specified model, that
includes student demographic covariates, student enrollment in a district-grade-year cell, and fixed eﬀects
for grade, year, and school district. I include treatments in 2000-2013, so that each centered treatment year
has at least one year of observed pre-treatment data.
230
Table C.4: Table 3.6 with Main Eﬀects: Short-term Student Discipline Out-
comes, by Demographic Group
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Disciplinary1
Action
Suspension1
(In9School)
Suspension1111111
(Out9of9School) Expulsion
Middle&School&+&Accept&Effects
Economic&Disadvantage
Black 90.001 90.006 90.002 90.0013
(0.009) (0.014) (0.009) (0.0009)
Hispanic 90.006 90.009 90.004 90.0005
(0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.0006)
White 0.013* 0.005 0.016*** 90.0003
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.0005)
Other1Race 0.031** 0.026* 0.018** 0.0003
(0.011) (0.011) (0.006) (0.0006)
No&Economic&Disadvantage
Black 0.031*** 0.024** 0.018** 90.0001
(0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.0006)
Hispanic 0.022*** 0.014* 0.016** 0.0006+
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.0003)
White 0.017*** 0.011* 0.011*** 0.0002
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.0002)
Other1Race 0.024*** 0.017* 0.014*** 0.0003
(0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.0004)
High&School&+&Accept&Effects
Economic&Disadvantage
Black 90.017** 90.021** 90.016** 90.0017**
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.0006)
Hispanic 90.017** 90.018** 90.003 90.0008
(0.006) (0.007) (0.004) (0.0005)
White 0.0002 90.002 0.004 90.0008+
(0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.0005)
Other1Race 0.011 0.005 0.012+ 90.0009
(0.010) (0.010) (0.006) (0.0006)
No&Economic&Disadvantage
Black 90.002 90.007 90.0001 90.0008*
(0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.0004)
Hispanic 0.004 90.0001 0.003 90.0012***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.004) (0.0004)
White 0.002 90.003 0.001 90.0008***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.0002)
Other1Race 90.001 90.005 0.003 90.0004
(0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.0004)
Main&Effects
Economic&Disadvantage
Black 0.269*** 0.220*** 0.151*** 0.0048***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.0004)
Hispanic 0.184*** 0.1568*** 0.075*** 0.0030***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.0004)
White 0.168*** 0.1426*** 0.067*** 0.0029***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.0003)
Other1Race 0.039*** 0.0327*** 0.014*** 0.0009*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.0004)
No&Economic&Disadvantage
Black 0.159*** 0.1362*** 0.077*** 0.0017***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.0002)
Hispanic 0.1118*** 0.0952*** 0.044*** 0.0015***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.0002)
White 0.046*** 0.0369*** 0.022*** 0.0005*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.0002)
Student9Year1Observations 13,596,577 13,596,577 13,596,577 13,596,577
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1. Robust standard errors clustered at the school district level
are shown in parentheses. This table is equivalent to Table 3.6, but shows additional estimated coeﬃcients
for demographic controls in the model, or main eﬀects.
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C.2 Data Appendix
Grant Data The grant data for this project was obtained through a FOIA request
to the COPS oﬃce at the DOJ. The original FOIA request contained information
on all accepted and rejected federal COPS grants between 1993-2015. In addition
to grants for school police, the total set of grants oﬀered through the COPS of-
fice includes hiring grants for traditional police departments, police technology and
equipment grants, and other grants for community partnerships or targeted crime
initiatives. Both the accepted and rejected grant records included information on
the organization applying for a grant, the grant program type, and the project start
and end dates. The accepted grant records also included information on the number
of oﬃcers eligible for funding for hiring grants and the total award size, though this
information was often incomplete.
As a first step to cleaning this data, I identified grants for school police in
Texas from the total grant files. I did this by extracting grants administered specifi-
cally for schools, including COPS in Schools (CIS) hiring grants, Secure our Schools
(SOS) security technology grants, and School-based Partnership grants (SBP). Ad-
ditionally, I extracted grants that independent school district police departments
applied for, regardless of their COPS grant program type.
To match the grant start dates to the school calendar, I coded start
years to correspond to the current school year if the grant project start date was
between September and February, and linked grant projects with start dates between
March and August to the following school year (the last third of the school year and
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the summer). This strategy assumes that grants received in the last third of the
school year and the summer will be utilized in the next year. I next standardized
the duration of grants within particular program types, by applying the modal grant
project length for a particular grant program for all grants within that program.
Grants that last more than one year are coded to correspond to their grant duration
for analysis. For example, CIS grants last for 3 years, so if an accepted CIS grant
starts in 2000, the variables Acceptdt and Applydt are coded as 1 for 2000-2002. If a
CIS grant was rejected but would have begun in 2000, the variable Applydt is coded
as 1 from 2000-2002.
Because school districts do not directly apply for COPS funding, the
COPS grant records were manually linked to the appropriate school district or group
of school districts. When grants involved independent school district police depart-
ments, these links were unique. In cases where the entity applying for a grant was
a municipal police department or another organization, web sources and maps were
used to match school districts to these grant applying entities. Once a mapping
was identified, I collapsed grants to district-years, allowing some school districts to
have multiple types of grants or grant rejections and acceptances in the same year
(if covered by multiple applying organizations). In all analyses, any acceptance in
a given year is coded as an acceptance, even if the school district also was covered
by a grant application that was rejected in that year. At the same time, if a grant
covers multiple districts in a year, all districts are equivalently coded as acceptances
or rejections, depending on the outcome of the grant application. Grant tabulations
show in the body of the paper represent "new-school district-grant years," rather
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than actual distinct grants distributed to law enforcement agencies.
Student Data The Texas student data used in this project comes from the Texas
Education Research Center (ERC), which joins records on primary, secondary school-
ing from the Texas Education Agency (TEA), post-secondary schooling records from
the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board (THECB), and employment data
from unemployment insurance records collected by the Texas Workforce Commission
(TWC). For college attendance and graduation outcomes, THECB data covers all
public and private post-secondary institutions in Texas but not schools outside of
the state. Likewise, employment and earnings records provided by the TWC only
cover employment within the state. Student records can be linked across these data
sets using unique id numbers created by the ERC.
I created a longitudinal student data set by constructing cohorts of 7th
graders that first enrolled in 7th grade in 1999-2006. Throughout the analysis, I
assign students to school districts based on their enrollment in the 7th grade. These
school district assignments are used to create the district fixed eﬀects as well as to link
grant records to students. This design renders the output in the paper as "intent-to-
treat" estimates, given that students can change schools and school districts in later
years. Separately, I measure student transfers to new schools and new school districts
as outcomes to see how student enrollment responds to funding for school police in
the original student district that corresponds to 7th grade enrollment. Likewise,
failure to enroll in any Texas school district is also included as outcomes.
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Time-invariant student demographic characteristics are determined us-
ing the modal classification for a particular variable over time, to correct for potential
errors. For example, a student may be coded as diﬀerent races in diﬀerent years,
so the modal classification for each student is used. Multi-race students are not
consistently coded across years and districts, so these subgroups are not considered.
Instead, multi-racial students are categorized as Black if they are multi-race and
Black, then Hispanic, and then other race, prioritizing non-White background in the
increasing order of the size of these groups in the sample (other than Asian and other
race students who are considered last because they are not distinctly grouped in the
analysis). Economic disadvantage, special education, gifted and talented, and LEP
status are also assigned the modal value for each student over the panel, though
changing values in these characteristics is not common. I exclude student age be-
cause grade repeats are included as an outcome and may be impacted by funding for
school police, rendering age within a grade level a potentially endogenous regressor.
The number of students in a grade-district-year is also included as a control that
varies over time within districts.
For short-term discipline outcomes in this study, students are tracked
through the 12th grade through 2013, in panels that allow students to repeat up
to two grades. Because the analysis allows students to repeat grades, 2011 is the
last "on-time" 12th grade year in the sample. High school graduation and college
enrollment outcomes are measured within 2 years after an "on time" 12th grade
graduation, for all cohorts in the study. College graduation (from both 2 and 4
year schools) are measured within 6 years after an "on time" 12th grade graduation,
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or when the typical student is 24 years old. Likewise, employment outcomes are
measured during the 6th year after an "on time" high school graduation. Due to
limitations in the years of data available, college graduation and employment are
measured for the cohorts that enroll in the 7th grade between 1999-2001. The high
school graduation variable is constructed to equal 1 if a student graduates from any
public Texas high school in the state, regardless of where the student was enrolled in
the 7th grade. Similarly, college enrollment and graduation variables are measured
as any enrollment or graduation from any post-secondary institution in Texas.
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